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INTRODUCTION
On December 28, 1977, amidst much fanfare, Illinois Governor James R.
Thompson signed into law Public Act 80-10991 (Act), amending the Unified
Code of Corrections and converting Illinois from a system of indeterminate
to determinate prison sentences.2 The Act was widely hailed as ushering in
I. An act in relation to the criminal justice system in Illinois, Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub.
Act No. 80-1099, 1977 I1. Laws 3264-3318 (codified throughout Unified Code of Corrections,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1001-1008 (1983)) [hereinafter cited as Pub. Act No. 80-1099].
2. Indeterminate sentences are ones in which the sentencing judge imposes a minimum
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a new era in the sentencing of criminal offenders-one in which sentences
would be both fairer across the board and, where warranted, far more severe
than had previously been authorized by law.' There were, however, dissenters
from this view who saw the Act essentially as a punitive measure-one that
would fill Illinois' prisons to overflowing while doing little, if anything, to
control the abuses of prosecutorial, judicial, and correctional discretion in
sentencing that ostensibly had led to its enactment.4 Ironically, these dissenters
included many of the earliest and most ardent supporters of the legislative
predecessors to the Act, among whom was the present author.
As set out in more detail below, the Act and its numerous legislative
predecessors' adopted two broad strategies for improving the process of
term and a maximum term on an offender with the precise date of release within that period
determined by a correctional authority-in Illinois, the former Parole and Pardon Board. See
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1003-3-1 to 1003-3-13 (1975). Traditionally, Illinois inmates were
able to reduce both the minimum and maximum sentences imposed against them (and hence
both the date on which they first would be eligible for parole and the date on which they
would be required to be released) by accumulating a variety of good-conduct credits-typically
by not violating prison disciplinary rules or by properly performing prison work or program-
matic assignments. Id. §§ 1003-6-3, 1003-12-5. To prevent a judge from imposing a sentence
so lengthy that an inmate would never become eligible for parole, Illinois law had also created
a right to parole consideration for all inmates who had served at least 20 years (less time off
for good-conduct credits earned). Id. § 1003-3-3(a).
Determinate sentences, on the other hand, call on sentencing judges to impose fixed terms
of years on offenders, who would then have to serve their entire sentences (except, once again,
for any time taken off for good behavior). See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-3(c) (1983).
The concept of parole as a release mechanism is abolished for persons receiving determinate
sentences. Id. § 1003-3-3(b). Under Pub. Act No. 80-1099, the only good-conduct credits which
were expected to be awarded with any degree of regularity were those given for not violating
prison disciplinary rules. Those credits were established by statute at one day off of an offender's
sentence for each infraction-free day spent in confinement. Pub. Act. No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977
I11. Laws 3264, 3289 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-6-3 (1983)).
Both indeterminate and determinate prison sentences should be distinguished from mandatory
prison sentences. The latter term denotes a prison sentence which must be imposed, while neither
of the first two terms have that connotation. Mandatory prison sentences can-and have been
in Illinois' recent past-either indeterminate or determinate. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§
1005-5-3(c), 1005-8-1, 1005-8-2 (1979); id. §§ 1005-5-3(g), 1005-8-1, 1005-8-2 (1975).
3. See, e.g., ILL. S. J., 1st Spec. Sess., 86-88 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Sangemeister); id.
at 109-10 (remarks of Sen. Netsch); ILL. H. J., 1st Spec. Sess., 104-05, 109-10 (1977) (remarks
of Rep. Getty); id. at 106-08 (remarks of Rep. Bennett); id. at Ill (remarks of Rep. Katz).
It should be noted, however, that many senators and representatives, including a number
who voted for the bill, also expressed doubts over its efficacy as a deterrent to crime. The
same senators and representatives were also concerned about the possibility of prison over-
crowding and a severe drain on the state's treasury resulting from the new sentencing schedule.
See ILL. S. J., 1st Spec. Sess., 90-92 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Hickey); id. at 102-05 (remarks
of Sen. Newhouse); id. at 116-18 (remarks of Sen. Washington); ILL. H. J., 1st Spec. Sess.,
100-09 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Mugalian); id. at 113-15 (remarks of Rep. Kane); id. at 115-16
(remarks of Rep. Barnes); id. at 119 (remarks of Rep. Madison).
4. To some extent, this assessment is based on conversations this author had with a number
of individuals, some of whom might prefer to remain unidentified. Some of these assessments,
however, are a matter of public record. See supra note 3.
5. At least 11 original or amended bills warrant inclusion in this list: (1) S.B. 1884, 1885,
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bargaining for, imposing, and serving criminal sentences. The first strategy
sought to structure the exercise of discretion in order to produce fairer and
more consistent sentences. Included under this rubric are such reforms as
requiring judges to consider certain information before imposing sentence6
and insisting that they give reasons for their sentences; 7 imposing a variety
of checks against potential abuses of discretion by prosecutorial,' judicial, 9
and correctional'" officials; and endeavoring, by a variety of means, to pro-
mote the continuing development of even more refined sentencing practices."
These efforts are referred to as "structural" reforms because they did not
directly limit the exercise of substantive sentencing powers. Rather, these
proposals were meant only to promote the rational and consistent applica-
tion of those powers.
The second strategy for improving the sentencing process sought to place
direct limitations on substantive sentencing powers, primarily those of the
judiciary.' 2 The principal proposals narrowed the ranges of permissible
penalties for felonies' 3 by providing statutory factors in mitigation and
79th I1. Gen. Assembly, 1976 Sess. (portions of legislative package embodying the original
legislative reform proposals); (2) a draft bill prepared by the Adult Corrections Subcommittee
of the Illinois House Judiciary II Committee, but never introduced, see infra note 38 and
accompanying text (the earliest legislative reworking of the initial reform proposals); (3) H.B.
1500, 80th 11. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess. and House Amendment No. 1 thereto (the legislation
actually introduced to embody the initial proposals, prepared primarily by the Illinois House
Judiciary II Committee); (4) S.B. 1272, 80th Il1. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess., as well as Senate
Amendment No. I to S.B. 165, 80th 111. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess. and Senate Amendment
No. I to H.B. 1, 80th 11. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess. (all early versions of Governor Thomp-
son's proposed alternative to H.B. 1500, as amended); (5) H.B. 15, 80th 11. Gen. Assembly,
1st 1977 Spec. Sess. (the bill embodying the revised position of the proponents of H.B. 1500,
as amended); (6) S.B. 11, 80th I11. Gen. Assembly, 1st 1977 Spec. Sess. (the bill containing
Governor Thompson's revised proposed alternative to H.B. 1500, as amended); and (7) Senate
Amendment No. 8 to H.B. 1500, 80th Il. Gen. Assembly, Ist 1977 Spec. Sess. (the final com-
promise between the two legislative factions).
6. See infra notes 222-25 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 245-48 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 45-61 and accompanying text.
9. See generally infra notes 176-218 and accompanying text (discussing the Act's provi-
sions requiring judges to give reasons for the sentences they impose, requiring the DOC to
compile statistics on sentences imposed for judicial use and authorizing the Illinois Supreme
Court to use its rulemaking authority to promote uniformity in sentencing).
10. See infra notes 508-30 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 185-90 and accompanying text.
12. Some direct limitations on the power of the Department of Corrections (DOC) to lengthen
an inmate's sentence by depriving him of good-conduct credits also were proposed. See infra
notes 525-30 and accompanying text.
13. Compare Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3308 (codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-8-1, 1005-8-2 (1983)) (the 1983 revised statute changes the sentence of
imprisonment of a felony from an indeterminate to a determinate sentence, while at the same
time the 1983 version puts limits on the penalty for specific felonies) with ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, §§ 1005-8-1, 1005-8-2 (1977) (the 1983 version removes some of the discretion of the
court allowed by the 1977 version; it puts actual limits on the time extensions for sentences).
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aggravation to be utilized in imposing sentences,' 4 and specified the cir-
cumstances in which exceptionally lengthy sentences could be imposed.' 5 They
are referred to as "substantive" controls' 6 because they were intended to
directly affect the types and lengths of sentences that judges were free to
impose.
As of this writing, the Act has been in effect for over six years." Thus,
the time seems ripe for a critical reappraisal of its provisions. This article
will review the extent to which the Act's structural controls on the exercise
of prosecutorial, judicial, and correctional sentencing discretion have func-
tioned as intended. It concludes that those controls have been largely nullified
or rendered ineffective. A second article will analyze how the Act's substan-
tive limitations on judicial sentencing discretion have fared.' 8 Both articles
also will propose changes in Illinois law. The detailed recommendations call
for the retention of determinate sentences, but within narrower ranges and
with a variety of additional controls on the exercise of prosecutorial, judicial,
and correctional discretion in the bargaining for, imposing, and serving of
such sentences.
I. AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
To appreciate the significance of the Act's efforts to structure the exercise
of sentencing discretion, it is necessary to review the initial legislative
proposals,' 9 their detailed study by the Adult Corrections Subcommittee of
the Illinois House Judiciary 1I Committee,2" and their ultimate refashioning
by that committee into its legislative proposal, House Bill (H.B.) 1500.2
During this period there was a strong consensus in favor of what one
14. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I11. Laws 3264, 3300 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch 38, §§ 1005-5-3.1, 1005-5-3.2 (1979)).
15. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I1. Laws 3264, .3301, 3311 (codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-5-3.2(b), 1005-8-2(a), 1005-8-4(a) (1983)).
16. The distinction between structural and substantive controls is not a hard and fast one.
A number of the controls labeled as substantive were intended merely to influence, rather than
to bind, sentencing judges in their choices of appropriate dispositions and hence could be deemed
structural controls in that sense. The term "structural" as used here, however, is limited to
those measures not intended to affect the choice of a particular sentence.
17. The Act became effective February 1, 1978. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 4, 1977 I1.
Laws 3264, 3317.
18. Part II concludes that judges have failed to respect the substantive limitations on their
sentencing discretion embodied in the Act. It also concludes that they have declined to fashion
additional limitations on the exercise of that discretion, although the legislature had intended
that they would.
19. These bills were S.B. 1882, 1883, 1884, 1885, 79th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1976 Sess. They
were the outgrowth of some 18 months of drafting activities, which are discussed in more
detail infra notes 24-43 and accompanying text.
20. This subcommittee held extensive hearings on the issues raised by the Governor's reform
proposals over nearly a two-year period.
21. H.B. 1500, 80th 11. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess.
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thoughtful observer has termed a "prisoner's-eye-view" of sentencing.22 This
view placed primary importance on fashioning a system of sentencing and
corrections that would insure that incarcerated offenders were rationally
sentenced and that those sentences were humanely served.23 This viewpoint
generated all of the structural controls of sentencing adopted in the Act.
A. The Impetus for the Original Reform Proposals
Beginning in late 1974, a number of individuals, including this author,2 4
began drafting legislation to control what was regarded as undue discretion
vested in prosecutors, judges, correctional officials, and parole boards by
Illinois' existing system of indeterminate sentencing and parole release deter-
minations. Based in large part on a book by Dr. David Fogel" and on
numerous condemnations of both judicial sentencing practices and parole
release decisions,26 the reform group believed that new legislation was
necessary. The legislation was intended to replace indeterminate prison
sentences with determinate ones, and replace parole as an early release
mechanism with statutorily mandated day-for-a-day good-conduct credits.2"
The proponents recognized that insuring the fair implementation of such a
system required that the exercise of both prosecutorial and judicial sentenc-
ing discretion be narrowed and structured to be more informed, rational,
and accountable.28 Similarly, careful controls had to be placed on the exer-
cise of discretion by correctional officials to insure that initially fair sentences
were not arbitrarily lengthened through the unjustified revocation of good-
conduct credits.29 These concepts, termed the "justice model" of corrections,
initiated the debate which was to lead to the Act's passage.
22. See Zimring, Sentencing Reform in the States: Some Sobering Lessons from the 1970's,
2 N. ILL. U.L. REv. 1, 8 (1981). Professor Zimring is rather critical of this perspective. Id. at 7-12.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 508-11.
24. The reform group was formed at the urging of then-Governor Dan Walker. It included
Chester Kamin, Governor Walker's special counsel; Dr. David Fogel, then-director of the Il-
linois Law Enforcement Commission (ILEC or the Commission); this author, then-staff counsel
to the Commission; and others. Although ILEC staff played a major role in developing these
reforms, their recommendations were not formally acted upon by the Commission.
25. D. FOGEL, WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF: THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR CORRECTIONS (1975).
26. The literature critical of either judicial sentencing practices or parole release practices
is voluminous. For a representative cross-section of the literature extant at the time Pub. Act
No. 80-1099 and its legislative predecessors were under consideration, see AMERICAN FRIENDS
SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971); D. FOGEL, supra note 25; M. FRANKEL,
CRIMINAL SENTENCES (1973); N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976);
E. VON DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS (1975); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 1976); J.
WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975); Mattick, Reflection of a Former Prison Warden, in
DELINQUENCY, CRIME AND SOCIETY 229-300 (J. Short, Jr. ed. 1976).
27. A good concise explanation of the reasoning underlying these positions can be found
in Schuwerk, Commentary on Determinate Sentencing Bill 1-5, 47-49 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Proposal Commentary].
28. See infra notes 45-61, 176-218 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 525-30 and accompanying text.
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B. A Summary of the Early Reform Proposals
The most radical change in Illinois' sentencing practices sought by the
reform group was, of course, the replacement of indeterminate sentences
with determinate sentences. This proposal was intended to eliminate all
prospects of an early release except through the accumulation of day-for-a-
day good-conduct credits.3" The reform group foresaw that such a shift in
the structure of prison sentences would have a number of other important
consequences. First, it would greatly increase the significance of prosecutorial
and judicial decisions concerning the proper sentence to impose. Under the
proposal, no parole board would exist to mitigate any unduly harsh sanc-
tions through an early release.' Any sentence imposed-less good-conduct
credits earned-would be served in full. Judges, readily able to calculate
the effect of such possible credits, could tailor their sentences accordingly,
within statutory limits. For the first time, judges could impose prison
sentences with some assurance that their wishes would actually be carried
into effect. 2 In this sense at least, the early proposals augmented, rather
than restricted, judicial sentencing authority.33
The reform group also recognized that its proposals would affect the
30. See infra notes 512-24 and accompanying text.
At the outset, this change was widely viewed as a punitive measure. This was not its intent.
Instead, from the reform group's perspective, it was more in the nature of a "truth in sentenc-
ing" bill, which accomplished two things. First, it let inmates know from the outset exactly
how long they would serve, eliminating the widely perceived frustration and anger engendered
by the traditional parole release process. Proposal Commentary, supra note 27, at 3, 8-9. Second,
to a far greater extent than before, it proposed to place control over imprisoned inmates' sentences
in their own hands rather than leaving that determination to some outside authority. This not
only made inmates directly accountable for their successes or failures of self-control-lessons
seen as valuable to them after leaving prison-but also gave them a direct stake in maintaining
good order and discipline while incarcerated. Id. at 5, 8-9, 49.
31. It is widely believed that parole boards attempt, to some extent, to even out what they
view as indefensible sentencing variations by releasing harshly sentenced inmates at the first
opportunity, while holding for longer periods those offenders who appear to have received
a light sentence. See, e.g., NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS
AND GOALS, CORRECTIONS 394 (1973); J. SHIN, ANALYSIS OF OUTCOMES (1972); UNITED STATES
BOARD OF PAROLE, ANNUAL REPORT (1975). A number of studies, however, have failed to discern
such a trend. See Gottfredson, Parole Board Decision Making: A Study of Disparity Reduction
and the Impact of Institutional Behavior, 70 CRIMINOLOGY 77 (1979); Report on New York
Parole: A Summary, 11 CRIM. L. BULL. 297 (1975); Citizen's Inquiry on Parole and Criminal
Justice (1976).
32. As matters turned out, the pressure of severe prison overcrowding forced the DOC
to institute an early release program predicated on supplemental good time awards. As a conse-
quence, many judicially imposed sentences were shortened by substantially more than one-half.
This practice was successfully challenged as excessive of the DOC's authority in Lane v.
Sklodowski, 97 Ill. 2d 311, 454 N.E.2d 322 (1983). For a discussion of Lane, see infra notes
545-56 and accompanying text.
33. Or, as judicial orientation materials prepared in the wake of the Act's passage more
graphically put it, "BIG NUMBERS NOW MEAN SOMETHING." (Bold-faced type in original).
This feature has not always been recognized. See Aspen, New Class X Sentencing Law: An
Analysis, 66 ILL. B.J. 344, 346 & n.26 (1978).
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distribution of power within the correctional system. On the one hand, the
position of senior correctional officials, clinicians, and the like3" would be
weakened by the elimination from the correctional arsenal of various coer-
cive powers stemming from the parole release mechanism. On the other hand,
the power of lower level correctional officials would be enhanced by the
increased importance of any disciplinary sanctions imposed on inmates
because any revocation of good-conduct credits would inevitably lengthen
inmates' sentences.
Thus, the effect sought by the reform group was not so much to eliminate
discretion in sentencing matters as it was to reallocate existing discretion
within and among components of the overall criminal justice system. In order
to assure that this reallocation of sentencing discretion worked fairly and
rationally in practice, the entire process of bargaining for, imposing, and
serving criminal sentences had to be made more informed, consistent, and
accountable. The aim was not to remove the judge's discretion in such mat-
ters, but rather to prevent its perversion into a right to behave in an arbitrary
and unaccountable fashion.
C. Implementation of the Reform Proposals
Throughout 1975 and 1976, efforts to implement the reform group's pro-
posals proceeded on two fronts. First, the proposals were submitted to the
House Judiciary II Committee in mid-1975.3 That committee in turn created
a Subcommittee on Adult Corrections to give the proposals intensive
consideration." The reform group actively assisted the subcommittee in those
efforts by preparing a detailed, section-by-section commentary on its legislative
proposals37 and by assisting the subcommittee in conducting extensive hear-
ings over the next eighteen months. The subcommittee concluded its first
series of hearings and produced a report to the full House Judiciary II Com-
mittee in June 1976.38 In that report, the subcommittee made a number of
34. The abolition of good-conduct credits for programmatic or work-related activities furthered
this tendency. See infra text accompanying notes 518-24.
35. No copies of the precise bills furnished to the subcommittee exist. Except for two substan-
tive changes, however, the texts of S.B. 1882, 1883, 1884, 1885, 79th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1976
Sess., very closely approximate those given to the subcommittee. First, the early drafts pro-
vided that murder could be punished only by regular and extended prison terms of 20-30 and
30-40 years, respectively, while S.B. 1885 also added a natural life sentence for certain par-
ticularly heinous murders. See S.B. 1885, 79th 11. Gen. Assembly, 1976 Sess., 5-8-1(b)(1)(B)
at 40. Second, the early legislation permitted only reductions in sentences on appeal, but S.B.
1884 allowed for increases as well. See S.B. 1884, 79th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1976 Sess.,
5-10-3, 5-10-6(b)(2) at 3-4.
36. The subcommittee was exceptionally-ably staffed by its counsel James Bagley, who was
the principal drafter of a report and legislative proposals authorized by the subcommittee, see
infra note 38, and by the full House Judiciary II Committee, see H.B. 1500, 80th Il. Gen.
Assembly, 1977 Sess.
37. Proposal Commentary, supra note 27.
38. Summary of the Report to The Illinois House Judiciary II Committee by The Subcom-
mittee on Adult Corrections (June 24, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Subcommittee Report]. For
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legislative recommendations in bill form that were consistent with some of
the reform group's proposals and tentatively endorsed many other proposals,
subject to further study." The reform group in turn responded to those
legislative recommendations with a lengthy technical paper commenting on
the subcommittee's bill, paragraph by paragraph, and recommending
numerous changes to bring the bill into closer conformity with the reform
group's original proposals."0 These changes were incorporated almost in toto
into H.B. 1500, the bill eventually prepared by the full House Judiciary II
Committee."
Just a few months prior to the issuance of the subcommittee's report,
Governor Walker opened the second front by causing the introduction in
the General Assembly of a four-bill package virtually identical to the reform
group's bill then under study by the subcommittee.' 2 Although none of the
Governor's bills became law, they nonetheless are of unusual significance
in interpreting later legislative measures, because they too were directly and
extensively relied upon in crafting H.B. 1500."1
This close textual and philosophical linkage between the reform group's
proposals and H.B. 1500 is significant because it reveals additional impor-
tant sources of historical material which should be consulted in construing
the meaning of the Act-sources which in some respects are far clearer than
traditional legislative history materials." To the extent that the Act may be
the subcommittee's "recommendations for further study," see id. at 15-17. A "sample bill"
(Subcommittee Bill) is also set out. Id. at 19-72.
39. Subcommittee Report, supra note 38, at 15-17.
40. Schuwerk, Technical Paper-Comments on Proposed Determinate Sentencing Bill of
the Subcommitlee on Adult Corrections of the Illinois House Judiciary II Committee (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Technical Paper).
41. H.B. 1500, 80th I11. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess.
42. S.B. 1882, 1883, 1884, 1885, 79th I11. Gen. Assembly, 1976 Sess.
43. The subcommittee, whose draft bill is commonly viewed as the sole legislative predecessor
of H.B. 1500, took great pains to disavow any reliance on the concept of the reform group's
"justice model," stating in its report:
The Committee Proposal which we offer for consideration here differs significantly
from both the 'Illinois Justice Model' and proposals being considered in other states,
especially in regard to the flat time aspects of the 'Illinois Criminal Justice Model.'
Subcommittee Report, supra note 38, at 2 (emphasis in original).
Nevertheless, a direct textual comparison of either the Subcommittee Bill or H.B. 1500 with
the reform group's principal sentencing bill, S.B. 1885, belies that claim. Similarities are pointed
out throughout the balance of this article. Various authorities, however, have differed in assessing
the extent of that influence. See, e.g., Aspen, supra note 33, at 346-47; Bagley, Why Illinois
Adopted Determinate Sentencing, 62 JUDICATURE 390, 391 (1979). See generally McAnany, Merritt
& Tromanhauser, Illinois Reconsiders "Flat Time": An Analysis of the Impact of the Justice
Model, 52 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 621, 660-61 (1976) (the drafters appear to have taken the path
of least resistance by amending only sections of the Unified Code of Corrections rather than
adopting a total reform package). The subcommittee's disclaimer was not false pride of author-
ship. Rather, because Governor Walker's political fortunes were then at a low ebb, it was
apparently believed that the proposal's future would be improved if it were disassociated from
Walker.
44. By far the most useful conventional legislative history materials are the Subcommittee
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traced to these early proposals, its interpretation should be derived from
them as well.
II. STRUCTURAL CONTROLS ON THE EXERCISE OF PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION
A. The Nature of the Controls Proposed and Enacted
One of the principal concerns of certain opponents of the Act was that
the vagaries of a criminal justice system riddled with plea bargaining would
overcome all efforts to-make the sentencing process more rational. 5 Pro-
ponents of early predecessors of the Act, while not unsympathetic to such
views, were not offered any program to address them nor were they able
to devise any on their own." Consequently, they contented themselves with
proposals designed to control such practices indirectly, by assuring that
sentencing judges were in a position to make-and did make-informed,
independent sentencing decisions rather than blindly deferring to the recom-
mendations of counsel. To that end, Senate Bill (S.B.) 1885, the group's
Report, supra note 38, and the Subcommittee Bill, supra note 38. Those materials are of limited
value, however, because as the subcommittee's thinking continued to evolve, its proposals under-
went several significant revisions, the reasons for which are not documented in conventional
legislative sources. The only other traditional legislative history materials of note are the debates
on the final version of Pub. Act No. 80-1099, Senate Amendment No. 8 to H.B. 1500. See
ILL. S. J., 1st Spec. Sess., 82-125 (1977); ILL. H. J., 1st Spec. Sess., 104-21 (1977). They,
however, are almost totally devoid of information concerning the substance of the legislation,
apparently in large part because members had only an hour to review the material before casting
their votes. See ILL. S. J., Ist Spec. Sess., 105 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Guidice).
A number of nonconventional sources, however, provide considerable insight into the
explanations and justifications of the various legislative proposals which eventually culminated
in Pub. Act No. 80-1099. Two of them, the Proposal Commentary, supra note 27, and the
Technical Paper, supra note 40, detail the reasoning underlying two of the earliest legislative
proposals. Those early proposals also were extensively critiqued by McAnany, Merritt and
Tromanhauser in an article which provides a generally accurate summary of the legislative pro-
ponents' views in the 1975-1976 period. See McAnany, Merritt & Tromanhauser, supra note
43. Finally, a message Governor Thompson gave to the Illinois General Assembly contains
a detailed explanation and defense of his sentencing proposals as then embodied in Senate
Bill 11. Address by Governor Thompson, "The Class X Criminal Justice Program: An Analysis
and Comparison," 1st Spec. Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as Class X Analysis].
In addition to these contemporaneous sources, a number of articles have been written in
the wake of Pub. Act No. 80-1099, explaining its meaning or purpose. Among the most promi-
nent authors are Bagley, supra note 43, and Aspen, supra note 33. Both Mr. Bagley and Judge
Aspen were knowledgeable observers of the process leading to the enactment of Pub. Act No.
80-1099. See supra note 36.
45. See McAnany, Merritt & Tromanhauser, supra note 43, at 632.
46. See the author's prepared statement delivered to the Adult Corrections Subcommittee,
at 1-5 (Dec. 1, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Schuwerk Statement].
Since the Act went into effect, however, a number of detailed proposals for regulating plea
bargains have been made. See, e.g., Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control
of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L.F. 37, 74-95; Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentenc-
ing, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 733, 755-60, 772-86, 791-98 (1980); Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of
Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1521, 1560-72 (1981).
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chief sentencing reform bill, proposed changing Illinois law to require the
preparation of a pre-sentence investigation report in every case in which a
defendant was convicted of a felony.4' Mandatory resort to the pre-sentence
reports was viewed as essential because the reports provided the sentencing
judges with their primary (and most unbiased) source of information necessary
to making an intelligent sentencing decision.4'The proponents of H.B. 1500
agreed, and adopted this proposal without change. 49
The early legislation also sought to insure that sentencing judges actually
utilized this new information and did not unthinkingly acquiesce to the recom-
mendations of counsel as to the appropriate sentence to be imposed. It was
already clear under Illinois law that the imposition of a sentence was solely
an act of judicial discretion and that counsels' recommendations were not
binding upon a sentencing judge." Nonetheless, it was believed that the temp-
tations to accept those recommendations were sufficiently numerous and com-
pelling enough to require an admonition to the sentencing judge as to his
or her duty." Consequently, S.B. 1885 explicitly required the sentencing judge
to impose sentence "based on his independent assessment" of the factors
relevant to a proper sentence." This requirement, too, was retained in H.B.
1500.11
But while this proposal contained no guidelines or admonitions directed
to prosecutors concerning any procedural, ethical, or substantive limitations
that might apply to plea bargains, it was nonetheless construed in some
quarters as threatening the very existence of that practice.54 The proponents
47. S.B. 1885, 79th Il1. Gen. Assembly, 1976 Sess., 5-3-1 at 21.
48. Under prior law, these reports were optional and could be waived by the defendant.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §1005-3-1 (1975). A waiver typically occurred when the state's attorney
and defense counsel had agreed on a sentence to be sought from the court. The reform group
felt that this procedure placed far too much power in the hands of counsel and invited arbitrary
and unfair sentences stemming from a variety of extraneous factors having no real bearing
on the appropriateness of the offender's sentence, such as the relative bargaining acumen of
prosecution and defense counsel. Proposal Commentary, supra note 27, at 26. Under existing
law, the sentencing judge was free to request a pre-sentence report in any case, see ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-3-1 (1975), but, for a variety of reasons, he or she was unlikely to do
so. See infra note 62.
49. See H.B. 1500, 80th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess. 5-3-1 at 26; Subcommittee Bill,
supra note 38, at 29, 5-3-1.
50. See People v. Ventura, 415 Ill. 587, 590, 114 N.E.2d 710, 712 (1953); People v. Hancasky,
410 Ill. 148, 155, 101 N.E.2d 575, 579 (1951).
51. Proposal Commentary, supra note 27, at 25-26.
52. S.B. 1885, 79th Il1. Gen. Assembly, 1976 Sess., 5-4-1(b) at 21.
53. H.B. 1500, 80th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess., 5-4-1(b) at 28; see Subcommittee
Bill, supra note 38, at 31, 5-4-1(b).
54. This concern was noted in correspondence from Sen. Jack E. Bowers:
Pursuant to our conversation, following is an abbreviated form of my principal
objections to House Bill 1500.
3. Plea Bargaining
At the top of Page 35 [of H.B. 1500, as amended] the added language "based
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of this view apparently had the ear of Governor Thompson, who proposed
a legislative alternative to H.B. 1500 in the First Special Session of the 1977
General Assembly." That bill dispensed with a pre-sentence report altogether
whenever "both parties agree to the imposition of a particular sentence,"
5 6
apparently viewing the report as a useless and costly formality in such cases. 7
The clear thrust of the Governor's scheme was to remove effective sentenc-
ing authority from the hands of the judiciary and give it to the prosecutors
by eliminating the most ready source of judicial enlightenment concerning
the soundness of the bargains struck."
The compromise ultimately reached in this area reaffirmed the notion of
judicial preeminence in sentencing matters. While not insisting on the prepara-
tion of full pre-sentence reports in cases where a bargain had been struck
as to sentence, the enacted compromise guarded against the blind judicial
ratification of inappropriate pleas. It did so by requiring judicial findings
of defendants' histories of delinquency and criminality, including any previous
noncustodial sentences imposed upon them. 9 This information, coupled with
the retained requirement that a judge's sentence be "based upon his indepen-
dent assessment" of relevant factors, 60 promised to prevent at least grossly
inappropriate bargains. The compromise, however, did legitimize in law what
undoubtedly was already present in practice: some unspecified degree of
judicial deference to "any agreement as to sentence reached by the parties." 61
upon his independent assessment of the elements specified" indicates to the State's
Attorneys' Association of Illinois that the intent is to eliminate plea bargaining.
I think they may be right. Incidentally, the President and Vice President of the
State's Attorneys' Association advise me that they were never consulted about the
contents of House Bill 1500 and do not support it in its present form.
Letter from Senator Jack E. Bowers to Representative Lee Daniels (June 29, 1977).
55. S.B. 11, 80th Il. Gen. Assembly, 1st 1977 Spec. Sess., 1 5-3-1 at 37.
56. Id.
57. See Class X Analysis, supra note 44, at 29-30.
58. The Governor implied that selection of an appropriate sentence was primarily a
prosecutorial rather than a judicial concern:
House Bill 1500 compels the court to order a presentence investigation in all cases
in which it intends to impose a sentence of more than 90 days. The requirement
cannot be waived by the defendant.
With about 90 percent of our cases now being resolved through negotiated pleas,
this requirement would place a meaningless-but, nevertheless, intolerable-burden
on the system. Where a sentence has been agreed upon in return for a plea of
guilty, reliance will not be placed upon the presentence report. It is incumbent upon
the State's Attorney to take the defendant's prior record into account in plea negotia-
tions and bring it to the court's attention, and, as a policy matter, most prosecutors
do so.
Class X Analysis, supra note 44, at 29-30 (emphasis added).
59. Senate Amendment No. 8 to H.B. 1500, 80th I11. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess., 5-3-1 at 45.
60. Id. 5-4-1(b) at 47.
61. Id.
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B. The Effect of the Act on Plea Bargaining Practices
The Act's relatively modest efforts to reform plea bargaining practices
obviously were dependent to a considerable extent upon the interest and zeal
of sentencing courts in asserting their prerogatives. Given the General
Assembly's intent that prosecutors prevail in "close" cases-and the institu-
tional tendencies to let them prevail in many more as wel-it would be
surprising if the Act had had any real impact on such practices.
Although the available data on plea bargaining practices offer only the
most rudimentary description of those activities, three conclusions may be
drawn. 3 First, the Act does not seem to have affected the frequency of plea
bargaining. Second, while no data permit a direct analysis of the nature,
quality, or general effect of the bargains struck, certain studies and reported
cases indicate that plea bargaining frequently results in pleas to inappropriate
charges or the imposition of inappropriate sentences.6" Finally, reported cases
strongly suggest that there is no discernible effort on the part of the judiciary
to regulate those practices. 6
1. The Frequency of Plea Bargaining
The only statewide sources of data on plea bargaining practices are the
Annual Reports prepared for the Illinois Supreme Court by the Administrative
Office of the Illinois Courts. 66 Those data, compiled in terms of disposi-
tions of defendants by case, include information on whether those persons
who were convicted of a felony were found guilty pursuant to a guilty plea
or were convicted after a bench or jury trial.6 7 As shown in Chart 1 below,
those data reveal that both before and after the Act went into effect, some
ninety percent of all convicted felons chose to plead guilty to the charges
of which they were convicted.
62. A judicial "hard look" at agreed-upon sentences is not a naturally congenial act for
at least three reasons. First, it will impose additional work on the judicial system in the short
term and, if the bargain is rejected, in the long term as well, because the case will have to
be tried. Second, it will impose an additional strain on the local probation authority. Third,
it will incur the wrath of counsel. None of these consequences, of course, normally would
be decisive in a clearly egregious case; but they all would have the tendency to convince a
beleaguered trial judge that the bargain before him isn't so bad after all.
63. See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 68-83 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 85-131 and accompanying text.
66. The Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts has prepared an Annual Report to
the Supreme Court of Illinois each calendar year since the 1970 Illinois Constitution became
effective.
67. These data are based on the chart entitled "Dispositions in [Year] of Defendants Charged
With a Felony" [hereinafter cited as Sentencing Chart], and the chart entitled, "Sentence Imposed
During [Year] on Defendants Convicted of a Felony" [hereinafter cited as Dispositions Chart]
contained in each of the Administrative Office's Annual Reports for the years 1974 through 1981.
The way dispositions are recorded is somewhat complicated. According to Anthony Valaika,
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Chart 1
Year Jurisdiction * Method of Conviction (%)**
PG BT JT
1974 Downstate 89.5 2.9 7.6
Cook 92.3 5.6 2.1
Total 91.2 4.4 4.4
1975 Downstate 89.0 3.6 7.5
Cook 92.4 5.9 1.7
Total 90.9 4.9 4.2
1976 Downstate 90.5 2.8 6.6
Cook 92.3 5.1 2.6
Total 91.5 4.1 4.4
1977 Downstate 85.6 8.1 6.3
Cook 90.3 6.5 3.2
Total 88.3 7.2 4.5
1978 Downstate 91.0 3.1 6.0
Cook 90.3 6.5 2.9
Total 90.5 5.3 4.2
1979 Downstate 90.0 3.7 6.3
Cook 88.8 7.9 3.3
Total 89.3 6.3 4.4
1980 Downstate 90.0 3.3 6.7
Cook 86.4 10.3 3.2
Total 87.9 7.4 4.7
1981 Downstate 91.5 3.2 5.3
Cook 84.4 12.9 2.7
Total 87.4 8.8 3.8
*Downtown refers to the 101 Illinois counties outside of Cook County. Cook
County contains both Chicago and the bulk of the felonies committed in Il-
linois each year.
**PG=plea of guilty; BT=bench trial; JT=jury trial
There has been a slight decrease in the number of plea bargains in Cook
County (Chicago) since the Act became effective in 1978, most of it
attributable to a rather substantial increase in the number of defendants elect-
ing a bench trial there. It is unlikely that this decrease is due to the Act,
however, because during the same period there has been an increase in the
use of plea bargains in Illinois' downstate counties.
These data reveal little if anything about either the nature or quality of
the bargains struck or the effectiveness of judicial oversight of plea bargain-
ing as it relates to the sentences actually imposed on offenders. They do
show, however, the importance of regularizing plea bargaining practices to
achieve a rational sentencing system. Any reform that ignores the manner
in which such bargains are struck will fail to ameliorate any disparaties or
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inequities resulting from either the charges lodged against, or the sentences
imposed upon, approximately ninety percent of all convicted felons.
2. The Nature and Quality of the Bargains Struck
Plea bargains are of three general types, although particular bargains fre-
quently employ features of more than one type. The first is a bargain to
plead guilty to a stated charge in return for the prosecutor's agreement to
dismiss other pending charges. This is frequently referred to as a "bargain
as to counts" (referring to separate charges or "counts" in the felony charg-
ing instrument)." The second is an agreement to plead guilty to a lesser
offense in return for the prosecutor's agreement not to press a more serious
charged offense. This is frequently referred to as a "bargain as to charge.' '69
The third type of plea bargain is an agreement to plead guilty to certain
charges, which may or may not be some or all of the original charges, in
return for an agreement by the prosecutor to make, or not to oppose, a
particular sentence recommendation. This type of bargain is frequently
referred to as a "bargain as to sentence." A plea made without any such
assurance is typically called a "blind plea." 7 Of all these practices, that
which presents perhaps the greatest potential for abuse is a bargain as to
charge that does not retain at least one charge of the same class as the most
serious offense supportable by the admissible evidence. Such a plea has two
very grave and related defects. Most importantly, such a plea will inevitably
alter the range of sentences available to the court in such a way as to make
a suitably severe sentence improbable, if not impossible." Second, given the
limited information available to the court in this setting, 2 such a bargain
is more likely to mislead the court about the nature of the crime committed.
There are no data available on the frequency of this type of plea. 3
an Assistant Director and Chief Statistician for the Administrative Office, the most serious
action taken against a defendant in a given case will control how his disposition is recorded.
Thus, for example, if a single defendant is charged with rape (a class X felony) and burglary
(a class 2 felony) but is found guilty only of burglary, his "disposition will be shown as
one defendant convicted of a class 2 felony. The acquittal of rape will not appear. If two
defendants are charged in a single indictment with burglary, and one is convicted of burglary
while the other is acquitted, two separate dispositions will be shown, one for each defendant.
68. Prosecutors frequently charge the offender with a number of offenses related to one
criminal act. See Gifford, supra note 46, at 46.
69. An offender may face charges for multiple offenses or a more serious offense than
necessary for his criminal conduct.
70. See Gifford, supra note 46, at 49.
71. This is not merely because the range of legally authorized penalties is not broad enough.
It may be that a suitably severe sanction is available, but that because of the misrepresentation
of the nature of the current crime, the court would not consider using it.
72. It should be recalled that at sentencing the court normally will have only the defen-
dant's prior adult and juvenile record, together with information received to establish a factual
basis for the plea. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-3-1 (1983).
73. The Administrative Office records dispositions of felony cases by the class of the most
serious charge sustained. See Dispositions Chart, supra note 67. Since it does not track felony
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Nonetheless there are scattered indicia that such offense-distorting pleas are
prevalent. For example, as shown in Charts 2 and 3 below, in the years
1979, 1980, and 1981, the statewide ratio of class 1 felony convictions to
class X felony convictions is substantially higher than the corresponding ratio
of class 1 felony arrests to class X felony arrests for those years.7" The data
Chart 2
A COMPARISON OF THE NUMBERS OF
ARRESTS FOR CLASS X AND CLASS 1
FELONIES IN DOWNSTATE AND COOK COUNTIES
Arrests Percent
Year Jurisdiction Class X Class 1 Cl. 1/Cl. X
1979 Downstate 1754 189 10.8
Cook 6391 57 0.9
Total 8145 246 3.0
1980 Downstate 1521 158 10.4
Cook 6617 96 1.5
Total 8138 254 3.1
1981 Downstate 1298 142 10.9
Cook 5953 57 1.0
Total 7251 199 2.7
Chart 3
A COMPARISON OF THE NUMBERS OF
CONVICTIONS FOR CLASS X AND CLASS 1
FELONIES IN DOWNSTATE AND COOK COUNTIES
Convictions Percent
Year Jurisdiction Class X Class 1 Cl. 1/Cl. X
1979 Downstate 371 295 79.5
Cook 1724 260 15.1
Total 2099 555 26.5
1980 Downstate 429 242 56.4
Cook 1840 322 17.5
Total 2269 564 24.9
1981 Downstate 492 325 66.1
Cook 1857 305 16.4
Total 2349 630 26.8
filings in that manner, comparisons of the number or nature of charges brought with those
sustained are presently not possible without a manual search of court records.
74. Felonies are classified, for the purposes of sentencing, into six categories. Murder is
a separate class of felony that carries a minimum sentence of 20 years and maximum of 40
years, or, if the court finds the murder was accompanied'by exceptionally brutal or heinous
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show that throughout those years convictions for class 1 felonies downstate
were about six to eight times more frequent than their proportion of arrests
would indicate, while in Cook County they were from twelve to sixteen times
more frequent.75
Of course, without checking individual cases it is impossible to be certain
where those "extra" class 1 crimes came from. One tempting conclusion
consistent with the data is that they represent class X felonies bargained
down to attempted class X felonies-the latter being class 1 felonies.76 This
is revealed rather strikingly by the fact that consistently far more persons
are convicted of class 1 offenses than are even arrested for them. Chart
4 below shows, for example, that there were five times as many convictions
as arrests for class 1 felonies in Cook County in 1981. The only apparent
source of these extra class 1 convictions would be fortunate plea-bargaining
class X offenders.77
Chart 4
A COMPARISON OF THE NUMBERS OF
ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS FOR CLASS 1
FELONIES IN DOWNSTATE AND COOK COUNTIES
1979 TO 1981
Class 1 Percent
Year Jurisdiction Arrests Convictions Conv./Arr.
1979 Downstate 189 295 156
Cook 57 260 456
Total 246 555 226
1980 Downstate 158 242 153
Cook 96 322 335
Total 254 564 222
1981 Downstate 142 325 229
Cook 57 305 535
Total 199 630 317
behavior, or by any aggravating factors delineated in the Unified Code of Corrections (§ 9-1),
a term of natural life imprisonment may be imposed. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-5-1(b)(1),
1005-8-1(1) (1983). An offender convicted of murder may also be sentenced to death. Id. §
1005-5-3(c)(1). Beyond murder, the other felonies are classified as: class X, which carry a minimum
sentence of six years and a maximum of 30 years, id. § 1005-8-1(a)(3); class 1, which carry a
minimum sentence of four years and a maximum of 15 years, id. § 1005-8-1(a)(4); class 2, which
carry a minimum sentence of three years and a maximum sentence of seven years, id.
§ 1005-8-1(a)(5); class 3, which carry a minimum sentence of two years and a maximum of five
years, id. § 1005-8-1(a)(6); class 4, which carry a minimum sentence of one year and a maximum
of three years, id. § 1005-8-1(a)(7).
75. Data on felony arrests by class of felony were furnished by the Statistical Analysis Center
of the ILEC, which derived them from the Illinois' Uniform Crime Report data for 1979,
1980 and 1981. Data on convictions by class of felony were derived from Dispositions Chart,
supra note 67.
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 8-4(c)(2) (1983).
77. The Act of Sept. 16, 1981, Pub. Act No. 82-517, 1982 Ill. Laws 2618, 2618 (codified
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Such bargains are not necessarily either unethical"8 or unjust. Their prevalence
could be explained as a result of the reaction to the harsh minimum sentences
for class X felonies, a reaction the legislature always risks evoking whenever
it makes such sanctions sufficiently draconian." For the purpose of analyz-
ing charge-bargaining, however, this observation has additional significance.
It raises the possibility that a prosecutorial willingness to bargain down class
X charges might not be representative of a general willingness to reduce
charges in that manner. While there is little hard evidence either supporting
or refuting that possibility, one system-wide measure may shed some light
on the question: a willingness of prosecutors to bargain at the other end
of the offense spectrum by reducing felony charges to misdemeanors.
at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-2 (1983)), making voluntary manslaughter a class 1 felony, became
effective January 1, 1982. After that date, some of the extra class 1 convictions may
be explained as the bargained-for reduction of murder charges.
78. See ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Ch. 3, The Prosecution Function, Stan-
dards 3-3.8(a), 3-3.9(b) (2d ed. Approved Feb. 1979) [hereinafter cited as ABA Prosecution Function
Standards]. Those standards provide:
Standard 3-3.8. Discretion as to noncriminal disposition
(a) The prosecutor should explore the availability of noncriminal disposition,
including programs of rehabilitation, formal or informal, in deciding whether to press
criminal charges. Especially in the case of a first offender, the nature of the offense
may warrant noncriminal disposition.
Standard 3-3.9. Discretion in the charging decision
(b) The prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the evidence might
support. The prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good cause consistent
with the public interest decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that sufficient evidence
may exist which would support a conviction. Illustrative of the factors which the
prosecutor may properly consider in exercising his or her discretion are:
(i) the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty;
(ii) the extent of the harm caused by the offense;
(iii) the disproportion of the authorized punishment in relation to the particular
offense or the offender;
(iv) possible improper motives of a complainant;
(v) reluctance of the victim to testify;
(vi) cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or conviction of others; and
(vii) availability and likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction.
Id.
79. Since the passage of the Act, numerous courts have balked at imposing (and occasionally
have simply refused to impose) the penalties the Act required. For a representative cross-section
of the various stratagems employed, see People ex rel. Daley v. Schreier, 92 Ill. 2d 271, 442
N.E.2d 185 (1982) (disallowing the trial judge's imposition of a class 3 felony penalty provision
upon defendant convicted of a class X felony on the basis that the class X felony classification
was unconstitutional, and therefore, its penalty provision inapplicable); People ex rel. Daley v.
Limperis, 86 I1. 2d 459, 460, 427 N.E.2d 1212, 1215 (1981) (expressing disapproval of the trial
judge's device to avoid imposing a class X felony sentence by entering an unappealable acquittal
of the class X offense of delivering over 30 grams of cocaine by finding defendants guilty of
delivering lesser amounts, even though the parties had stipulated that the quantity exceeded 30
grams); People ex rel. Carey v. Bentivenga, 83 11. 2d 537, 541, 416 N.E.2d 259, 263 (1981)
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In that regard, Chart 5 below displays the percentages of defendants
charged with felonies who had those charges reduced to misdemeanors by
the prosecutor." As that chart shows, there was a marked difference between
Cook County and the rest of the state under this measure. In 1980, for
example, reductions of felonies to misdemeanors occurred in only a miniscule
2.4% of those cases resulting in conviction in Cook County, compared to
a downstate figure of 39.907o.
Chart 5
PERCENTAGE OF ALL CONVICTED DEFENDANTS
CHARGED WITH A FELONY WHOSE
MOST SERIOUS CONVICTION WAS FOR A
MISDEMEANOR
Year Jurisdiction Percent
1980 Downstate 39.9
Cook 2.4
Total 17.7
1981 Downstate 41.3
Cook 3.3
Total 19.1
This startling difference makes it doubtful that a prosecutorial willingness
to reduce felonies to misdemeanors can be utilized as a direct measure of
proneness to charge-bargain felony offenses generally." Given the overall
frequency with which such reductions occur, however, it seems fair to con-
clude that there is a considerable willingness on the part of prosecutors to
(issuing a writ of mandamus directing the trial judge to vacate its order granting defendant pro-
bation for a non-probationable offense); People v. Baes, 94 111. App. 3d 741, 745-46, 419 N.E.2d
47, 51 (3d Dist. 1981) (holding that a court cannot order a prosecutor to nolle prosequi a charge
merely because the prosecutor and court believe that imposing even the minimum available sentence
for that offense on the defendant would be unduly harsh, but indicating that the prosecutor
remained free to take such action). Cf. People v. Verstat, 112 IlI. App. 3d 90, 97, 444 N.E.2d
1374, 1380 (2d Dist. 1983) (court may not deny state's motions for continuance and to nolle
prosequi cases and proceed to "trial" over state's objection); People v. Oswald, 106 I11. App.
3d 645, 650, 435 N.E.2d 1369, 1373 (2d Dist. 1982) (termination of supervision instanter not
an allowable sentencing disposition).
80. This information was unavailable for Cook County prior to 1980. Chart 5 was com-
piled from Dispositions Chart, supra note 67.
81. It is certainly no reflection on the Cook County state's attorney's office to wonder
whether it really is some 12 to 18 times less likely to reduce felony charges than its downstate
counterparts, as this differential would suggest. A more likely explanation is that the former
office has had an extensive felony screening operation in place during the period in question.
Through this screening, all incidents that local police authorities believe should be treated as
felonies are reviewed and approved by an assistant state's attorney before formal charges are
filed. Such a system could, of course, be expected to reduce to a minimum the subsequent
reduction of felony charges to misdemeanors. A similar explanation could account for a number
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accept plea bargains as to charge." It is difficult to believe that all of these
bargains are in the interest of justice. Rather, one of two possibilites seems
far more likely. First, it may be that defendants are being routinely over-
charged and then those charges are reduced to more appropriate ones dur-
ing the bargaining process. The other possibility is that prosecutors are filing
appropriate charges initially, but then are abandoning proveable and
appropriate offenses in favor of lesser, factually inappropriate ones.
The prevalence of either one of these practices, but particularly the latter,
obviously raises substantial questions concerning not only the quality of
sentences but the basic integrity of the criminal justice system as well. While
the Act contains limited safeguards against inappropriately lenient or severe
sentences resulting from plea bargains, all of them are premised on the notion
that an offender before the court for sentencing has pled guilty to a charge
bearing some resemblance to what he or she actually did. It obviously makes
no sense to struggle to fit a sentence to an offender and his or her offense
of the other downstate counties-12 in 1980 and 15 in 1981-that also reduced less than 10%
of their felony filings to misdemeanors. See infra note 83 (discussing an increased frequency
in defendants' lesser charges than brought by prosecutors).
A few further words of caution in interpreting these data also are in order. First, there is
no way of knowing whether an observed tendency to reduce felonies to misdemeanors result
from unilateral prosecutorial decisions (perhaps a needed corrective to local police practices)
or whether such reductions arise from bargains with defense counsel. The answer to that ques-
tion obviously would be of the utmost significance in assessing what any given frequency of
reduction meant. Likewise, there could be substantial differences from one jurisdiction to another
in the proportion of less serious or marginally proveable felonies in a prosecutor's mix of cases,
and this variation, in turn, could justify substantial differences in the rate of reduction of
felonies. In short, it would be unjustified to equate a particular rate of reduction with prosecutorial
effectiveness.
82. In 1979, 1980 and 1981 a total of 34, 42 and 31 counties respectively reduced more
than 40% of their felony filings to misdemeanors at the instance of the prosecutor, as shown
in the table below.
Table 1
Percentages Of All Convicted Defendants
Charged with A Felony Whose Most Serious
Conviction was for a Misdemeanor
1979 to 1980
% of Msdmr. Number of Counties
Convictions 1979 1980 1981
40+ to 50 12 20 16
50+ to 60 9 12 11
60+ to 70 8 5 4
70+ to 80 4 4 0
80+ to 90 1 1 0
90+ to 100 0 0 0
TOTALS 34 42 31
There seems to be at least some downward trend in the 1981 data, with only four counties
handling more than 60% of their felony filings in that manner, as compared to 10 in 1980
and 13 in 1979.
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if the latter is distorted or concealed from the court as a result of pro-
secutorial practices. Nevertheless, the available data indicate that this is
occurring with some degree of regularity.83 This article will return at a later
point to a fuller discussion of how this problem might be alleviated. 4 For
now it will assess how the Act's intended judicial oversight of prosecutors'
sentencing recommendations has worked out in practice.
3. The Efficacy of Judicial Checks on Bargained-For Sentences
For two reasons, a complete assessment of judicial supervision of plea
bargained sentences is not possible at present without a detailed study of
individual court records. First, very little data concerning these bargains are
available."5 The number of pleas involving prosecutorial sentencing recom-
mendations is unknown, as is the number of such pleas rejected by the
judiciary. 6 Second, even if this information was available and a rate of
judicial and prosecutorial confrontations over sentencing could be established,
the proper interpretation of such data would be difficult. A low rate of con-
frontation, for example, would not neccesarily mean that the Act's stric-
83. This trend may have accelerated since passage of the Act. One early study of the impact
of the Act on the criminal justice system in Cook County found the frequency of cases in
which defendants charged with armed robbery (a class X felony) were disposed of by a plea
or finding of guilty to some lesser charge was 42% after the Act's passage as compared to
only 20% before its enactment. Schiller, Illinois' New Sentencing Laws-The Effect on Sentenc-
ing in Cook County: Some Early Returns, 60 CHI. B. REc. 130, 138-39 (1978). A later study,
using different case samples, found that the frequency of cases in which a defendant was allowed
to plead guilty to reduced charges increased from 17% in the pre-act sample to 23% in the
post-act sample-an overall 35% increase which the study's authors termed a "significant dif-
ference." See Consult, Ltd., Analysis of the Impact in Cook County of the 1978 Illinois Sentenc-
ing Legislation 12 (1981) (unpublished, prepared for the Evaluation Committee of the Chicago-
Cook County Criminal Justice Commission).
Apparently this high rate of pleas to reduced charges has continued. The most recent study
on this subject followed the cases of a cohort of 272 defendants charged with armed robbery
through to disposition, and found that a total of 64 (23.5%) were sentenced only to some
reduced charge, 41 (15.1%) were sentenced apparently as the result of plea bargains and the
remaining 23 (8.4%) as a result of judicial determinations at preliminary hearing or trial. See
CHICAGO CRIME CoMMIssIoN, ARMED ROBBERY IN CHICAGO" THE RESPONSE OF THE COOK COUNTY
JUSTICE SYSTEM 20-26 (1984) [hereinafter cited as CCC ARMED ROBBERY STUDY].
84. See infra notes 135-74 and accompanying text.
85. Some of these deficiencies are referred to supra note 73. The studies referred to in
supra note 83 do not extensively discuss the judicial role in plea bargaining. Interestingly enough,
the Chicago Crime Commission study, while generally criticizing the lenity of the sentences
imposed on repeat offenders, whether after plea or trial, nonetheless concluded that "[t]here
was little difference in the sentences given to those defendants who either pled or were fouod
guilty before the bench." CCC ARMED ROBBERY STUDY, supra note 83, at 29, 41-42.
86. There are only a few reported opinions in which trial judges imposed different (and
usually more severe) sentences on defendants than those proposed by the prosecution. See,
e.g., People v. Horstman, 103 Il1. App. 3d 17, 430 N.E.2d 523 (5th Dist. 1981); People v.
Cheshier, 3 111. App. 3d 523, 278 N.E.2d 93 (3d Dist. 1972). It is likely, however, that most
instances of judicially rejected bargains are not the subject of reported decisions because the
parties either accede to the judge's view or proceed to trial.
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tures were ineffective. Arguably, the mere existence of a legislative structure
for a detached and somewhat enlightened judicial review of sentencing
bargains could have produced agreements more readily defensible on their
merits. If so, judicial interference would seldom be necessary.
But while direct evidence of the nature and extent of judicial plea bargains
may not be available, there is a small group of cases that casts doubt on
the rosy theory of judicial "benign neglect." This group is comprised of
those multi-defendant cases in which some but not all defendants plead guilty
to a particular offense and the remaining defendants, tried and convicted
of the same offense, challenge their sentences as excessive compared to those
of their pleading colleagues. These cases all too frequently display a pattern
in which judges allow questionably lenient bargains to be made with more
culpable members of the criminal enterprise while imposing all the law
allows-and sometimes a bit more-on those defendants who insist on their
right to trial.87
The case of People v. Surges,"8 involving the armed robbery of a man
and the subsequent brutalization of his family, starkly illustrates the blind
judicial acceptance of plea bargained sentences. The opinion reveals that
Surges and two codefendants, Banks and Smith, accosted a man on the street
and robbed him at gunpoint, with Banks wielding the weapon.89 Under threat
87. Even before passage of the Act, Illinois law had treated sentencing disparity in such
cases as creating special problems irrespective of the apparent propriety of the sentence imposed
on the more heavily punished offender. The prevailing, but not unanimous, view was that any
substantial difference in the sentences imposed on different offenders should be justified by
their respective prior adult and juvenile records, the degree and manner of their participation
in the crime, and any other personal factors which should be considered in imposing sentence.
If these factors were not considered, then notions of "fundamental fairness and respect for
the law" required that the sentences be brought in line. See, e.g., People v. Cherry, 130 I11.
App. 2d 965, 969, 267 N.E.2d 744, 747 (5th Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 962 (1972);
People v. Steg, 69 Ill. App. 2d 188, 191-92, 215 N.E.2d 854, 855-56 (3d Dist. 1966); cf. People
v. Curl, 131 Ill. App. 2d 944, 269 N.E.2d 740 (4th Dist. 1971) (refusing to reduce sentence
of not less than three years for conviction of armed robbery where accomplice, who had plead-
ed guilty, was given probation).
The application of this body of law to cases involving a mix of pleading and tried codefen-
dants has been tempered by the realization that concessions in the sentences imposed on those
pleading guilty were frequently necessary to obtain their pleas. A greater degree of disparity
would be tolerated than in a case involving defendants who had all either pleaded guilty or
had been found guilty. Consequently, while recognizing that a defendant was not to be punished
for asserting his or her right to put the state to its proof, People v. Moriarty, 25 I11. 2d 565,
567, 185 N.E.2d 688, 689 (1962), a defendant who was tried and found guilty could not prevail
merely by showing that his or her sentence was more severe than that of an otherwise similarly
situated codefendant who pled guilty. Rather, he or she had the additional burden of showing
that the sentence was both grossly disparate from that of a codefendant and unjustified in
light of his or her prior criminal record and the nature of his or her participation in the offense
at bar. See People v. Utinas, 55 111. App. 3d 306, 324-25, 370 N.E.2d 1080, 1093 (lst Dist.
1978); cf. People v. House, 98 Ill. App. 3d 304, 307, 424 N.E.2d 412, 415 (5th Dist. 1981)
(disparity created by prosecutorial grant of immunity to codefendant not a basis for challeng-
ing sentence imposed).
88. 101 I11. App. 3d 962, 428 N.E.2d 1012 (1st Dist. 1981).
89. Id. at 964, 428 N.E.2d at 1014.
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of death, the three men then forced their victim to take them to his home,
ostensibly to get more money.9" Upon their arrival, however, Banks pistol-
whipped the initial victim and then sexually assaulted the victim's wife and
fourteen-year-old daughter." Smith also sexually assaulted the daughter.92
Surges stood watch over the husband while these crimes were being commit-
ted, but did not otherwise participate in them.93
Banks and Surges were tried jointly, Banks to the bench and Surges to
a jury.9" In the middle of the trial, Banks changed his plea to guilty and
was given concurrent eight year sentences for armed robbery, rape, attempted
rape, and indecent liberties.9" At the time, Banks was already serving a fifteen-
to-thirty-year sentence for murder.9" Surges's trial continued. He claimed that
the victims had been mistaken in their identification of him, and presented
an alibi defense. 7 The jury, however, convicted him of armed robbery and
unlawful restraint. 8 The trial judge imposed concurrent sentences of thir-
teen and three years for these offenses," giving no reason for doing so. '
On appeal, Surges contended that his thirteen-year sentence for armed rob-
bery was grossly disparate from the eight-year sentence imposed on the far
more culpable Banks. Surges suggested that the only reasonable explanation
for his longer term was his decision to exercise his right to a jury trial and
to interpose a vigorous defense. ' The appellate court disagreed, concluding
that Banks's lighter sentence was supported by the fact that he was already
sentenced to a long term and had presented only a "minimal" defense. In
contrast, the appellate court strongly implied that Surges's alibi defense con-
sisted of suborned perjured testimony."02 Those factors, coupled with Surges's
facilitation of the more serious crimes committed by Banks and Smith, were
seen as justifying his longer sentence. '
The traditional rationales favoring disparity in codefendant sentencing
include prior criminal record, degree of participation in the offense, and
amenability to rehabilitation.0 ' There is not one shred of evidence in the
Surges opinion to suggest that any of these traditional rationales would sup-
90. Id.
91. Id. at 965, 428 N.E.2d at 1014.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 966, 428 N.E.2d at 1015.
95. Id. at 971, 428 N.E.2d at 1019.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 972, 428 N.E.2d at 1019-20.
98. Id. at 964, 428 N.E.2d at 1014.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 971, 428 N.E.2d at 1019.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 972, 428 N.E.2d at 1020.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., People v. Godinez, 92 I11. App. 3d 523, 524, 415 N.E.2d 36, 38 (3d Dist.
1980), rev'd on other grounds, 91 II1. 2d 47, 434 N.E.2d 1121 (1982); People v. Dimmick,
90 111. App. 3d 136, 139-40, 412 N.E.2d 1150, 1152-53 (3d Dist. 1980); People v. Martin, 81
111. App. 3d 238, 245, 401 N.E.2d 13, 18 (3d Dist. 1980).
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port a shorter sentence for Banks than for Surges. Banks was both the leader
and the most vicious perpetrator of all of the crimes committed." 5 He
apparently had the more serious criminal record,' 6 and there certainly is
nothing to suggest any reasonable likelihood of his rehabilitation any time
in the foreseeable future." 7
Any error in Surges's sentence, however, is dwarfed by the real problem
the case presents: the inexplicably lenient eight-year sentence imposed on
Banks. There are innumerable reported decisions in which less culpable
offenders than Banks have received extended terms of imprisonment.' 00 Even
though the propriety of Banks's sentence was not directly at issue, a sharp
criticism of that penalty would have been far more constructive and
appropriate than the court's remarkably farfetched defense of it.' 9 The
appellate court could have influenced countless future sentencing decisions
for the better by making it clear that the Act did not intend trial courts
to routinely approve bargained sentences." ' Its pusilanimous deference to
the reasoning and result reached below, however, undoubtedly had just the
opposite effect. As the appellate court in People v. Blumstengel' wisely
observed, "[tihe mere fact that the trial court has a superior opportunity
105. See supra text accompanying notes 89-93.
106. Banks had been previously convicted and sentenced of an unrelated murder. 101 Ill.
App. 3d at 972, 428 N.E.2d at 1019.
107. Moreover, the appellate court was faced not with a well-reasoned sentencing decision
but rather with a totally unexplained one. Id. at 971-72, 428 N.E.2d at 1019. Although the
court held that the defendant had waived that issue, the court's approach to the question of
waiver appears to be erroneous. See infra notes 265-315 and accompanying text. Certainly,
its willingness to search the record for factors which might support the sentence imposed and
then to assume that such factors were relied upon below was clearly inappropriate, especially
where those factors appeared to involve Surges's assertion of his right to a jury trial. As the
second article in this series will make clear, however, such opinions are the legacy of the abuse-
of-discretion standard of review prevailing in this area.
108. See, e.g., People v. Perruquet, 118 Ill. App. 3d 293, 300, 454 N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (5th
Dist. 1983) (affirming consecutive 60-year sentence imposed for two acts of rape of same vic-
tim, where defendant had "extensive prior record," including previous rape conviction); People
v. Medley, 111Ill1. App. 3d 444, 444 N.E.2d 269 (4th Dist. 1983) (defendant received concur-
rent 45-year sentences for brutal rape and home invasion, did not appeal sentence); People
v. Perez, 101 Il. App. 3d 64, 73, 427 N.E.2d 820, 828-29 (1st Dist. 1981) (defendant's 60-year
sentence for rape affirmed, based on prior rape conviction and testimony of two other women
at sentencing hearing who said defendant also raped them); cf. People v. Nance, 100 Ill. App.
3d 1117, 1122, 427 N.E.2d 630, 635-36 (4th Dist. 1981) (affirming 45-year sentence for unag-
gravated armed robbery based primarily On prior armed robbery conviction). These cases are
cited for comparative purposes only and not to imply that they all are appropriate in their
own right.
109. Affirming a lenient sentence on the grounds that the defendant receiving it has already
been convicted of murdering someone else will hopefully not soon be repeated. Given the nature
of Banks's crimes and the strength of the evidence against him, rewarding him for his graceful
surrender with a lenient sentence makes the "minimal defense" rationale rather like the argu-
ment asserted by the defendant of fable who murders his parents and then throws himself
on the mercy of the court because he is an orphan.
110. See supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
111. 61 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 378 N.E.2d 401 (5th Dist. 1978).
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to observe and evaluate potential dangerousness of a criminal offender .
. . does not imply that the sentence imposed in a particular case is just
and equitable."" 2 The Surges court would have done well to observe that
admonition.
Beyond such general exhortations to virtue, the Surges court could have
taken some tentative steps down the road to quantifying the lenity in sentenc-
ing which is appropriate in return for a guilty plea. '3 Even prior to the
Act, isolated opinions recognized the injustice of permitting too great a dif-
ferential to develop between the sentences given to pleading and tried defen-
dants. Justice Schaefer, who supported some such differential, pointed out
in People v. Darran' ' that "a great disparity [between sentences], combined
with other circumstances unrelated to guilt or innocence, may cause innocent
persons to plead guilty.""'5 Certainly, these concerns are even more relevant
since the Act's passage. While the Act did not intend to eliminate either
guilty pleas or sentencing concessions as a quid pro quo for such pleas, it
did seek to subject those practices to its overriding concern for fairness and
proportionality in sentencing." 6 The Act intended that standards be developed
to quantify the permissible differences between the sentences imposed on
plea-bargained and tried defendants and to ensure that all sentences would
lie within a relatively narrow range of reasonable dispositions, given all the
relevant facts and circumstances.' 7 This intent is demonstrated by the Act's
general concern over undue sentencing disparity, its efforts to improve the
quality of the sentencing process, and its insistence that even bargained-for
sentences be subject to an independent judicial assessment of their propriety.
Nevertheless, it seems clear that, with rare exceptions,'' 8 the Act has not
fostered the development of these standards.
The recent case of People v. Frank'' illustrates the need for a systematic
112. Id. at 1021, 378 N.E.2d at 404.
113. For some tentative suggestions along these lines, see infra text accompanying notes 159-66.
114. 33 Ill. 2d 175, 210 N.E.2d 478 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 919 (1966).
115. Id. at 180-81, 210 N.E.2d at 481; see also People v. Hall, 17 Il1. App. 3d 1, 4, 307
N.E.2d 664, 667 (5th Dist. 1978) (sentence of 100 to 150 years for murder found excessive
and reduced to 35 to 80 years where codefendant received sentence of only 20 to 50 years,
notwithstanding substantially worse criminal record of the more severely sentenced offender).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 27-61.
117. See supra notes 45-61 and accompanying text; see also Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3,
1977 111. Laws 3264, 3300-01 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-5-3.1, 1005-5-3.2
(1983)) (establishing factors in mitigation and aggravation for judges to consider in sentencing
determinations).
118. See authorities cited infra note 422; see also People v. Griffin, 113 111. App. 3d 184,
189, 446 N.E.2d 1175, 1181 (lst Dist. 1982) (four consecutive five-year sentences for conspiracy
to commit theft reduced to concurrent sentences of same length); People v. Hobbs, 90 Ill.
App. 3d 587, 588, 413 N.E.2d 454, 456 (4th Dist. 1980) (affirming conviction, but reversing
six-year extended term sentence imposed on defendant having extensive (but unspecified) prior
record for stealing five bottles of whiskey), vacated, 86 11. 2d 242, 427 N.E.2d 558 (1981);
People v. LaPointe, 85 Ill. App. 3d 215, 221, 407 N.E.2d 196, 204 (2d Dist. 1980) (reducing
sentence of life imprisonment without parole to term of 60 years to allow for possibility of
rehabilitation), rev'd, 88 11. 2d 482, 431 N.E.2d 344 (1981).
119. 98 Ill. App. 3d 388, 424 N.E.2d 799 (2d Dist. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982).
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and careful consideration of codefendants' sentence disparity. That case
involved a brutal murder committed by Frank and two other defendants,
Wieting and Johnson. The evidence at Frank's trial revealed that although
he and Johnson both had had serious disagreements with the victim in the
recent past,'2 ° all three defendants had played active roles in the planning
and execution of this brutal crime. 2' Johnson and Wieting each pleaded
guilty to murder and received sentences of thirty-five and thirty years, respec-
tively. Frank, however, insisted on a jury trial. He was convicted of murder
and received a sentence of seventy-five years. Frank argued on appeal that
his sentence was excessive in light of those imposed upon his codefendants.'22
The appellate court disagreed, stating that the Wieting/Frank disparity was
justified by differences in their prior criminal records (the nature of which
was not discussed) and that the Johnson/Frank disparity was justified by
Johnson's serious grievance with the victim. 3 The appellate court upheld
Frank's sentence, concluding that there was "no evidence" that Frank "was
being punished" for standing on his right to stand trial."'24
The Frank court's explanation of why he should have been sentenced to
forty or forty-five more years than his partners in crime seems to be somewhat
lacking in substance. The court's use of Frank's prior criminal record to
support some sentencing differential between him and Wieting was
appropriate.' 25 A disparity of this magnitude seems excessive, however,
especially because the court apparently was not willing to distinguish between
Johnson and Frank on that basis, and Johnson's sentence was only five years
more than Wieting's 26 Similarly, the highlighting of Johnson's prior grievance
against the victim smacks rather strongly of a post hoc rationale, especially
because the court ignored Frank's prior differences with the victim 7 and
also downplayed Johnson's role in perpetrating various atrocities on the
120. Id. at 390, 397, 424 N.E.2d at 800, 805.
121. All three defendants waylaid the victim after work and, using guns supplied by Frank,
sought to abduct him. When the victim attempted to flee, Wieting shot and wounded him
in one knee, and Frank then shot him in the other leg. After the victim was subdued, he
was taken to Johnson's van where he was handcuffed and chloroformed. Id. at 390-91, 424
N.E.2d at 800-01. The defendants then drove around for awhile, trying to decide what to do
with the victim. At one point Johnson administered chloroform to him again, with the intent
to kill him, but apparently was unsuccessful. After Wieting pointed out that the victim still
appeared to be alive, he was taken to a deserted stretch of road, and dumped in a snowbank,
still unconscious. He apparently died of exposure, contributed to by the many wounds he had
received. Id. at 390, 424 N.E.2d at 801.
122. Id. at 397-98, 424 N.E.2d at 805-06.
123. Id. at 397, 424 N.E.2d at 805.
124. Id.
125. See supra note 87. The Act also requires courts to take into account defendants' prior
histories of delinquency or criminal activity in sentencing. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§
1005-5-3.2(a)(3), 1005-5-3.2(b)(1) (1983). Indeed, it is the only matter that must be considered
even in plea-bargained cases. Id. § 1005-3-1.
126. 98 Ill. App. 3d at 397, 424 N.E.2d at 805.
127. Id. at 390, 424 N.E.2d at 800.
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victim."2 8 In short, the factors purportedly relied on by the court in upholding
Frank's sentence were dwarfed in importance by its conclusion that a sentenc-
ing differential of this magnitude between the pleading and non-pleading
codefendants was legitimate.'" 9 Such a tolerant attitude was inappropriate
even before passage of the Act.' Under the Act's additional strictures against
such disparity,' 3' it is even more inappropriate today.
C. Additional Reforms
Although the issue of codefendant sentencing disparity has attracted a great
deal of judicial attention and controversy,'32 the need to devise a rational
solution to that issue'33 should not obscure the need to address a far more
crucial problem: the need to develop general principles to govern the negotia-
128. See supra note 121.
129. A hint of the court's visceral reaction in this regard was its willingness to go out of
its way to reject the idea that "a person who is found guilty of murder after a full trial should
have his sentence reduced to the length of sentence of his companions who pleaded guilty and
were not tried." 98 I11. App. 3d at 398, 424 N.E.2d at 806. Frank, however, had made no
such argument.
130. See authorities cited supra notes 114-15.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 24-33 and infra notes 176-218, 343-58 and accom-
panying text.
132. Judges have exchanged rather unkind words over this doctrine. For a representative
sampling, see People v. King, 102 I11. App. 3d 257, 260-61, 430 N.E.2d 292, 295 (3d Dist.
1981) (doctrine questioned in majority opinion, defended in dissent); People v. Dewaele, 98
Ill. App. 3d 636, 638-41, 424 N.E.2d 876, 877-79 (3d Dist. 1981) (Heiple, J., concurring);
People v. Steg, 69 Il1. App. 2d 188, 193-96, 215 N.E.2d 854, 856-58 (3d Dist. 1966) (Coryn,
P.J., dissenting).
133. The most sensible way to approach plea/trial codefendant disparity cases is that sug-
gested by the dissenting opinion in People v. King, 102 I11. App. 3d 257, 261-64, 430 N.E.2d
292, 295-97 (3d Dist. 1981) (Stouder, J., dissenting). Beginning with the principle that the sentence
imposed ought not depend on the judge rendering the decision "but only on the application
of the legal rules [governing sentencing] in an objective manner," the dissent suggested that
the sentence deemed appropriate for the first offender be treated as "a point of departure
or standard of comparison" in determining the sentences of others participating in that same
offense. Id. at 262, 428 N.E.2d at 296 (Stouder, J., dissenting). While stating that a judge
imposing a later sentence should not be bound by the first sentence, Justice Stouder maintained
that a substantially different sentence should not be imposed unless the judge found, based
on matters of record, either that: (1) the defendants were distinguishable in terms of tradi-
tionally recognized objective factors or (2) the earlier-acting court had abused its discretion
in imposing a sentence that was either too severe or not harsh enough. Id. at 263, 428 N.E.2d
at 297 (Stouder, J., dissenting).
This approach, it is submitted, is both entirely consistent with the Act and quite likely to
ameliorate existing criticisms of the codefendant disparity doctrine. Treating the latter point
first, the codefendant rule is most persistently faulted because there is no reason to assume
that the lower sentence is appropriate and, if it is not, there is no reason to compound that
error by imposing another unduly lenient or unduly severe sentence on a codefendant. See
authorities cited supra note 132. The proposed approach would accommodate this concern by
insisting that the earlier imposed sentence's appropriateness be re-examined by allowing a departure
therefrom, based on a convincing and properly articulated rationale. It thus would permit the
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tion of all plea bargains. Cases involving questionable sentencing differen-
tials between codefendants represent only a small percentage of the plea
bargains presented to sentencing judges each year.' 34 Larger issues must be
faced, including how to facilitate the striking of appropriate bargains across
the board and how to assure an appropriate level of scrutiny of such bargains.
There are no easy answers to fashioning the necessary improvements in
those areas. Direct control of prosecutorial charging decisions seems unlikely
to be effective. The judiciary cannot insist that particular charges be
brought,' 3 and legislative injunctions seeking to do so are probably impossible
to police.' 36 To be beneficial the solution should appeal to prosecutors' and
"best" sentence to be imposed on all defendants, as critics of the codefendant rule argue should
Occur.
Moreover, this approach could have a number of important collateral benefits affecting the
plea bargaining process by curbing excessive differentials in sentences between pleading and
tried codefendants. Once a rule became established that any objectively indefensible lenity in
the bargains offered to defendants would have to be publicly repudiated by a later-acting judge,
prosecutors would undoubtedly begin negotiating within a more appropriate range of alter-
natives. Such a prospect would not only reign in unduly lenient bargains, but also would alleviate
the in terrorem effect of threats of the likely sanctions for defendants who chose not to plead.
134. See People v. Surges, 101 I11. App. 3d 962, 428 N.E.2d 1012 (1st Dist. 1981); People
v. Frank, 98 Il1. App. 3d 388, 424 N.E.2d 799 (2d Dist. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927
(1982); cases cited supra note 104; see also supra note 133 (detailing a proposed approach
to evaluating plea-bargained sentences to ensure parity between codefendants).
135. People ex rel. Daley v. Moran, 94 I11. 2d 41, 49-51, 445 N.E.2d 270, 274-75 (1983);
People v. Brooks, 65 Ill. 2d 343, 349, 357 N.E.2d 1169, 1172 (1976).
Some authorities have called for early judicial scrutiny of prosecutorial charging decisions,
arguing that it is essential to effective regulation of plea bargaining practices. See Arenella,
Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and the State Preliminary Hearing to Prevent Conviction
Without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REV. 463, 530-32 (1980); Gifford, supra note 46, at 75-77.
The author seriously doubts the wisdom of that approach for four reasons. First, it would
tend to enmesh the judiciary, to a very significant extent, in the affairs of the prosecution.
Second, it would require the judiciary to make detailed assessments of the weight and suffi-
ciency of the evidence, which would be both time consuming and arguably inappropriate at
least where defendants later chose to exercise their right to trial. Third, the "return" for such
supervision probably would be minimal for all but the small percentage of cases where very
serious charges (murder, class X or class I felonies) were substantially and unjustifiably reduced
at a later stage of the proceedings. Finally, judicial oversight of this last class of cases can
be accomplished by less intrusive means. See infra text accompanying notes 149-57.
136. Additionally, the constitutionality of any such efforts might well be called into question
as violations of the principle of separation of powers, as rigidly construed in such cases as
People v. Davis, 93 111. 2d 155, 442 N.E.2d 855 (1982) (effort by legislature to require judges
to give reasons for imposing sentences would be unconstitutional intrusion on judicial prerogatives)
(discussed infra in text accompanying notes 291-315), and People v. Cox, 82 I11. 2d 268, 412
N.E.2d 541 (1980) (legislative efforts to provide for appellate review of sentences struck down
as unconstitutional intrusion by General Assembly into the manner in which cases are decided)
(discussed infra in text accompanying notes 369-90). As argued in those discussions, although
both cases were incorrectly decided and certainly should not be extended to the measures pro-
posed herein, they obviously cast a pall over efforts by the General Assembly to control how
other branches of government utilize their sentencing discretion. It remains to be seen whether
the judiciary will defend prosecutorial powers against perceived legislative encroachments as
zealously as it has defended its own prerogatives.
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judges' senses of professionalism and fairness and should strike at the fac-
tors that might prevent such officials from attaining those standards. Several
measures, only one of which is apt to be expensive, merit consideration.
First, prosecutors should not be forced by the press of their dockets and
budgets into making concessions that they do not believe are in the interests
of justice. It seems likely, in many areas of the state, that prosecutors labor
under burdens that make it difficult for them to strike bargains that are
in the best interests of both society and the defendant.' 7 Where that is so,
their resources should be strengthened. The extent of any such bolstering
must, of course, be tempered by pragmatic considerations. The resources
that can be made available to any component of the criminal justice system
are finite. Moreover, any strengthening of prosecutorial resources almost cer-
tainly will place additional demands on judicial and criminal defense per-
sonnel rather quickly. Considerations of efficiency and fairness clearly require
a response to such demands as well.' 38 It is beyond this author's competence
to estimate how substantial those costs may be.
In addition, it is likely that increases in the resources available to adjudicate
criminal cases will impose additional burdens on the correctional system.
The nature and magnitude of that impact is also difficult to assess. On the
one hand, additional resources at the adjudicatory stage of criminal pro-
ceedings could speed up conviction rates, and hence, incarceration rates. These
rate increases could occur, at least in the short term, regardless of whether
the frequency or length of prison sentence were increased.' 39 In addition,
if unduly lenient bargains predominate over those of undue severity, as seems
to be the case,'"" then the net effect of the plea bargaining reforms propos-
ed below could be to increase both the frequency and length of prison
sentences with a resultant increase in prison population. On the other hand,
in this author's opinion, the entire structure of prison sentences, as well as
many individual sentences, are too severe and should be modified downward
137. The influence such considerations have on prosecutorial willingness to bargain is not
entirely clear. One authority recently reviewed the literature on that subject and concluded that
"caseload considerations may not be as important as commonly believed," and that "even
if heavy caseloads do encourage prosecutors to plea bargain generally, they do not determine
a prosecutor's attitude toward plea bargaining in any particular case." Gifford, supra note
46, at 44.
138. It is unclear to what extent public funds will be committed. The answer will depend
on the manner in which criminal defense work is handled in the areas of the state most directly
affected, as well as the present workload of judges sitting in those areas. Judicial caseloads
vary widely in Illinois, and in many locales substantial increases in criminal caseloads might
well be accommodated without any appreciable increases in judicial manpower. Criminal defense
counsel, on the other hand, appear more universally hard pressed with numerous counties not
even served by full-time public defenders.
139. Such a phenomenon appears to have contributed to recent prison population increases
in Illinois, as Cook County judicial and criminal justice authorities responded to a substantial
backlog in criminal cases by assigning large numbers of additional judges, prosecutors and
public defenders to these matters. For a fuller discussion of the DOC's overcrowding problems,
see infra text accompanying notes 539-56.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 73-83.
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rather substantially." ' Were such reforms instituted, their effect would be
to lower the prison population, or at least to lessen its rate of growth. How
these opposing tendencies would balance out is problematic, but the likelihood
of some increase in public expenditures for correctional facilities or pro-
grams must be acknowledged.
The next step in rationalizing the plea bargaining process would be to
eliminate features of the Act that in themselves tend to induce distortion
of the facts or the law in order to do "justice" in a particular case. On
occasion, the minimum penalties applicable to some offenses are perceived
as so severe that everyone-prosecutor, defense counsel, and judiciary-
may agree that it would be highly unjust to impose them. In such cases,
even in a system free of undue demands on prosecutorial resources, it is
likely that an offense-distorting bargain will be struck and approved."4 '
A far better approach to such cases would be to build sufficient flexibility
into the sentencing code to handle such exceptionally mitigated offenders
without altering the offense in that manner. As discussed in more detail
elsewhere, to achieve such flexibility, it would be necessary to amend the
Act to include a modest downward modification of present sentencing
ranges,' 3 to allow for periodic imprisonment for a narrowly described group
of class X or class 1 felony offenders currently subject to mandatory prison
sentences,"' to modify the armed violence statute,' 5 and perhaps to further
narrow other provisions of the Act that presently mandate prison sentences.' 6
141. This topic is covered systematically in the second article in this series. See authorities
cited supra note 79 and infra notes 631-42 and accompanying text.
142. See authorities cited supra note 79. This phenomenon is commonly recognized in the
literature on plea bargaining. See D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT
OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 177-84 (1966); Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargain-
ing, 36 U. CMI. L. REV. 50, 52-53 (1968).
143. See infra text accompanying notes 631-42. Further support for such a change also will
be proffered in the second article in this series.
144. See infra note 630 and accompanying text.
145. The amendments to Illinois' armed violence statute included in the Act made it a class
X felony to commit any felony while armed with a dangerous weapon. Pub. Act No. 80-1099,
§ 1, 1977 III. Laws 3264, 3268 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 33A-2 (1983)). Case
law quickly established that the statute was constitutional as applied even to nonviolent felonies
in which the defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon, but made no effort to use it.
People v. Haron, 85 111. 2d 261, 264, 422 N.E.2d 627, 630 (1981); People v. Pace, 100 Ill.
App. 3d 213, 215, 426 N.E.2d 983, 986 (1st Dist. 1981). But see People v. Griswald, I 1111.
App. 3d 454, 444 N.E.2d 267, 268-69 (4th Dist. 1983) (questioning the wisdom of such a broadly
drawn statute).
In addition, a number of courts concluded that the armed violence statute applied to either
voluntary manslaughter, People v. Rollins, 108 Ill. App. 3d 480, 495, 438 N.E.2d 1322, 1332-33
(1st Dist. 1982), or involuntary manslaughter, People v. Matzke, 102 Il. App. 3d 905, 907-08,
430 N.E.2d 353, 355 (1st Dist. 1981), if committed while armed with a deadly weapon. These
conclusions gave prosecutors the option to convert most homicides into class X felonies. This
situation, at least, appears to have been remedied by the court in People v. Alejos, 97 II.
2d 502, 507-14, 455 N.E.2d 48, 50-53 (1983), which held that the armed violence statute was
not intended to apply to voluntary manslaughter. The other problems with the statute, however,
still remain.
146. See People ex rel. Carey v. Bentivenga, 83 Il1. 2d 537, 416 N.E.2d 259 (1981), for
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If such a flexible system is conditioned to avoid abuses, plea negotiations
may take place within that broadened framework. This will allow the defen-
dant to be sentenced appropriately without sacrificing public safety. Such
a revision, while probably not significantly changing the types and lengths
of sentences actually received by exceptionally mitigated offenders, nonetheless
could produce substantial benefits for the public. Because it would produce
more accurate versions of the criminal propensities of defendants, such a
system would go a long way towards assuring that dangerous recidivist
offenders would be quickly detected and appropriately punished.
After removing these barriers to rational bargains, troublesome questions
remain. What standard should be used to determine whether a bargained-
for sentence is in compliance with the Unified Code of Corrections, and
how will a judge actually go about determining whether that standard has
been met? For the prosecutor, the basic starting point is to consider the
information at hand concerning the nature and circumstances of the offense,
the defendant's participation therein, and the defendant's personal
background including any prior history of delinquency or criminal activity.
The prosecutor then must ask and answer the following question: Given all
of the foregoing information, what charge(s) would I be prepared to bring
against the defendant at trial and what sentence(s) would I recommend upon
conviction?' 7 This is a complicated process, but a necessary one, for the
a very compelling argument favoring a reform of this sort. Further support for this change
also will be proffered in the second article in this series.
147. The ethical precepts governing decisions on charging and sentencing require the prosecutor
to consider such matters. As to charging considerations, the ABA Prosecution Function Stan-
dards, supra note 78, make it "unprofessional conduct" for a prosecutor to either institute
or permit the continued pendency of charges once it becomes known either that they are not
supported by probable cause or that there is insufficient admissible evidence to support a con-
viction. Id. Standard 3-3.9(a). Similarly, Standard 3-3.9(e) points out that a prosecutor should
not bring or seek charges greater in number or degree than can reasonably be supported with
evidence at trial. For the text of Standard 3-3.9(b), see supra note 78. See also ILLINOIS CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 7-103(a) (codified as Article VIII of the Illinois Supreme
Court Rules set out following ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA, § (1983)) ("prosecutor may not in-
stitute criminal charges when obvious no probable cause") [hereinafter cited as ILL. CPR].
The ABA Prosecution Function Standards, supra note 78, also call upon the prosecutor to
play a role in the sentencing process very much like that called for by this proposal. In that
regard, Standards 3-6.1 and 3-6.2 provide in pertinent part:
Standard 3-6.1 Role in Sentencing
(a) The prosecutor should not make the severity of sentences the index of his
or her effectiveness. To the extent that the prosecutor becomes involved in the sentenc-
ing process, he or she should seek to assure that a fair and informed judgment
is made on the sentence and to avoid unfair sentence disparities.
(b) . . . When requested by the court to furnish a sentencing recommendation,
the prosecutor should have the obligation to do so.
Standard 3-6.2 Information Relevant to Sentencing
(a) The prosecutor should assist the court in basing its sentence on complete and
accurate information for use in the presentence report. The prosecutor should disclose
to the court any information in the prosecutor's files relevant to the sentence. If
incompleteness or inaccurateness in the presentence report comes to the prosecutor's
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sentence thus arrived at is the benchmark against Which the propriety of
any lenity in the actual plea bargain reached must be measured.' The process
of determining how much lenity is too much cannot be answered without
a candid assessment of what is being foregone.
For offenders chargeable with a class 1 or greater felony, a further measure
would be proposed: the filing with the sentencing judge, under seal,'" 9 of
a statement by the prosecutor answering the question posed above and
explaining why he or she was prepared to recommend making any conces-
sions embodied in the plea bargain.'50 This document would serve a number
of useful purposes. First, the judge would be informed of the basis and
attention, the prosecutor should take steps to present the complete and correct
information to the court and to the defense counsel.
(b) The prosecutor should disclose to the defense and to the court at or prior
to the sentencing proceeding all information in the prosecutor's files which is rele-
vant to the sentencing issue.
ABA Prosecution Function Standards, supra note 78, Standards 3-6.1, 3-6.2.
148. See People v. Moriarty, 25 Ill. 2d 565, 567, 185 N.E.2d 688, 689 (1962); People v.
Meyers, 56 111. App. 3d 176, 182, 371 N.E.2d 1130, 1134 (1st Dist. 1977).
The possibility of offering additional lenity to an offender, up to and including immunity,
based on the cooperation with law enforcement authorities, was deliberately omitted from this
calculus for several reasons. First, many cases do not involve this variable at all, making it
an improper subject of inclusion in a generally applied rule. Second, these cases vary enor-
mously, making the formulation of any general rule rather difficult. At one extreme are those
in which a relatively minor actor in a criminal episode provides absolutely critical information
against the major figure in the case, which is essential for successful prosecution. At the other
extreme are cases in which the information or testimony furnished either is of little or no
importance to the prosecution of others or is outweighed by other factors, such as the cooperating
defendant's role in the commission of the offense, and/or his or her prior record.
Perhaps the closest one can come to a general rule in this area is that plea bargaining conces-
sions should not normally be offered for such cooperation, unless it is of significant help to
law enforcement authorities and could not be obtained without a sentence discount of the type
offered. Agreements to sentences of probation or grants of immunity would be reserved for
those cases in which a nonincarcerative sentence otherwise would have been appropriate. See
Gifford, supra note 46, at 84-85.
149. Keeping prosecutorial sentencing recommendations confidential in this manner could
have the twin benefit of encouraging prosecutorial candor while discouraging prosecutorial play
to the gallery of public opinion. It is anticipated, however, that the prosecutor's recommenda-
tions would be available to defense counsel, in accordance with prevailing ethical precepts.
See ABA Prosecution Function Standard 3-6.2, supra note 147; cf. ILL. CPR, supra note 147,
Rule 7-104(b). Other authorities have argued that such disclosures should be made public, as
a matter of principle. See Gifford, supra note 46, at 85-86.
150. This measure is tied to the offenses charged rather than those pleaded to by the defen-
dant. This allows close scrutiny of the disposition of all offenders who were believed by the
authorities to have committed those crimes posing the greatest danger to public safety. The
decision to allow these offenders to plead guilty to charges of an entirely different character
undoubtedly poses the greatest threat to the public's well-being. Admittedly, some such persons
might still escape scrutiny by convincing the responsible authorities to file more lenient but
factually inappropriate initial charges. Because counsel for the accused is not involved at that
stage of the typical case, however, such reductions would almost certainly be limited to those
rare cases with extraordinary mitigating circumstances. A failure to file the full range of charges
in these cases could well be viewed as entirely appropriate. See ABA Prosecution Function
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magnitude of the concessions being offered and would be alerted to whether
additional measures, such as a pre-sentence investigation, 5 ' should be under-
taken before approving or disapproving the bargain. Second, the judge would
be provided with a second opinion as to the appropriate "non-discounted"
sentence for the offender.' 52 Finally, this statement would provide a more
informed basis for the sentencing judge's deference to the bargain struck
between the parties than is presently called for under the Act.' 3
It is, of course, possible that these prosecutorial statements would be biased
or self-serving, but it is far from clear that such would be the case. To
begin with, rule 7-102(a)(5) of Illinois' Code of Professional Responsibility
expressly forbids the attorneys from "knowingly mak[ing] a false statement
of . . . fact," 5 a prohibition echoed in ethical standards directed specifically
to prosecutors.' Those strictures, when coupled with a variety of other
ethical constraints,' 56 hopefully could be expected to keep such prosecutorial
statements reasonably accurate.
Moreover, there are a number of pragmatic factors that would operate
in favor of keeping such statements within reasonable bounds. Persistent
prosecutorial puffing concerning the charges that could be asserted and the
sentences that would be recommended after conviction would expand the
differential between the bargained-for sentence and that deemed "just." This
Standards, supra note 78, Standard 3-3.9(b); see also supra note 135 (cases holding that the
judiciary cannot insist that prosecutors bring particular charges against offenders).
There is no reason in principle why such recommendations should be limited to the offenses
herein proposed. At least one authority has advocated that a similar disclosure be required,
not just for serious offenses, but for every case in which the prosecutor has made a sentencing
recommendation. See Gifford, supra note 46, at 85. In this author's view, however, because
of this requirement's possible additional burden on prosecutorial authorities and its marginal
importance in many less serious cases in which imposition of probation would be virtually
a foregone conclusion, it seems preferable to confine it to cases involving more serious charges
as herein proposed. Proponents of Governor Thompson's original criminal justice package also
favored this view. S.B. 165, as amended 80th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess., 1.
151. These investigations may be ordered in any case. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-3-1
(1983).
152. For a discussion of the reasons for crediting this recommendation as "appropriate,"
see infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text. Of course, nothing in this proposal prevents
defense counsel from disputing the prosecutor's contentions.
153. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
154. See ILL. CPR, supra note 147, Rule 7-102(a)(5).
155. See ABA Prosecution Function Standards, supra note 78, Standard 3-2.8(a), which pro-
vides in pertinent part: "It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor intentionally to misrepresent
matters of fact . . . to the court."
156. Prosecutors' attempts to make their pre-sentence statements either biased or self-serving
would also appear to violate Rules 1-102(a)(4) (prohibiting "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation") and 1-102(a)(5) (prohibiting "conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice") of the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility. Such conduct
also could be construed as a "fraud upon a tribunal," which Rule 7-102(b)(2) would require
him to "promptly reveal . . . to the tribunal." See ILL. CPR, supra note 147, Rules 1-102(a)(4),
1-102(a)(5), 7-102(b)(2), and Rules 1-102(a)(l), 7-102(a)(8) (both forbidding conduct that violates
a disciplinary rule).
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gap would not only tend to reflect adversely on the prosecutor's bargaining
acumen, if not the prosecutor's veracity, but also could jeopardize the bargain
itself if the trial judge should be convinced that the proposed disposition
was unduly lenient. If, on the other hand, the prosecutor sought to minimize
these problems by "low-balling" the state's supposed charging and sentenc-
ing demands at trial, other difficulties would arise. The prosecutor would
have to explain why a light sentence would have been acceptable, in light
of the original charges and the offender's prior history of delinquency or
criminal activity." 7 The desire to avoid these embarrassing extremes, together
with the efforts of defense counsel, would hopefully keep most prosecutors
steered to a middle course.
What, then, of the sentencing judge's review of bargained-for sentences?
It seems that the judge is confronted with a process very similar to that
facing the prosecutor. Like the prosecutor, the judge must first consider the
information at hand concerning the nature and circumstances of the offense,
the defendant's participation in it, the defendant's personal background, and
any prior history of delinquency or criminal activity. The judge then must
ask: Given all the foregoing information, what range of sentences would
I have been prepared to impose had the defendant been convicted after a
trial on the charges in the bargained for plea? The answer to this question,
difficult though it may be, is nonetheless an essential prerequisite to a deci-
sion as to whether to approve the plea bargain, for it is that hypothetical
post-trial sentence that provides the scale against which the bargained-for
sentence must be measured.' 8
How great a deviation should be tolerated? The Act contains no answer,
but it was designed to insure that all offenders receive sentences which are
at least arguably commensurate with their crimes, prior records, and other
pertinent circumstances.' 9 Given the legislative design, some specific and
relatively narrow limitations are appropriate. For the sake of discussion, the
following proposals are advanced. First, for class 2, 3, and 4 felonies, a
plea bargain should be approveable'6 ° if the bargained-for sentence is within'6'
157. Such information always will be before the judge at sentencing in such cases. See ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-3-1, 1005-3-2 (1983).
158. See supra note 148.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 45-61.
160. As the word "approveable" indicates, this proposal is not intended to require a judge
to approve any bargained-for sentence. Instead, this proposal merely sets outer limits on the
deference that the court can show to the prosecutor's assessment of what sentence is appropriate
in a given case.
Other proposals regulating plea bargaining have recommended pegging allowable concessions
to percentages of a "presumptive" sentence to be set for each offense. See Gifford, supra
note 46, at 77-85 (total available range normally to be within plus or minus 30% of presump-
tive sentence). While that approach has its virtues, the author believes that it does not allow
sufficient interplay for the principal variables that can effect a choice of sentence-the defen-
dant's prior record and the variations in circumstances surrounding commission of the offenses
charged. It also would necessitate additional amendments to Illinois' sentencing law which,
in this author's judgment, are utterly beyond the political pale.
161. Normally, of course, a discounted plea-bargained sentence "within" a given range of
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two years of the sentence the judge would have imposed after trial. Second,
for class X and class 1 felonies, a bargained-for sentence should be
approveable only if within six and three years respectively of the judge's
hypothetical sentence. Third, special rules should govern prosecutorial recom-
mendations of probation or periodic imprisonment. In such cases, the judge's
hypothetical after-trial sentence would have to be within two years of the
minimum term for class 4 and 3 felonies, within one year of the minimum
term for class 2 felonies, and equal to the minimum term for class 1 or
X felonies before such agreements could be approved.' 62 Finally, for class
M felonies, the bargained-for sentence should be within ten years of the
judge's hypothetical post-trial sentence if it would have been imprisonment
for a term of years, not less than the median extended-term sentence if the
after-trial sentence would have been natural life, and not less than the max-
imum extended-term if the judge's sentence would have been death.' 63
This rule would allow considerable flexibility to prosecutors and judges to
compromise their differences, especially for minor offenses. The two-year dif-
ferential between prosecutorial and judicial sentencing recommendations for
class 2, 3, and 4 felonies covers the overwhelming majority of sentences cur-
rently meted out for such offenses. For example, with respect to the decision
as to whether to grant probation in such cases, the judge could accept a bargain
in which the prosecutor agreed to probation for every class 4 felon except those
for whom an extended term of imprisonment seemed to be required, and for
those class 3 and 2 felons whom the judge believed did not deserve prison
sentences in excess of four years.'64 Because most offenders at present receive
a hypothetical post-trial judicial sentence would be below rather than above the hypothetical
sentence. In those presumably rare instances where the court would be inclined to give a less
severe sentence than that proposed in the bargain at hand, it would probably be appropriate
to order a pre-sentence investigation to determine the source of the discrepancy. If the informa-
tion provided by that investigation left the judge convinced of the correctness of his or her
assessment, he would, of course, be free to impose the sentence of his choice, as in any other
case. See supra note 160. If a bargained-for sentence were beyond the acceptable range of
deviation from the hypothetical judicial sentence, however, the sentencing judge would be required
to disapprove it.
162. At present, all class X felonies and many class I felonies carry mandatory prison terms.
See ILL.' REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3(c)(2) (1983). In later sections of this article, as well
as in the next article in this series, proposals for making sentences of periodic imprisonment
available in a carefully circumscribed group of such cases are recommended. See infra note
630 and accompanying text. Unless such changes were implemented, however, the above recom-
mendations would apply only to certain class I felonies.
163. Under present law, the median extended term sentence for murder is 60 years and the
maximum extended term sentence for that crime is 80 years. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §
1005-8-2(a)(1) (1983). Interestingly, the latter part of this proposal already may be law. See
People v. Walker, 84 Ill. 2d 512, 419 N.E.2d 1167 (1981) (where state offered defendant an
80-year sentence if he pleaded guilty to murder and trial court indicated that sentence would
not exceed that amount, state not later allowed to seek death penalty when defendant withdrew
his plea), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1297 (1984).
164. These limitations are based on the minimum prison sentence for classes 4, 3 and 2
felons of one, two or three years respectively, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(a)(5)(6)(7)
(1983), and the proposed requirement that hypothetical judicial after-trial sentences be within
19841
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 33:631
sentences well below those figures,' no appreciable impact is anticipated on
plea bargaining practices for such offenses. For class M, X, and 1 felonies, the
permissible divergence increases to ten, six, and three years respectively, in
recognition of the need to offer greater concessions to obtain guilty pleas to
serious charges.' Hopefully, most bargained for sentences will fall within these
ranges of their hypothetical judicial after-trial counterparts so as to minimize
interbranch conflicts."7
This proposal is subject to a number of criticisms from a wide variety
of quarters. For one, it legitimates both plea bargaining and concessions
in sentencing made for the purpose of obtaining bargains, two practices that
have been widely condemned.'" A sufficient answer, however, is that such
two years of those minima for Class 4 and 3 felons and one year for Class 2 felons. See
text accompanying supra note 162.
165. Most convicted offenders in these categories presently receive probation. See Chart 6 in
text, at 699. Likewise, data provided by the DOC show that most offenders in these categories
who are incarcerated presently receive relatively minimal prison sentences. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 413-25.
166. Not surprisingly, even under the current unstructured bargaining regime, substantially
fewer persons plead guilty to more serious felonies than to lesser ones. The following table,
compiled from the Dispositions Chart, supra note 67, displays the percentages of felons con-
victed of various classes of felonies who pleaded guilty to such offenses in each indicated year.
Table 2
Year Jurisdiction M X 1 2 3 4
1979 Downstate 32.8 61.5 76.9 92.2 92.5 91.4
Cook 42.9 75.7 81.5 92.8 97.7 87.0
Total 41.2 73.2 79.1 92.6 92.6 89.8
1980 Downstate 24.1 58.3 80.7 92.7 92.1 92.6
Cook 37.1 69.5 65.4 90.3 91.4 88.8
Total 33.6 67.3 72.0 91.2 91.7 90.8
1981 Downstate 29.6 61.0 86.8 92.8 93.5 94.9
Cook 30.6 60.2 79.3 87.7 90.0 86.1
Total 30.4 60.3 83.2 89.7 91.3 92.0
167. The author has made no effort to ascertain what types of sentencing concessions are
actually offered by prosecutors in order to induce pleas to such charges. Were it to turn out
that those consessions are presently less than those proposed here, reductions to the current
levels would be favored. A considerable number of cases indicate, however, that the current
"discount" being offered for such serious offenses is considerably greater than proposed here.
See People v. Jackson, 89 I11. App. 3d 461, 411 N.E.2d 893 (tst Dist. 1980) (defendant sentenced
to 40 to 120 years for murder after trial instead of 15 to 25 years offered pursuant to plea
of guilty); People v. Peddicord, 85 ll. App. 3d 414, 407 N.E.2d 89 (3d Dist. 1980) (defendant
offered probation if he pleaded; sentence of eight years after trial affirmed); People v. Franklin,
80 111. App. 3d 128, 398 N.E.2d 1071 (1st Dist. 1979) (defendant claimed to have been offered
18 to 50 years if he pleaded guilty to murder, affirmed sentence of 200 to 600 years imposed
after trial). If those differentials are typical of the discounts offered, a thorough airing of
the causes of such conduct and any necessary corrective measures would be highly desirable.
168. See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS. COURTS
46-49 (1973) (Standard 3.1, the commentary thereto and various authorities cited therein);
Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1313-14 (1975).
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activities are a practical necessity approved by law. 6 9 Moreover, this pro-
posal at least has the virtue of rendering the criticized practices somewhat more
standardized, limited, and regulated.
Another likely criticism of this proposal is a charge that it will hamstring
prosecutors. Certainly that is not the intent, nor in this author's judgment
the likely effect, of such a system.' 0 Furthermore it seems clear that present
plea bargaining practices raise intolerable barriers to a rational sentencing
scheme. Thus, a remedy involving some structuring and limiting of
prosecutorial discretion must be undertaken. If such a remedy can be
accomplished in a way that is viewed as less threatening to legitimate
prosecutorial interests,' 7 ' its identification and implementation would be most
welcome.
Finally, the proposal could be subject to the opposite criticism-that it
will accomplish nothing. Under this view, judges would tailor their theoretical
sentences to fit the proposed limitations, while prosecutorial recommenda-
tions, however bizarre and unsupportable, would be routinely approved just
as they are now.' 2 This author believes, however, that most sentencing judges
really will try to take an independent "hard look"'7 3 at the bargains brought
before them if they are convinced that it is their duty to do so.' 7 Quite
apart from that possibility, the mere existence of concrete guidelines concern-
ing plea bargaining concessions could favorably affect the quality of the
169. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 361-62 (1978); Santobello v. New York,
404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971); People v. Hill, 78 I1. 2d 465, 471-72, 401 N.E.2d 517, 520 (1980);
People v. Davis, 94 Ill. App. 3d 809, 811, 419 N.E.2d 724, 726 (3d Dist. 1981); People v.
Benniefield, 88 Ill. App. 3d 150, 153-55, 410 N.E.2d 455, 457-58 (lst Dist. 1980). These cases stand
for the fact that results of plea bargains, specifically reduced sentences, have been promised
by the prosecutor and obtained via court order. See also Gifford, supra note 46, at 96 (reject-
ing abolitionist arguments as unrealistic and unwise).
170. See supra notes 147, 165-67 and accompanying text.
171. The paramount interests served by prosecutors are not obtaining convictions and lengthy
sentences, but doing justice and obtaining appropriate sentences. See ILL. CPR, supra note
147, Rule 7-104; ABA Prosecution Function Standards, supra note 78, Standards 3-1.1(b)(c),
3-1.4, 3-2.5(a), 3-3.4(c), 3-3.8, 3-3.9, 3-3.11, 3-6.1(a)(b), 3-6.2.
172. See supra notes 113-31 and accompanying text.
173. The term "hard look" is borrowed from various administrative law cases, where it
is utilized as a shorthand description for the degree of scrutiny to be given to the decision
of administrative agencies by reviewing courts. See, e.g., South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504
F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974); Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA.
L. REv. 509, 511 (1974).
174. This opinion may appear surprising in light of the unkind reflections on certain judicial
decisions appearing later in this article. See infra notes 262-64, 313-24, 376-89 and accompany-
ing text. Nonetheless, it is sincerely held. The requisite judicial independence would, of course,
be all the more likely were the Illinois Supreme Court to exercise either its inherent or statutory
rulemaking authority in support of such an effort. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-4.2
(1983). Indeed, the entire proposal outlined above could be implemented in this manner and,
as a matter of constitutional law, it arguably should be. Suggestions for the court's considera-
tion in that regard, as well as others, are discussed infra in notes 467-507 and the accompany-
ing text.
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bargains struck between counsel by setting realistic parameters for their
negotiations. Of course, recommendations for even more effective procedures
are wholly consistent with this limited effort.'75
But control of plea bargaining practices, important as it is, represents only
one aspect of the efforts needed to structure the exercise of sentencing discre-
tion. Another facet of that problem, the one most directly affected by the
Act, concerns its efforts to control judicial sentencing discretion.
III. STRUCTURAL CONTROLS OF JUDICIAL SENTENCING DISCRETION
A. An Overview
The Act took a somewhat ambivalent approach to structuring the exercise
of judicial discretion in sentencing. On the one hand, it clearly recognized
the preeminent role to be played by the judiciary in sentencing matters by
investing it with the authority and tools necessary to police prosecutorial
sentencing discretion.'7 6 On the other hand, mindful of the maxim "who
will guard tle guardians," The Act sought in a variety of ways to insure
that judicial sentencing prerogatives would be exercised in an informed,
reasoned manner. The provisions expanding resort to pre-sentence
investigations, '77 requiring a sentencing judge to be aware of a felony-
defendant's prior juvenile and adult record before imposing sentence,' and
mandating an independent judicial assessment of any bargained-for sentence'79
all illustrate efforts to structure sentencing discretion for that purpose.
In addition to these measures, the Act placed heavy reliance on a require-
ment that a trial judge prepare a statement detailing the evidence, informa-
tion, or factors relied upon in selecting the sentence imposed.' 0 The Act
also mandated the preparation of a report containing all information
presented to the court in connection with the defendant's sentencing and
a verbatim transcript of the sentencing hearing itself.' 8 ' These requirements,
which have their origins in almost identical provisions of the reform group's
bill,' 2 were intended to serve two principal goals. First, they were expected
to focus the trial judge's mind on the purposes and importance of the sentenc-
ing decision, thus enhancing the likelihood that an appropriate sentence would
be imposed.' Second, they were expected to facilitate an informed appellate
review of any sentences that were challenged as inappropriate.',"
175. For a representative cross section of these approaches, see authorities cited supra note 46.
176. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
180. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 III. Laws 3264, 3302 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-4-1(c) (1983)).
181. Id.
182. See S.B. 1885, 79th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1976 Sess., 5-4-1(c), (e)(2) at 22-24.
183. Proposal Commentary, supra note 27, at 27-28.
184. Id. at 29.
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In addition, the Act also intended that a number of sources of aid be
available to counsel and trial judges who wished to place a particular sentenc-
ing decision in a larger context. First, the Department of Corrections (DOC)
was required to gather detailed information concerning the sentences imposed
on felony offenders committed to the department and to prepare annual
reports of that information for the use of sentencing judges and counsel
in criminal cases.' 85 These efforts were to be augmented by a newly-created
Criminal Sentencing Commission (CSC).'" The CSC's role was to gather
a wide range of information on sentencing dispositions, to monitor the Act's
overall effects on the criminal justice system, and to propose any additional
reforms that it thought appropriate to further the purposes of the Act,
including sentencing guidelines. '87 The data generated by the DOC and the
CSC, it was believed, would serve to educate both judges and counsel as
to the prevailing sentencing practices in the state. Thus, by identifying cer-
tain sentences as either extremely lenient or exceptionally harsh as compared
to the usual run of cases, both sentencing judges and reviewing courts would
be alerted to their anomalous, and arguably unduly disparate, nature.' 88
In addition, the Supreme Court of Illinois was authorized to utilize its
rulemaking powers to "prescribe such practices and procedures as [would]
promote a uniformity and parity of sentences within and among the various
circuit courts and appellate court districts."' 89 This action, it was hoped,
would serve to interject issues of parity into the sentencing process in the
most painless fashion possible-by allowing the judiciary a leading role in
developing guidelines and standards for the exercise of the considerable
sentencing discretion left to it under the reform proposals.' 90
But what if, in spite of all these measures, a sentence was imposed that
was wholly disproportionate to the facts and circumstances of the case? The
Act provided a final barrier against such an eventuality by expanding the
power of the appellate courts to modify the sentencing judge's decision.' 9 '
Because of the controversy this proposal engendered, it is useful to trace
the historical development of the Act's appellate review provisions in some
detail.
As originally conceived, the process for appellate review of sentencing was
designed as a principal means for imposing regional and, ultimately, statewide
185. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3302 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-5-4.3 (1983)).
186. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I11. Laws 3264, 3314 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-10-1 (1983)).
187. Pub. Act. No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3315 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-10-2 (1983)).
188. Technical Paper, supra note 40, at 43-44.
189. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I11. Laws 3264, 3302 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-5-4.2 (1983)).
190. Technical Paper, supra note 40, at 43.
191. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I11. Laws 3264, 3302 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-5-4-1 (1983)).
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controls upon any undue sentencing extremes, whether of unwarranted harsh-
ness or lenity.'92 Placing this power to modify sentences firmly under judicial
auspices was believed to have at least four advantages. First, it would per-
mit the development of a "common law" approach to sentencing that would
be more responsive to significant factual differences arising from one case
to the next. Second, it would draw fully on the existing expertise of judges
in sentencing matters. Third, it would lessen concerns over the supposed
threats to judicial independence implicit in the new law.' 93 Finally, resistance
to any evolving limitations on sentencing discretion would be lessened if those
limitations were developed by judges rather than by others.' 4
As originally developed, appellate review procedures were contained in a
rather complicated bill that proposed both a state-initiated review' 9 and a
defendant-initiated review"' of the sentence for legality, fairness, and
proportionality.' 97 This initial approach, however, was criticized on the ground
that it was neither necessary nor appropriate for the General Assembly to
prescribe the precise method for reviewing a sentencing decision.' 8 The pro-
posal was abandoned in drafting H.B. 1500, in favor of a simple provision
authorizing felony defendants to appeal their sentences' 99 and, as a protec-
tion against frivolous appeals, creating "a rebuttable presumption that the
sentence imposed by the trial judge [was] proper."2 ' If a defendant suc-
ceeded in overcoming this presumption, the appellate court was authorized
to "modify the sentences and enter any sentence that the trial judge could
have entered. '"20' The appellate court, however, was precluded from increasing
the severity of any sentence even though the defendant had put the propriety
of his or her sentence at issue.20 2 Moreover, the right of the state to challenge
the leniency of a given sentence was eliminated. 0 3 The ultimate appellate
review provision adopted in the Act closely tracked this language, differing
only in authorizing the state to challenge the leniency of any sentence that
had been put at issue by the defendant.2 '
192. Technical Paper, supra note 40, at 43.
193. Id.
194. This point was never made explicit, but it was a concern of this author and at least
some members of the subcommittee and its staff.
195. S.B. 1884, 79th I11. Gen. Assembly, 1976 Sess., 5-10-3 at 3-4.
196. Id. 5-10-2 at 2-3.
197. Id.
198. Certain members of the judiciary took this position in testimony before the Adult Cor-
rections Subcommittee.
199. H.B. 1500, 80th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess., 5-5-4.1 at 36.
200. Id.
201. Id. 5-5-4.1(1).
202. Id. 5-5-4.1(2).
203. Id. 5-5-4.1.
204. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 II1. Laws 3264, 3302 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-5-4.1 (1983)). This was a rather hollow right, as it was unlikely that a sentence
that a defendant found too severe would be found too lenient by the appellate court. The
author cannot recall a single reported instance in which the state sought to exercise this right
before § 1005-5-4.1 was struck down as unconstitutional in People v. Cox, 82 Ill. 2d 268,
412 N.E.2d 541 (1980), discussed infra in text accompanying notes 369-90.
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Throughout the period in which these legislative efforts were being under-
taken, however, Illinois already had a mechanism for obtaining appellate
review of the sentence imposed on a criminal defendant. Supreme Court
Rule 615(b)(4) empowered a reviewing court to "reduce the punishment
imposed by the trial court.""0 5 There were two reasons to legislate in this
area despite the existence of rule 615(b)(4). The first was to permit increases
in sentences on appeal, the assumption being that such a power would be
exercised responsibly.1 6 It was also thought that this power would enable
the appellate courts to fashion a more balanced and complete treatment of
sentencing issues by bringing before those courts a fuller range of the
sentences actually imposed on offenders, rather than merely the most severe
sentences. 207
The second reason for legislative action was the narrow construction given
to rule 615(b)(4) in People ex rel. Ward v. Moran.2"8 In that case, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that the rule did not authorize a reviewing court to
alter the type of sentence imposed on an offender by the sentencing judge.2"9
This limitation, which certainly was not apparent from the language of the
rule itself, seemed particularly anomolous. It made those sentences thought
by an appellate court to be most unfair-sentences of imprisonment when
periodic imprisonment or probation was believed most appropriate-the least
amenable to correction." ' This state of affairs seemed to be particularly
undesirable in a sentencing system in which parole, the only source of discre-
tionary power to mitigate sentences (other than the appellate courts), was
to be abolished.
The General Assembly obviously felt it to be both fair and prudent to
vest broad sentencing review powers in the appellate courts in such cir-
cumstances. That decision, however, was not prompted by any specific desire
to modify the "abuse of discretion" standard for reviewing trial judges'
sentencing determinations. This standard had become firmly fixed in law
by the time of the Act's passage."' Although the legislature felt that appellate
205. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IlOA, § 615(b)(4) (1975).
206. There were dissenters from this view. See McAnany, Merritt & Tromanhauser, supra
note 43, at 639. Policy considerations aside, arguments were advanced from certain quarters
that allowing state-initiated appeals might violate the double jeopardy clauses of the Illinois
and United States Constitutions. This argument seems ripe for re-evaluation in light of the subse-
quent Supreme Court decision in United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980) (allowing
appellate court to increase sentence on appeal initiated by government does not violate double
jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution). But see Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S.
430, 446-47 (1981) (statute allowing prosecutor to appeal defendant's sentence in capital case
held unconstitutional, on rationale that the statute subjected defendant to "a trial on the issue
of punishment"). DiFrancesco, of course, does not resolve the question of state constitutional
strictures against such appeals, a subject beyond the scope of this article.
207. Proposal Commentary, supra note 27, at 56.
208. 54 Ill. 2d 552, 301 N.E.2d 300 (1973).
209. Id. at 555, 301 N.E.2d at 302.
210. Proposal Commentary, supra note 27, at 56.
211. See, e.g., People v. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d 149, 153, 368 N.E.2d 882, 883 (1977); People
v. Butler, 64 111. 2d 485, 490, 356 N.E.2d 330, 333 (1976); People v. Burbank, 53 Ill. 2d 261,
275, 291 N.E.2d 161, 169 (1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 951 (1973).
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review of sentencing decisions had been sporadic and ineffective at best,2"2
it believed that that condition had arisen because reviewing courts had been
hamstrung by a lack of legislative guidance regarding appropriate sentences,
coupled with a dearth of information concerning the bases for the sentences
imposed below. 2 3 With those defects corrected, it was anticipated that both
sentencing errors and appropriate dispositions would be far clearer than they
had been in the past. But while this meant that trial judges' sentencing deci-
sions would be vacated more frequently than before the Act's passage, no
modification of the abuse-of-discretion standard itself was seen as necessary
in order for this to occur.
Properly analyzed, then, the Act's efforts to structure judicial sentencing
discretion were quite conservative and deferential to both the general
independence and sentencing prerogatives of the judiciary. The preeminent
role of judicial discretion in sentencing matters was preserved largely as it
had been prior to the Act.2 ' Indeed, that role was enhanced in a number
of respects. 2 Nor was this done at all reluctantly. Rather, it seems fair
to say that the legislature trusted judges to impose a proper sentence in most
cases, provided that they were informed adequately as to the particulars of
the case before them and that they were fully informed concerning the fac-
tors pertinent to their decisions." ' When errors did occur, it was anticipated
that they would be revealed by the requirement for a reasoned basis for
imposing sentence. 2 7 The General Assembly trusted the judiciary to correct
such errors itself through the appellate review process established by the Act,
as well as through judicially created guidelines governing the exercise of trial
212. Subcommittee Report, supra note 38, at 11.
213. Id. The Subcommittee Report's treatment of the issue of undue judicial discretion was
itself a model of legislative discretion. Thus, while finding that undue disparity in sentencing
had occurred, the subcommittee did not lay this failure directly on the judiciary itself. Instead,
it found that "the wide range [of sentences] provided by indeterminate sentence statutes" was
"responsible for excessively disparate and inequitable sentences." Id. at 4. These disparities,
the subcommittee noted, were "compounded by the uncertainties and inequities caused by the
capriciousness of arbitrary parole decisions." Id. at 5.
Nonetheless, either in the body or appendix of its report, the subcommittee endorsed each
of the proposals suggested by the reform group for either structuring or directly limiting the
exercise of judicial sentencing discretion. Id. at 15-16.
214. This is not to deny that substantive limitations of sentencing discretion were imposed
as well in a variety of forms-providing specific factors in mitigation and aggravation, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-5-3.1, 1005-5-3.2 (1983), narrowing existing sentencing ranges, id.
§§ 1005-8-1, 1005-8-2, and limiting the circumstances under which extended or consecutive term
sentences could be imposed, id. §§ 1005-5-3.2(b), 1005-8-4(a), being the most noteworthy.
Nonetheless, as will be proffered in the next article in this series, these controls were deliberately
subordinated to the structural controls discussed below.
215. The reassertion of judicial control over plea-bargained sentences illustrates this point.
Indeed, determinate sentences in and of themselves enhance that authority, by assuring the
sentencing judges that their wishes as to punishment will be implemented. See supra notes 32-33
and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 180-83, 185-90 and accompanying text.
217. See Proposal Commentary, supra note 27, at 29.
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judges' sentencing discretion.2 8 Direct legislative limitations on that discre-
tion were kept to a minimum.
This experiment in judicial self-restraint and self-policing appears to have
worked rather poorly in practice. All three of the Act's major controls on
judicial discretion have been subject to constitutional attack as violative of
the separation of powers. Only the first requirement, the mandatory con-
sideration of certain information before imposing sentence, has been
sustained.2"9 The latter two requirements, mandating a statement of reasons
for imposing sentence and requiring a searching appellate review of sentenc-
ing decisions, have been invalidated as unconstitutional legislative intrusions
on judicial prerogatives.22 These developments have been accompanied by
an almost liturgical devotion to the perceived wisdom of the sentencing deci-
sions of trial judges. As a result, the correction of such decisions on appeal
as "abuses of discretion" has become a far too infrequent event.22 ' These
developments are traced out in detail below.
B. The Use-of-Information Requirement
The Act sought to improve sentencing practices by mandating judicial con-
sideration of certain information in all felony cases. When the parties had
agreed upon a sentence to recommend to the court, a legislative judgment
was made that the court need not have more information available to it
than "the defendant's history of delinquency or criminality." '222 When such
an agreement had not been negotiated, however, a full pre-sentence report
218. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3302 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-5-4.2 (1983)) (authorizing the Supreme Court to utilize its rulemaking powers
in that area); see also Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3315 (codified at ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-10-2(5) (1983)) (allowing the Criminal Sentencing Commission to
develop guidelines).
219. See People v. Youngbey, 82 IIl. 2d 556, 413 N.E.2d 416 (1980) (sustaining constitu-
tionality of mandatory consideration of certain information by trial judge before imposing
sentence). For a discussion of Youngbey, see infra notes 226-40 and accompanying text.
220. See People v. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d 155, 442 N.E.2d 855 (1982) (stating that any effort
by the General Assembly to require judges to provide reasons for imposing sentences would
be unconstitutional; and holding that the Act's language that judges "shall" do so was direc-
tory rather than mandatory); People v. Cox, 82 111. 2d 268, 412 N.E.2d 541 (1980) (holding
that the Act's appellate review provisions were unconstitutional as intrusions by the General
Assembly on the manner in which cases are decided). For a discussion of Davis, see infra
notes 291-315 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Cox, see infra notes 369-90 and
accompanying text.
221. The author is aware of approximately 20 cases since the Act went into effect in which
trial judges' sentences were vacated on appeal as unduly harsh and which were not in turn
reinstated by the Illinois Supreme Court. None of these cases develops any general guidelines
for taking such actions and a number appear to have been erroneously decided. See infra notes
445-66 and accompanying text.
222. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 II1. Laws 3264, 3294 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-3-1 (1983)); see supra notes 45-61 and accompanying text.
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touching on a wide variety of matters was required.223 This information was
required to be disclosed and considered because of the public interest in
informed, rational sentencing decisions. The public interest overrode any
custom of allowing the parties to strike their own bargains and have them
ratified with minimal judicial oversight.22 ' Those procedures also facilitated
the intelligent presentation of sentencing issues to trial courts and the review
of those courts' sentencing decisions on appeal, as the Act intended.225
The right of the legislature to pursue these goals did not go unchallenged.
In People v. Youngbey,21 6 the Illinois Supreme Court reviewed a circuit court
decision that had held, sua sponte, that the legislative requirement of a man-
datory pre-sentence investigation was an unconstitutional encroachment on
both the judiciary's sentencing power and the executive's plea bargaining
authority.227 Neither party to the appeal supported this ruling228 and the
supreme court made short work of it as well. The court referred to its then
recent opinion in Strukoff v. Strukoffl2 9 for an authoritative discussion of
the limitations that the legislature must observe in enacting laws relating to
judicial proceedings. The court concluded that the pre-sentence investigation
provision was constitutional.230 While observing that the imposition of
sentence is a judicial function, the Youngbey court went on to note that
the provision on review dealt merely with an aspect of presentencing
procedure 3 ' that had been enacted "for the enlightenment of the court as
well as for the benefit of the defendant." 32 Such a "useful tool for the
sentencing judge" constituted a "reasonable legislative requirement" that did
not violate the separation of powers.233
The Youngbey court's heavy reliance on Strukoff seemed to bode well
for the resolution of separation of powers issues raised by other provisions
of the Act. The Strukoff court had tolerated a far more marked intrusion
into an area of judicial activity than was presented by any of the Act's
provisions. 34 In so doing, it had specifically refused an invitation to "fence
off" the procedural aspects of judicial operations as beyond the legislative
223. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3294 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-3-2 (1983)).
224. See supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
226. 82 I11. 2d 556, 413 N.E.2d 416 (1980).
227. Id. at 559, 413 N.E.2d at 418.
228. Id.
229. 76 111. 2d 53, 389 N.E.2d 1170 (1979).
230. 82 111. 2d at 560, 413 N.E.2d at 419.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 565, 413 N.E.2d at 421.
233. Id.
234. In Strukoff v. Strukoff, 76 I11. 2d 53, 389 N.E.2d 1170 (1979), the court sustained
a legislative provision requiring bifurcated trials in contested divorces. Although the statute
did not conflict directly with any Illinois Supreme Court rule, it obviously was a direct regula-
tion of the procedure to be followed by trial courts in conducting their day-to-day activities,
an area in which judicial prerogatives are entitled to exceptional deference.
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pale."' It also rejected the notion that the separation of powers doctrine
necessitated "rigidly separated compartments" of government.23 6 Rather, the
"real thrust" of the doctrine was to keep each branch of government "free
from the control or coercive influence of the other departments." '37
The Strukoff court then analyzed the legislative purpose in enacting the
measure noting that its objective was "unquestionably laudable . .
reasonable, and within the province of legislative power.""23 The court con-
cluded that, because the legislature had not tried to "direct how a court
should decide cases ... [or] to determine facts and apply the law to them," '239
the measure at issue did not pose the dangers necessary to a proper invoca-
tion of the separation of powers doctrine.246
Based on that reasoning, it would seem to follow that legislative
requirements that judges give reasons for their sentencing decisions2" and
that those decisions be subjected to correction on appeal" 2 could not possibly
be unconstitutional intrusions on judicial prerogatives. These requirements
posed no threat to the institutional independence of the judicial branch of
government, nor were they an effort by the legislature to influence the out-
come of particular cases. Instead, they had the "unquestionably laudable
[and] . . . reasonable"2 '3 objective of insuring that the legislative sanctions
were imposed in a fair, rational, and even-handed manner. In two excep-
tionally misguided decisions, however, the Illinois Supreme Court struck down
each of these requirements on precisely those grounds.4 '
C. The Reasons Requirement
One of the linchpins of the new law was its requirement that a trial judge
give reasons for the sentence imposed on an offender. 5 This feature of
the law served three principal functions. First, it accorded offenders a measure
of fundamental fairness: the right to know why a particular sentence was
imposed and to be assured that it met minimum standards of rationality.2
6
235. In fact, the court noted rather tolerantly that "statutory provisions governing procedure
are not uncommon." 76 I11. 2d at 61, 389 N.E.2d at 1173.
236. Id. at 58, 389 N.E.2d at 1172 (quoting In re Estate of Barker, 63 Ill. 2d 113, 119,
345 N.E.2d 484, 488 (1976)).
237. 76 I11. 2d at 58-59, 389 N.E.2d at 1172 (quoting People v. Farr, 63 I11. 2d 209, 213,
347 N.E.2d 146, 148 (1976)).
238. 76 111. 2d at 61, 389 N.E.2d at 1173.
239. Id. at 60, 389 N.E.2d at 1172 (quoting People ex rel. County Collector v. Jeri, Ltd.,
40 I11. 2d 293, 302, 239 N.E.2d 777, 781 (1968)).
240. 76 111. 2d at 58-62, 389 N.E.2d at 1172-73.
241. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-4-1(c), 1005-8-1(b), 1005-8-4(b) (1983).
242. Id. § 1005-5-4.
243. Strukoff v. Strukoff, 76 II1. 2d 53, 60-61, 389 N.E.2d 1170, 1173 (1979).
244. See People v. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d 155, 442 N.E.2d 855 (1982) (discussed infra notes 291-315
and accompanying text); People v. Cox, 82 Ill. 2d 268, 412 N.E.2d 541 (1980) (discussed infra
notes 369-90 and accompanying text).
245. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Il1. Laws 3264, 3296, 3309 (codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-4-1(c), 1005-8-1(b) (1983)).
246. See supra notes 176-84 and accompanying text.
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This effect also bolstered the second main purpose of this requirement:
facilitating the correction of sentencing errors at the trial level by permitting
the defendant to correct any errors or misperceptions the court might have
had regarding the nature of the offender or the circumstances of the
offense.2"7 Finally, if the trial judge remained convinced of the propriety
of the sentence, this requirement eliminated the need to speculate on why
the judge imposed a given sentence. Instead, a complete record would be
provided upon which an appellate court could conduct a thorough review
of the sentence imposed for appropriateness under the Unified Code of
Corrections.24
From the outset, the requirement of a statement of reasons was given a
rather chilly reception by courts of review. Countless indulgent appellate
panels approved even the most minimal utterance by trial judges as
sufficient," 9 exhibited an unquestioning acceptance of lengthier explanations
of doubtful quality,"' and even excused sentences apparently imposed in
part for reasons that violated the Act."' Finally, in People v. Davis"2 the
Illinois Supreme Court administered the coup de grace to this requirement
by holding that it was directory rather than mandatory." 3
1. The Erosion of the Reasons Requirement
Judicial hostility to the requirement of a reasoned basis for imposing
sentence is manifested by a wide variety of presumptions used by appellate
courts to shield questionable sentencing decisions from attack. In numerous
cases, for example, trial judges made only passing generic reference to
extensive mitigating evidence tendered by the defendants. At the same time,
these judges dwelt at length on aggravating circumstances. Defendants' claims
that the trial judges did not give due consideration to those mitigating fac-
tors have usually failed. 5' Frequently the appellate courts have excused the
247. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
248. See supra text accompanying note 184.
249. Illustrative of this attitude is the case of People v. Riley, 99 Ill. App. 3d 244, 424
N.E.2d 1377 (4th Dist. 1981), in which the trial court's statement that " 'justice would be served'
and a sufficient deterrent effected" by imposition of the sentences at issue would satisfy the
statutory requirement. Id. at 254, 424 N.E.2d at 1384.
250. See, e.g., People v. Surges, 101 Ill. App. 3d 962, 428 N.E.2d 1012 (Ist Dist. 1981)
(discussed supra text accompanying notes 88-118); People v. Dewaele, 98 Ill. App. 3d 636,
424 N.E.2d 876 (3d Dist. 1981).
251. See, e.g., People v. Lobdell, 121 I1. App. 3d 248, 259, 459 N.E.2d 260, 263 (3d Dist.
1983) (extended term sentence of 50 years for brutal rape affirmed, even though appellate court
recognized that trial judge had relied on one admittedly improper factor, as well as on a general
deterrence rationale, which also is not an appropriate basis for such a sentence); People v.
Longoria, 117 Ill. App. 3d 241, 256, 452 N.E.2d 1350, 1360 (2d Dist. 1983) (imposition of
extended term sentence on defendant affirmed, even though trial court had relied on a mistaken
view of the severity of defendant's prior record in imposing sentence). This issue will be discussed
at greater length in the next article in this series.
252. 93 Ill. 2d 155, 442 N.E.2d 855 (1982).
253. Id. at 162-63, 442 N.E.2d at 858.
254. See, e.g., People v. Meeks, 81 11. 2d 524, 533-34, 411 N.E.2d 9, 14 (1980); see also
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absence of any specific reference to the mitigating materials by saying that
the reasons requirement does not obligate trial judges to recite and assign
a value to each factor they relied upon.255 Other courts have gone still fur-
ther and stated, against all logic, that a court of review may assume that
a trial judge who did articulate factors in aggravation also properly con-
sidered the factors in mitigation which were not articulated. 5 6 Finally, other
courts have erected a presumption that mitigating evidence was considered
by the trial judge, absent some indication to the contrary, other than the
sentence imposed."'
The Act's requirement of an articulated, reasoned basis for imposing
sentence also has been affected by appellate courts' repeated affirmation of
the principle that a sentencing judge should be given exceptionally wide
latitude, free of traditional evidentiary restrictions, in deciding what matters
to consider in imposing a given sentence. 2" The basic rule in this context
has been that any information bearing on the defendant's background or
character, or the circumstances of the crime, may be taken into account
in sentencing, as long as it meets minimal standards of fairness, reliability,
and accuracy. 2" Pursuant to this rule, a great quantity and variety of
information has been held to have been properly put before sentencing judges.
Moreover, lengthy sentences have been affirmed without any serious con-
sideration being given to the reliability of the information, the fairness of
its use against the defendant at sentencing, or the weight given to it by the
sentencing judge.2'" Defendants frequently have fared little better even in
People v. Baker, 114 11. App. 3d 803, 811, 448 N.E.2d 631, 637 (2d Dist. 1983) (where mitigating
evidence is before the court, it is presumed that the sentencing judge considered the evidence,
absent some indication to the contrary); People v. Peacock, 109 I1. App. 3d 684, 687-88, 440
N.E.2d 1260, 1263 (2d Dist. 1982) (the trial record need only be sufficient to enable the appellate
court to review the question of whether the court exercised discretion pursuant to the statutory
criteria); People v. Wallace, 100 Ill. App. 3d 424, 434, 426 N.E.2d 1017, 1025-26 (5th Dist.
1981) (no abuse of discretion in sentencing defendent where it appeared the court had con-
sidered the evidence adduced at trial, the pre-sentence investigation and the information offered
in aggravation and mitigation).
255. See authorities cited supra note 254.
256. See, e.g., People v. Baker, 114 11. App. 3d 803, 811, 448 N.E.2d 631, 637 (2d Dist.
1983); People v. Bartik, 94 Ill. App. 3d 696, 701, 418 N.E.2d 1108, 1112 (2d Dist. 1981);
People v. Padilla, 91 Il1. App. 3d 799, 802, 415 N.E.2d 12, 14-15 (1st Dist. 1980).
257. People v. Baker, 114 I1. App. 3d 803, 811, 448 N.E.2d 631, 637 (2d Dist. 1983); Peo-
ple v. Fugitt, 87 11. App. 3d 1044, 1047, 409 N.E.2d 537, 540 (3d Dist. 1980).
258. See, e.g., People v. LaPointe, 88 Ill. 2d 482, 491, 431 N.E.2d 344, 349-350 (1981);
People v. Meeks, 81 Ill. 2d 524, 535, 411 N.E.2d 9, 14-15 (1980); People v. Adkins, 41 Ill.
2d 297, 300-01, 242 N.E.2d 258, 260 (1968).
259. See supra note 258; see also People v. Crews, 38 11. 2d 331, 337-38, 231 N.E.2d 451,
454 (1967) (stating that a sentencing determination is not bound by the usual rules of evidence,
but may search anywhere within reasonable bounds for other factors which tend to aggravate
or mitigate the offense).
260. People v. LaPointe, 88 I1. 2d 482, 494-95, 431 N.E.2d 344, 349 (1981) (defendant's
acknowledged use of illegal drugs, as well as alleged attempt to have them smuggled into jail,
found to be a history of prior criminal activity); People v. Woods, 122 Il. App. 3d 176, 179,
460 N.E.2d 880, 883 (1st Dist. 1984) (defendant's 60-year rape sentence affirmed in part because
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those rare cases where they have succeeded in convincing an appellate court
that the rule's generous limits were exceeded. In these cases, yet another
presumption has protected trial judges' sentencing discretion: that trial judges
have recognized and disregarded incompetent evidence introduced during
sentencing proceedings, unless the contrary clearly appears in the record.261
This rather cavalier approach hardly comprises the battery of rules that
would be formulated by a judiciary bent on assuring fairness and justice
in sentencing. In their totality, these rules have eroded the value of the state-
ment of reasons as a check on improper judicial sentencing decisions and
have placed an extraordinary and unfair burden on any defendants seeking
to challenge their sentences. The practical effect of these cases has been to
create the presumption that trial judges have weighed all salient matters,
and no others, in imposing sentence. Thus, trial judges have been allowed
to consider matters that should not be given weight, and to ignore factors
that should be taken into account. Inasmuch as the length of a sentence
alone has been deemed irrelevant,262 defendants apparently may secure reduc-
tions of "explained" sentences only in those rare appeals in which that
explanation contained an explicit error.263
he attempted to hire person to kill victim after he had been apprehended); People v. Alex-
ander, 118 111. App. 3d 33, 38, 454 N.E.2d 691, 694-95 (1st Dist. 1983) (defendant's 20-year
armed robbery sentence affirmed in part on basis of testimony of another alleged victim of
defendant who claimed he had robbed her); People v. Goree, 115 Ill. App. 3d 157, 162-63,
450 N.E.2d 342, 345-46 (5th Dist. 1983) (defendant's 40-year murder sentence affirmed in part
on basis of his alleged involvement in another murder); People v. Smith, 105 I11. App. 3d
639, 642-43, 433 N.E.2d 1169, 1171 (4th Dist. 1982) (fact that defendant utilized shotgun rather
than some less dangerous weapon in perpetrating armed robbery held to be legitimately con-
sidered in aggravation, even though weapon was never fired); People v. Perez, 101 Ill. App.
3d 64, 67, 427 N.E.2d 820, 824 (1st Dist. 1981) (defendant's 60-year sentence for rape affirmed
in part on the basis of testimony by two women, other than the complainant, who said he
had raped them in separate incidents). Also fairly considered under this category are cases
which permit defendants' perceived perjury at trial, People v. Hayes, 62 Ill. App. 3d 360,
366, 378 N.E.2d 1212, 1216 (1st Dist. 1978), or at sentencing, People v. Oravis, 81 111. App.
3d 717, 719, 402 N.E.2d 297, 299 (4th Dist. 1980), to be utilized in aggravation as indicia
of a lack of remorse. These and similar cases, many of which are rather questionable in the
author's view, are discussed at greater length in the second article in this series.
261. See, e.g., People v. Tucker-El, 123 Ill. App. 3d 955, 962, 463 N.E.2d 991, 996-97 (2d
Dist. 1984); People v. Beyah, 102 Ill. App. 3d 434, 437, 430 N.E.2d 83, 86 (1st Dist. 1981);
People v. Boyce, 51 I11. App. 3d 549, 563, 366 N.E.2d 914, 925 (2d Dist. 1977); People v.
Flynn, 23 I11. App. 3d 730, 736, 320 N.E.2d 138, 142 (1st Dist. 1974).
262. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
263. Occasionally such explicit admissions are made. See, e.g., People v. Moriarty, 25 Ill.
2d 565, 566-67, 185 N.E.2d 688, 689 (1962) (vacating sentence where the trial judge had stated
that the heavy sentence was imposed in part because the defendant had availed himself of
his right to a jury trial); People v. Young, 20 Ill. App. 3d 891, 894, 314 N.E.2d 280, 282
(lst Dist. 1974) (sentence vacated where trial judge acknowledged that it had been increased
in part because defendant had exercised his right to trial by jury). In rare instances, courts
will vacate sentences based solely on the disparity between the rejected bargain and the sentence
imposed after trial, but only in extreme cases. See People v. Dennis, 28 I11. App. 3d 74, 76-77,
328 N.E.2d 135, 137-38 (Ist Dist. 1975) (40- to 80-year sentence vacated where defendant was
offered term of two to four or two to five years to plead guilty to same charges).
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The Act unquestionably requires far more of both sentencing judges and
reviewing courts. The whole purpose of the reasons requirement is to eliminate
precisely the kinds of guesswork and speculation that the above cases have
papered over with presumptions.264 Whenever factors which may have been
either improperly excluded or improperly included may have been material
to the sentence reached, remand for further sentencing proceedings should
be required unless the undisputed matters of record fully justified the sentence
imposed. The present trend, however, is in precisely the opposite direction:
the internment rather than the resurrection of the reasoned basis requirement.
2. The Elimination of the Reasons Requirement
Even the forgiving rules of construction developed in the cases discussed
above did not dispose of a more troubling group of cases: those in which
the trial court had stated no reason for imposing sentence. The sentences
in these cases had clearly been imposed in a manner contrary to that required
by the Act.2 65 The question thus arose whether such an omission automatically
required an appellate court to vacate the sentence and remand the case, or
whether the omission, in at least some cases, might not have been excused
on the basis of either harmless error or waiver.
Among the early appeals involving the complete failures of trial judges
to follow the reasons requirement, a split of authority soon appeared as
to the need for a further sentencing hearing. One of the first cases, People
v. Rickman,26 6 held that a new sentencing hearing was required because the
statutory provision mandated an adequate specification of reasons. 267 The
Rickman opinion did not mention whether the defendant had been prejudiced
by or had waived the omission. Shortly thereafter People v. Slack2 6' also
vacated a "no reason" sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hear-
ing, holding that the statute made "some statement of sentencing considera-
tions mandatory. 2 69 Once again, the issues of prejudice and waiver were
not specifically raised. Prejudice to the defendant seemed likely, however,
because he had received concurrent maximum regular term sentences for the
offenses involved despite his presentation of mitigating evidence at his sentenc-
264. See supra text accompanying notes 245-48.
265. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 111. Laws 3264, 3296, provided that "[i]n imposing
a sentence for a felony, the trial judge shall specify on the record the particular evidence,
information, factors or other reasons that led to his sentencing determination." Public Act
No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 111. Laws 3264, 3296 (emphasis added), amended by Pub. Act No.
82-209, § I, 1981 111. Laws 1163, 1164 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §1005-4-1(c) (1983))
(included factors in mitigation and aggravation); see also Public Act No. 80-1099, §3, 1977
I11. Laws 3264, 3309 (the judge's reasons may include any mitigating or aggravating factors
specified in the Unified Code of Corrections) (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(b)
(1983)).
266. 73 Ill. App. 3d 755, 391 N.E.2d 1114 (3d Dist. 1979).
267. Id. at 762, 391 N.E.2d at 1120.
268. 81 I11. App. 3d 557, 402 N.E.2d 275 (5th Dist. 1980).
269. Id. at 559, 402 N.E.2d at 277.
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ing hearing. 7 The Slack court noted that the basic purposes behind the
requirement were to enable reviewing courts to determine whether sentenc-
ing decisions were "consistent with statutory objectives," and to further the
defendant's rehabilitation by making it clear that the sentences were not the
result of "arbitrariness or persecution."" '' Neither of these statutory pur-
poses could be fulfilled, the court noted, if the bases for the sentencing deci-
sions were unclear.
272
In a line of cases beginning with People v. Taylor,2 73 however, the First
District took a different view. The Taylor court, while agreeing that the
statutory requirement was mandatory, nonetheless held that a remand for
resentencing was unnecessary absent a showing of any prejudice caused by
the omission.2 7 In Taylor, a defendant with two prior convictions for forgery
and counterfeiting received a four year prison sentence for a robbery in which
he repeatedly struck the victim.2 7' Although a pre-sentence report had been
prepared and a hearing in aggravation and mitigation had been held, the
trial judge gave no reason for his choice of sentence. 76 On appeal, the defen-
dant challenged that omission but did not allege that his sentence was illegal
or excessive. Nor did he allege that the trial court had considered incompe-
tent evidence in arriving at its determination.
77
The appellate court concluded that the failure to give reasons in such cir-
cumstances was "only technical or formal error. ' 2 78 Noting that the defen-
dant had not even attempted to counter the statutory rebuttable presump-
tion that the trial court's sentence was proper,2 79 the Taylor court concluded
that "it could hardly be contended that a sentence one year greater than
the minimum was excessive or improper. "280 Consequently, the appellate court
concluded that the statutory purpose of facilitating the appellate review of
sentences would not be furthered by a remand for a new sentencing hear-
ing, and refused to require one.2 8'
The Taylor court also implied that the defendant had waived his right
to challenge the trial judge's omission of reasons for sentencing by failing
to object thereto either contemporaneously or in post-trial motions. 2 Never-
theless, two later cases, People v. Padilla283 and People v. Wilson,284 made
270. Id. at 559, 402 N.E.2d at 276.
271. Id. at 559, 402 N.E.2d at 277.
272. Id.
273. 82 Ill. App. 3d 1075, 403 N.E.2d 607 (1st Dist. 1980).
274. Id. at 1077, 403 N.E.2d at 608-09.
275. Id. at 1077, 403 N.E.2d at 608.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 1077, 403 N.E.2d at 609.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1078, 403 N.E.2d at 609-10.
282. Id.
283. 91 I11. App. 3d 799, 415 N.E.2d 12 (1st Dist. 1980).
284. 93 I1. App. 3d 161, 416 N.E.2d 1169 (1st Dist. 1981).
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it clear that a waiver rationale would not stand when undisputed facts of
record did not clearly and affirmatively show that the trial court's sentence
was proper."' In Padilla, the defendant was able to point to "facts which
show he might have been given a lesser [prison] sentence or some other
disposition." '286 As a result, his five-year sentence for voluntary manslaughter
was vacated and the case remanded for a new sentencing hearing. 87 Wilson
went even farther, vacating the relatively modest sentences of thirty and fif-
teen years imposed by the trial court for a brutal shotgun murder and
attempted murder respectively, even though the defendant alluded to no
specific circumstances in mitigation. 88 The Wilson court noted that the defen-
dant's allegation of an excessive sentence could not be reviewed due to the
trial court's failure to articulate the factors it had considered. On that basis
the court found neither "actual nor substantial compliance with the statute"
and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. 89
The Padilla!Wilson approach was a most salutary construction of the new
law because it promised to prevent the imposition of arbitrary and
unjustifiable sentences while forestalling needless delay and disruption. In
effect, it stripped away the statutory presumption that a sentence was
proper298 when the reasoned weighing and analysis of the nature of the
offender and the circumstances of the offense underlying that presumption
did not affirmatively appear in the record. If a defendant in such cir-
cumstances could point to factors suggesting that a reasonable sentencing
judge might have imposed a lesser sanction, a new sentencing hearing would
be held. Otherwise the sentence would be affirmed based either on the
appellate court's independent review of the record or on a "waiver" rationale.
All of these developments were thrown into disarray, however, by the
Illinois Supreme Court's opinion in People v. Davis.29 Davis involved two
consolidated cases in which defendants had been sentenced without a state-
ment of reasons by the trial court. The defendants had not objected to that
omission at the sentencing hearing or in a post-trial motion. 92 In each case,
285. Id. at 165-66, 416 N.E.2d at 1172-73. In People v. Baseer, 90 I11. App. 3d 866, 867-68,
414 N.E.2d 5, 6 (1st Dist. 1980), the defendant was convicted of assaulting and raping the
17-year-old sister of his former wife and received an eight-year sentence. Concerning the trial
judge's unobjected to failure to give reasons for that sentence, the appellate court stated,
"[A]bsent any showing of prejudice to defendant, a remand for resentencing is not required.
We have determined that defendant's sentence was not excessive." Id. at 874, 414 N.E.2d at 11.
286. 91 111. App. 3d at 802-03, 415 N.E.2d at 15.
287. Id. at 803, 415 N.E.2d at 15.
288. 93 I11. App. 3d at 168, 416 N.E.2d at 1174.
289. Id.
290. The Act created a rebuttable presumption that a trial judge's sentence was proper. Pub.
Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3302 (codified at ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-4.1
(1979)), amended by P.A. 83-344, § 1, 1983 111. Laws 2573, 2573 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, §1005-5-4.1 (1983)). The section now reads in its entirety: "The defendant has the right
of appeal in all cases from sentences entered on conviction of murder or any other Class of
felony." Id.
291. 93 Ill. 2d 155, 442 N.E.2d 855 (1982).
292. Id. at 158-59, 442 N.E.2d at 855-56.
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the appellate court had refused to remand for resentencing, holding that
the defendant had waived his right to an explanation of his sentence.293 The
supreme court noted that these appellate decisions conflicted with the view
that the specification of reasons was "an independent duty imposed upon
the trial court by statute which cannot be waived by either party," and whose
violation always called for remand for a proper sentencing hearing.2 94 The
middle ground adopted in such cases as Padilla and Wilson, requiring remand
only when the absence of prejudice to the defendant did not clearly appear
of record, apparently escaped the court's notice.'
Thus, under the Davis court's view of existing authority there were two
lines of cases, both of which viewed the statute as imposing a mandatory
requirement on trial judges to give reasons for the sentences they imposed,
but only one of which permitted that requirement to be waived by the
defendant.29 ' In a stunning turnabout, however, this uniform-and unques-
tionably accurate-construction of the Act was rejected by the court in its
holding that the legislature had merely directed rather than mandated that
trial courts give their reasons for sentencing.297 The Davis court concluded
that a mandatory provision "would clearly . . . [be] an unconstitutional
invasion of the inherent power of the judiciary" to impose sentence.298 To
avoid invalidating the statute, the court construed it as merely stating a purely
personal right of the defendant, rather than imposing an independent duty
on the sentencing judge. The court concluded that this right could be
waived.2 99
The Davis court's constitutional argument was both unnecessary and
ill-conceived. Inexplicably, a majority of the court seemed anxious to go
out of its way to discourse on what was, at best, an ephemeral separation-
of-powers issue.3"0 Rather than raise a constitutional issue, the court could
have construed the statutory language, albeit erroneously,30 ' as intended solely
to confer a personal benefit on a defendant which was waivable by that
defendant in much the same way that other important rights are waivable.3 ° '
Alternatively, the court could have avoided constitutional questions by adopt-
ing the construction put forward in the Padilla/Wilson line of cases, excus-
293. Id. at 158-59, 442 N.E.2d at 856.
294. Id.
295. The Court cited Wilson, supra notes 284-94, but treated it as an absolute "no waiver"
case. Davis, 93 I11. 2d at 159, 442 N.E.2d at 856.
296. Id. at 159, 442 N.E.2d at 856-57.
297. Id. at 160-61, 442 N.E.2d at 857-58.
298. Id. at 162, 442 N.E.2d at 858.
299. Id.
300. A dissent in Davis contended that the majority had raised the applicability of this doc-
trine on its own. Id. at 163, 442 N.E.2d at 859 (Simon, J., dissenting).
301. Cases such as People v. Slack, 81 I11. App. 3d 557, 402 N.E.2d 275 (5th Dist. 1980),
had correctly noticed that this requirement also served a public purpose of having sentences
imposed consistent with statutory objectives. See supra text accompanying notes 271-72.
302. The full panoply of constitutional protections available to persons accused of crimes
can be, and routinely are, waived in connection with pleas of guilty.
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ing noncompliance except when a defendant could demonstrate possible
prejudice-that is, a colorable basis for concluding that he might have been
entitled to a less severe sentence. 30 3
Additionally, as a strong dissent pointed out, the majority was clearly
wrong in its disposition of the separation-of-powers issue.3 14 The dissent noted
that the court's prior pronouncements in this area had repeatedly recognized
the General Assembly's right to enact laws governing judicial practice, as
long as those laws did not unduly infringe upon the powers of the judiciary." 5
The dissent then argued that no plausible basis had been suggested for find-
ing the present intrusion to be "undue. ' 3 6 The statute, the dissent noted,
did not dictate the content of any sentence.30 7 Moreover, its practical effect
was indistinguishable from a provision of the Juvenile Court Act requiring
a judicial statement of reasons for taking certain actions, 00 the validity of
which already had been sustained by the court.30 9 The dissent also main-
tained that the provision at issue was far less intrusive on judicial sentenc-
ing prerogatives than other legislative provisions that the court had sustained
in the past. 3 ' The dissent concluded:
An unfortunate aspect of the majority's decision is that it emasculates
a fair and wise pronouncement of our legislature. . . .The result will
be the creation in the eyes of the public of an imperial judiciary-a judiciary
that is too busy fighting battles with the legislature over an imaginary
encroachment on its independence to understand its relationship with the
legislature and the people in proper perspective. 3 '
The position taken in the dissent, it is submitted, is entirely correct. The
Davis majority completely failed to consider that the reasons requirement
had both private and public interest aspects. Quite apart from a particular
defendant's interest in receiving a proper sentence, the General Assembly
has a legitimate interest of its own in seeing that the sentences which it
authorizes are imposed in a fair and rational manner and that some viable
mechanism exists for the correction of sentences which are at variance with
those principles.3"2 The Padilla/Wilson "harmless error" approach recognized
303. See supra notes 266-89 and accompanying text.
304. 93 I11. 2d at 163-68, 442 N.E.2d at 858-61 (Simon, J., dissenting).
305. Id. at 165, 442 N.E.2d at 860 (Simon, J., dissenting).
306. Id. at 166, 442 N.E.2d at 860 (Simon, J., dissenting).
307. Id. (Simon, J., dissenting).
308. Id. (Simon, J., dissenting).
309. Id. (Simon, J., dissenting); see In re Griffin, 92 I11. 2d 48, 440 N.E.2d 852 (1982).
310. Davis, 93 I11. 2d at 167, 442 N.E.2d at 860-61 (Simon, J., dissenting).
311. Id. at 167-68, 442 N.E.2d at 861 (Simon, J., dissenting).
312. The dissent in Davis recognized this when it stated:
The legislature of this State obviously has an interest in ensuring that our entire
system of criminal justice is workable and fair to all concerned with it. Legislators
declare what acts will be illegal and provide the permissible range of punishments.
They put the ball in motion and obviously are interested in what comes after. By
requiring judges to give reasons for the sentences they impose, legislators may become
better informed and able to set punishment ranges, The cause of uniformity in
19841
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
and accomodated this public interest as well as the legitimate judicial interest
in avoiding wasteful and pointless supplemental sentencing proceedings.3 3
Davis, on the other hand, inexplicably ignored these interests altogether. The
court's failure to acknowledge and defer to these interests, a marked depar-
ture from its own prior decisions, amounts to a rather gross judicial curtail-
ment of legislative prerogatives."" That curtailment is even more inexplicable
in light of the supreme court's apparent acceptance of the unanimous view
of the appellate courts that the statute has properly conferred a right on
a defendant to require the court to furnish a statement of reasons for the
sentence imposed. 3 ' If the supreme court is really saying that the legislature
may vest a defendant with a power that the legislature could not exercise
directly, that is a most peculiar doctrine indeed. The majority's position,
in short, seems to be completely indefensible.
Unfortunately, the error propagated by Davis has already spread to another
area in which it could have even more severe consequences for defendants:
the imposition of consecutive sentences. Because these sentences could increase
a defendant's period of incarceration dramatically,3 6 the Act set out a special
admonition requiring that a judge "shall set forth in the record" the basis
for imposing consecutive sentences. 3 7 This section of the Act was not dis-
punishment is promoted and appellate review of sentencing errors is facilitated,
all without imposing any hardship on or taking any discretion away from the trial
judge. The ability of the courts to decide individual cases and sentence individual
defendants is completely unimpaired.
Id.
313. See supra notes 283-90 and accompanying text.
314. The court apparently forgot its observation of a few years earlier that "statutory provi-
sions governing [judicial] procedures are not uncommon," Strukoff v. Strukoff, 76 I11. 2d 53,
61, 389 N.E.2d 1170, 1173 (1979), as well as its conclusion that in such cases, at least where
"there is no conflict with a rule of this court, the procedural requirements . . . [will not be
found to be] an unconstitutional legislative encroachment upon the rulemaking power of the
judicial branch." Id. There was, of course, no Supreme Court rule existing governing the
giving of reasons for sentences in criminal cases.
315. In Davis, the court noted that the appellate courts had unanimously concluded that
the Act entitled a defendant to a statement of reasons and that it would be error for the court
to refuse to make a statement when requested. 93 Ill. 2d at 159, 442 N.E.2d at 857. While
the court did not expressly affirm this view, a subsequent case has continued to characterize
the statute as conferring a personal right on a defendant to a statement. See People v. Burton,
121 Il1. App. 3d 182, 184-85, 459 N.E.2d 329, 332 (2d Dist. 1984) (citing People v. Davis,
93 I11. 2d 155, 442 N.E.2d 855 (1982)) (claim that trial judge erred in not providing such a
statement held "waived . . . for failure to request [same]").
316. Under the Act, consecutive sentences may range up to the sum of the maximum extended
terms for the two most serious offenses of which the defendant is convicted. Pub. Act No.
80-1099, § 3, 1977 I11. Laws 3264, 3311-12 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-4(c)(1)
(1983)). For a defendant convicted of two class X felonies, for example, the potential max-
imum sentence would be extended from 60 years to 120 years. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3,
1977 I11. Laws 3264, 3310-12 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch 38, §§ 1005-8-2(a)(2), 1005-8-4(c)(1)
(1983)).
317. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 II1. Laws 3264, 3311 (emphasis added) (codified at
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-4(b) (1983)).
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cussed in Davis. Nevertheless, in People v. Hicks3" 8 the supreme court
concluded, solely on the authority of Davis, that this requirement also was
permissive rather than mandatory." 9 Consequently, because the defendant
had not requested that the trial judge set forth the basis for his decision
to impose consecutive sentences, the issue was deemed waived. 20
The Hicks court's separation-of-powers analysis is subject to the same
infirmities as was Davis.3"' Moreover, as in Davis, it appears to have been
an entirely gratuitous argument on the supreme court's part, because it
appears that the defendant was given a full explanation of the sentence
imposed on him. 22 It can only be hoped that the Illinois Supreme Court
will reexamine this area in the immediate future and ameliorate the mischief
caused by Davis and Hicks,323and adopt a rule patterned after the
Padilla/Wilson approach.32 '
D. Appellate Review of Sentencing Decisions
The provisions of the Act concerning the appellate review of sentencing
decisions were designed to effectuate two main changes in prior law. First,
review was to be more intensive. Before passing muster, a sentence would
have to be found to be appropriate rather than merely authorized by law. 2'
Appropriateness was to be determined not only by applying the objectives
and standards of the sentencing laws to the facts of the case at hand, but
also by considering whether the proposed disposition was proportionate to
the sentences imposed on similarly situated offenders. 2 ' Second, the power
of the appellate court to correct sentencing errors was to be expanded so
that the full range of possible abuses could be remedied on appeal. 27 This
was to be accomplished by legislatively supplementing the power already
granted to reviewing courts by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4)32' so
as to permit the imposition by the appellate court of "any sentence that
the trial judge could have entered, including increasing or decreasing the
sentence or entering an alternative sentence to a prison term."3 '9
These two changes were, of course, conceptually quite distinct. The first
318. 101 11. 2d 366, 462 N.E.2d 473 (1984).
319. Id. at 374, 462 N.E.2d at 476-77.
320. Id. at 374, 462 N.E.2d at 477.
321. See supra notes 304-15 and accompanying text.
322. Hicks, 101 I1. 2d at 374, 462 N.E.2d at 477; id. at 377, 462 N.E.2d at 478 (Simon,
J., concurring).
323. Such reconsideration need not be in the form of a judicial limitation or repudiation
of the constitutional doctrines enunciated in those decisions. Instead, the court could exercise
its rulemaking authority to address the problems that the two decisions have spawned. For
detailed recommendations along those lines, see infra notes 472-507 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 266-90 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 211-13.
326. See infra text accompanying notes 343-45.
327. See supra text accompanying notes 205-10.
328. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. lIOA, § 615(b)(4) (1977).
329. Id. ch. 38, § 1005-5-4.1 (1983).
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dealt with how closely sentencing decisions should be examined on appeal.
The second concerned what remedies should be available to the appellate
court once an erroneous sentencing decision was detected. Consequently, if
either of these provisions was infirm, the propriety of the other would not
necessarily be affected. Nonetheless, these two issues were soon fused together
as appellate courts sought to exercise the powers, long denied them by the
Illinois Supreme Court, to scrutinize prison sentences intensively and to deter-
mine whether they should be reduced to terms of probation.3" Because of
this conflation of issues, the Illinois Supreme Court erred in its analysis of
both the meaning and the constitutionality of the Act's sentencing review
provisions."'
1. The Standard of Review: "Abuse of Discretion" or Something Else?
Prior to the effective date of the Act, the Illinois Supreme Court had
held on many occasions that the sentence imposed upon a convicted criminal
was to be reversed on appeal only for an "abuse of discretion." '332 Although
that phrase was typically left undefined, the dissenting opinion in People
v. Perruquet333 explained that abuse of judicial discretion occurs "when the
judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable," so that no reasonable
person would agree with the trial court.33 ' In the dissent's view, this stan-
dard vested the circuit courts "with virtually unlimited discretion" to sentence
offenders, resulting in a justifiably criticized disparity in sentences."3
The dissent's characterization of abuse of discretion seems an apt one.
Certainly it was in keeping with the Perruquet majority to give the widest
possible latitude to trial judges in sentencing matters, while keeping to a
minimum the appellate interference with their determinations. Noting that
it was not the function of the supreme court "to serve as a sentencing court"
or to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court,336 the majority went
on to eulogize the role of the circuit court judge in the sentencing process. 37
330. See infra notes 391-92. -
331. See infra text accompanying notes 368-91.
332. See, eg., People v. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d 149, 153, 368 N,E.2d 882, 883-84 (1977);
People v. Butler, 64 I11. 2d 485, 490, 356 N.E.2d 330, 333 (1976); People v. Burbank, 53
Ill. 2d 261, 275, 291 N.E.2d 161, 169 (1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 951 (1973); People v.
Bonner, 37 I11. 2d 553, 563, 229 N.E.2d 527, 533 (1967).
333. 68 Il1. 2d 149, 368 N.E.2d 882 (1977).
334. Id. at 157, 368 N.E.2d at 885 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting).
335. Id. at 158, 368 N.E.2d at 886 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting).
336. Id. at 156, 368 N.E.2d at 885 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting).
337. The Perruquet majority explained the role of the circuit court judge as follows:
We have frequently stated that the trial judge is normally in a better position to
determine the punishment to be imposed than the courts of review. A reasoned
judgment as to the proper sentence to be imposed might be based upon the par-
ticular circumstances of each individual case. The trial judge, in the course of the
trial and the sentencing hearing, has an opportunity to consider these factors "which
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The sentence the judge selected was portrayed as a "reasoned judgment,"
based on "many factors, including the defendant's credibility, demeanor,
general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits and age,"
which an appellate court could not hope to capture in its review of the
record.3 3'
Much could be said against this sanctification of the sentencing process,
particularly as it relates to the great run of cases disposed of by plea
bargains. " 9 To the extent that this portrayal is accurate at all, it appears
applicable only to contested sentences imposed after full trials. When sentence
is imposed pursuant to a plea bargain, most of this information will not
be before the sentencing judge." ' Although it is true that a trial court's
ability to assess such factors, when they are present, is normally superior
to that of an appellate court,"' the Perruquet court failed to consider that
appellate tribunals have familiarity with the sentencing practices of a large
number of judges, an offsetting advantage denied the sentencing judge. That
perspective gives appellate tribunals a corresponding awareness of sentences
that vary substantially from those typically imposed and thus are in need
of modification. 342
It was precisely this added element of comparative fairness or
appropriateness that the legislature sought to provide through a more inten-
sive appellate review of sentences. 3 ' The broad discretion typically given
sentencing judges to adjust the sanction to fit the individual circumstances344
was to be tempered by also requiring that the penalty imposed show a due
regard for penalties imposed on other similarly situated offenders. In other
words, a sentence that conformed on its face with statutory guidelines could
be adjusted by an appellate court because it markedly and unjustifiably
departed from the penalty typically imposed on offenders in comparable cir-
cumstances to the defendant. 4 1
The General Assembly's desire for more intensive appellate review emerges
clearly from the legislative history of the Act, as several appellate courts
is superior to that afforded by the cold record in this court." (People v. Morgan
(1974), 59 I11. 2d 276, 282, 319 N.E.2d 764, 768.) We continue to find that the
trial court is normally the proper forum in which a suitable sentence is to be deter-
mined and the trial judge's decisions in regard to sentencing are entitled to great
deference and weight.
Id. at 154, 368 N.E.2d at 884.
338. Id.
339. See Chart I in text, at 644.
340. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
341. This is not to say that this advantage is always utilized.
342. See supra text accompanying notes 188-90 and infra text accompanying notes 399-407.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 191-213.
344. Although the Act was widely viewed as limiting judicial discretion, these limitations,
as will be shown in the next article in this series, have proved to be more apparent than real.
345. See supra text accompanying notes 191-213. See generally sections I. A and I. C of
this article.
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soon saw.3 "1 Relying on the subcommittee report3"" as well as various pre-
and post-enactment commentaries on the new law,3"' these cases correctly
concluded that the legislature specifically intended a review of sentences with
an eye to equalization and fairness.34 9 Nonetheless, the appellate courts were
uncertain as to the reach of their new authority in light of the supreme court's
abuse of discretion cases. Although these appellate courts realized that the
extraordinary deference historically shown to trial court sentencing decisions
was incompatible with the appellate courts' new responsibilities under the
Act,3"' it was unclear what the new standard of review should be.
Scanning the Act for insight, several courts seized upon its creation of
a "rebuttable presumption that the sentence imposed by the trial judge is
proper."3 '' Beginning with People v. Choate,"' several appellate courts con-
cluded that the fact that the legislature used the term "rebuttable presump-
tion" rather than "abuse of discretion" indicated an intent to authorize a
new standard of review.33 These courts concluded that under the common
legal meaning of rebuttable presumption, the circuit court's sentence could
"be presumed to have been properly made and for sound reasons," absent
an affirmative showing to the contrary. 34
This approach had a number of analytical shortcomings. On the one hand,
this "new" standard did not appear to differ markedly from the old "abuse
of discretion" standard it supposedly was supplanting. After all, if a sentence
seemed to be indefensible even after having been accorded "every reasonable
intendment," in all probability it also could be fairly described as one which
346. A number of appellate court opinions, most enterred on appeal by the Illinois Supreme
Court, nonetheless merit mention for their extraordinary efforts to interpret and apply the Act's
appellate review provisions. See People v. LaPointe, 85 111. App. 3d 215, 407 N.E.2d 196 (2d
Dist. 1980), rev'd, 88 Ill. 2d 482, 431 N.E.2d 344 (1981); People v. Cox, 77 Il1. App. 3d 59,
396 N.E.2d 59 (4th Dist. 1979), rev'd, 82 Il. 2d 268, 412 N.E.2d 541 (1980); People v. Meeks,
75 Ill. App. 3d 357, 393 N.E.2d 1190 (5th Dist. 1979), rev'd, 81 Ill. 2d 524, 411 N.E.2d 9
(1980); People v. Choate, 71 Ill. App. 3d 267, 389 N.E.2d 670 (5th Dist. 1979).
347. See supra note 38.
348. See authorities cited supra note 44.
349. See cases cited supra note 346.
350. See supra note 346.
351. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 11. Laws 3264, 3302 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-5-4.1 (1979), amended by Pub. Act No. 83-344, § 1, 1983 Ill. Laws 2573, 2573
(codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §1005-5-4.1 (1983)); see supra note 290.
352. 71 Ill. App. 3d 267, 389 N.E.2d 670 (5th Dist. 1979).
353. Id. at 273, 389 N.E.2d at 675; see also People v. LaPointe, 85 111. App. 3d 215, 220,
407 N.E.2d 196, 200-01 (2d Dist. 1980) (stating that the legislature intended a more comprehensive
review by appellate courts of sentences), rev'd, 88 Ill. 2d 482, 431 N.E.2d 344 (1981); People
v. Cox, 77 11. App. 3d 59, 63-64, 396 N.E.2d 59, 62-63 (4th Dist. 1979) (reiterating the intent
of the legislature as interpreted in Choate), rev'd, 82 Ill. 2d 268, 412 N.E.2d 541 (1980); Peo-
ple v. Meeks, 75 111. App. 3d 357, 364-66, 393 N.E.2d 1190, 1196-98 (5th Dist. 1979) (stating
that the danger of too much or too little emphasis on certain factors is handled by giving
appellate courts a broader scope of review and inquiring into the underlying basis for any
sentencing decision), rev'd, 81 Ill. 2d 524, 411 N.E.2d 9 (1980).
354. Choate, 71 Il1. App. 3d at 274, 389 N.E.2d at 676. The other appellate court opinions
cited supra note 353 reached similar conclusions.
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no reasonable person would adopt " within the traditional abuse-of-discretion
line of cases. On the other hand, it was certainly incongruous to discover
a mandate for closer appellate scrutiny of trial court sentencing decisions
in the guise of a presumption clearly intended as a protection against the
precipitous overturning of sentences by overly zealous appellate tribunals." 6
In short, the Act's "rebuttable presumption" phraseology may have been
an appealing peg upon which to hang a reformist hat, but it provided neither
the source nor the content of the appellate courts' sentencing review powers.
That phrase was a limitation upon, rather than a grant of, such powers,
and it did not differ appreciably from the old abuse-of-discretion standard.
The true source and nature of the appellate courts' new responsibilities
is both more indirect and more difficult to define. Those courts' new duties
did not stem from some positive grant of power to replace the prevailing
abuse-of-discretion standard with some more easily satisfied test. Rather,
sentencing decisions were to be more readily reversible because the Act had
made it easier for trial judges to commit an abuse of discretion."s 7 Because
the new law required more of sentencing judges than the old had, both pro-
cedurally and substantively, 58 sentencing decisions that formerly would not
have been abuses of discretion now could be. The need to correct such abuses
necessarily entailed a more intensive review of sentences than had been per-
mitted previously. The ultimate standard of review-abuse of discretion-
was unchanged; but the content of that standard had been transformed.
The type of appellate review envisioned by the Illinois legislature is indeed
attainable. The truth of this assertion is illustrated by the Illinois Supreme
Court's role in reviewing attorney discipline cases.359 In that capacity, the
supreme court has consistently recognized an overriding duty to seek "a
uniform standard of discipline" in comparable cases.3"' Indeed, in recent
355. People v. Perruquet, 68 I11. 2d 149, 157, 368 N.E.2d 882, 885 (1977) (Goldenhersh
and Dooley, JJ., dissenting) (quoting People v. Burbank, 53 11. 2d 261, 279, 291 N.E.2d 161,
171 (1972) (Schaefer, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 951 (1973)).
356. See supra text accompanying notes 199-204.
357. See supra text accompanying notes 211-13.
358. The intended substantive limitations on judicial sentencing discretion are discussed in
detail in the second article in this series. See also supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
359. No claim is made, of course, that the General Assembly had this specific example in
mind, or even that it fits exactly with the Act's intended role for appellate courts in reviewing
trial judges' sentencing decisions. Nonetheless, the analogy is sufficiently close in a number
of respects to merit a brief treatment here.
Final responsibility for the disciplining of attorneys rests with the Illinois Supreme Court.
In re Chapman, 95 I11. 2d 484, 492, 448 N.E.2d 852, 855 (1983). The court's involvement,
however, occurs only after a lengthy administrative process in which allegations of attorney
misconduct are first heard by a Hearing Board and, if any party so desires, by a Review Board.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. I10A, § 753(d), (e) (1983). Reports of the Review Board recommending
disciplinary action are filed with the supreme court and, after the attorney has been given
an opportunity to respond, that court determines the appropriate sanction, if any. Id.
360. In re Cohen, 98 I11. 2d 133, 144, 456 N.E.2d 105, 109 (1983); In re Kink, 92 I11. 2d
293, 302, 442 N.E.2d 206, 209 (1982); In re Pappas, 92 Il. 2d 243, 247-48, 442 N.E.2d 142,
143-44 (1982); In re Feldman, 89 I11. 2d 7, 11, 431 N.E.2d 388, 389 (1982) (citing In re Clayter,
78 Ill. 2d 276, 283, 399 N.E.2d 1318, 1321 (1980)).
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years it has come to attach ever greater importance to that goal.3 6' Such
a uniform standard is, of course, precisely what the Act sought to accomplish
in the realm of criminal sentencing." 2
Moreover, the supreme court has not hesitated to limit the effect to be
given to the determinations made by the finders of fact in attorney discipline
cases where such appeared necessary in the interests of achieving that uniform
standard. Thus, while showing considerable deference to their assessments
of such issues as credibility, state of mind, and the like,363 the court has
shown far less deference to their views on the legal significance of those
facts in determining the proper measure of discipline in the case at hand.
Instead, it has not hesitated to independently review the facts from that
perspective36 and to directly compare the case at hand with past disciplinary
matters36 ' in order to bring a disciplinary recommendation made in a lower
court into line with prevailing standards.
The similarities of this approach to the proper role of appellate courts
in reviewing criminal sentences are obvious. Sentencing determinations involve
questions of both fact and law. The Act left questions of fact to trial judges,
but it sought to increase the role of appellate courts in assessing what legal
significance those facts should have in sentencing. It did so in the interests
of achieving a greater degree of uniformity and parity in sentencing. The
techniques available to appellate courts to achieve that end are likely to be
at least as effective in the area of criminal sentencing as are those employed
361. The supreme court's most complete statement in this regard appeared recently in In
re Berkos, 93 Il. 2d 408, 444 N.E.2d 150 (1982):
This court has said that "[wlhile a degree of uniformity in the application of attorney
discipline is desirable, each case must still be determined on its merits." (In re
Andros (1976), 64 II1. 2d 419, 425-26, 1 11. Dec. 325, 356 N.E.2d 513). But more
recently this court has emphasized a keen awareness of "the necessity for consistency
in the imposition of discipline in similar cases." (In re Porcelli (1979), 77 I11. 2d
473, 479, 34 III. Dec. 158, 397 N.E.2d 830). In the case of In re Saladino (1978),
71 111. 2d 263, 275, 16 Ill. Dec. 471, 375 N.E.2d 102, the rationale for this con-
sistency was stated as follows: "Although appropriate factors may always be con-
sidered in mitigation, predictability and fairness require a degree of consistency in
the selection of sanctions for similar types of misconduct." Id. at 275, 16 111. Dec.
at 475-76, 375 N.E.2d at 106-07.
93 II1. 2d at 413-14, 444 N.E.2d at 152.
362. See supra text accompanying notes 343-45.
363. See, e.g., In re Jafree, 93 111. 2d. 450, 458, 444 N.E.2d 143, 148 (1982) (hearing panel's
determination accorded substantially same weight as that of any trier of fact); In re Kink, 92 111.
2d 293, 301, 442 N.E.2d 206, 209 (1982) (accord); In re Pappas, 92 111. 2d 243, 247, 442 N.E.2d
142, 143 (1982) (findings of hearing panel entitled to considerable weight as the trier of fact).
364. See, e.g., In re Crisel, 101 I11. 2d 332, 341-42, 461 N.E.2d 994, 998 (1984); In re Chap-
man, 95 111. 2d 484, 492, 448 N.E.2d 852, 855-56 (1983); In re Kink, 92 Ill. 2d 293, 301-02,
442 N.E.2d 206, 209 (1982); In re Kramer, 92 I11. 2d 305, 310-11, 442 N.E.2d 171, 173 (1982).
In each of these cases, the court accepted the factual findings made below concerning the nature
of the attorneys' conduct, but disagreed with the fact-finders' recommended sanctions for the
conduct.
365. See, e.g., In re Levin, 101 Ill. 2d 535, 541-42, 463 N.E.2d 715, 718 (1984); In re Cohen,
98 Il1. 2d 133, 144-45, 456 N.E.2d 105, 109-10 (1983); In re Woldman, 98 I11. 2d 248, 257-58,
456 N.E.2d 35, 39 (1983); In re Hall, 95 Ill. 2d 371, 375-76, 447 N.E.2d 805, 807 (1983).
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in attorney discipline cases;366 and there can be no doubt that the interests
at stake are at least as vital. 67 It is regrettable that the Illinois Supreme
Court, willing to exhibit such a keen awareness of the need for a minimal
degree of consistency and fairness to members of the bar, has adopted such
a contrary approach to legislative efforts emulating these concerns in the
area of criminal sentencing.
2. Treatment of the "New" Standard of Review
As suggested above, a change in the meaning of the term "abuse of discre-
tion" was necessitated by changed legislative goals in sentencing. In attempt-
ing to conceptualize their new powers of review under the Act, appellate
courts unfortunately never examined the matter in this way. Instead, the
issue was framed in terms of the General Assembly's authority to change
the standard of appellate review from that declared by the supreme court.
In several opinions, dissenting judges argued that the action violated the
doctrine of separation of powers.3" In People v. Cox369 the Illinois Supreme
Court, influenced by that view, concluded that the legislature's purported
replacement of the abuse-of-discretion standard was unconstitutional because
it infringed upon the supreme court's exclusive power to promulgate rules
of appellate practice and procedure.37
The unanimous Cox court's analysis of the separation of powers issue
left a great deal to be desired. It began by noting that the Illinois Constitu-
366. Many courts seem convinced that a meaningful degree of consistency is an elusive and
perhaps impossible goal in the area of criminal sentencing. See, e.g., People v. Welsh, 99 IIl.
App. 3d 470, 470-71, 425 N.E.2d 53, 54 (4th Dist. 1981) (sentences imposed in similar cases
"could have no bearing" on sentence imposed in case at hand "so long as the human psyche
differs radically between and among individuals"); People v. King, 102 Il. App. 3d 257, 260-61,
430 N.E.2d 292, 294-95 (3d Dist. 1981) (expressing doubt that meaningful comparisons can
be made for sentencing purposes, even between codefendants). The supreme court, however,
is much more sanguine about the achievability of uniform standards of attorney discipline.
Its view has been that the task, in that context, is difficult but far from insurmountable. See,
e.g., In re Hall, 95 Il1. 2d 371, 375, 447 N.E.2d 805, 806 (1983) (similar cases should be treated
alike, considering unique factors of each case); In re Berkos, 93 Ill. 2d 408, 413-14, 444 N.E.2d
150, 152 (1983) (both fairness in particular case and a degree of consistency from one case
to the next should be considered); In re Pappas, 92 Ill. 2d 243, 248, 442 N.E.2d 142, 143
(1982) (court should try to be consistent in imposing sanctions for similar conduct).
There is no reason why it should be more difficult to differentiate between criminals than
between attorneys. In fact, criminal cases should be easier in some respects, for at least two
reasons. First, the factors considered are specified by statute. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§
1005-5-3.1, 1005-5-3.2, 1005-8-1(a)(l), 1005-8-4(a) (1983). Second, additional techniques, based
on statistical aggregates of sentences, can be used to supplement the application of those stan-
dards to a particular case. For a discussion and application of this approach, see infra notes
399-407 and accompanying text.
367. The liberty interests at stake in criminal cases are clearly entitled to at least as great
a solicitude by the judiciary as are the property interests involved in attorney disciplinary matters.
368. See, e.g., People v. Cox, 77 11. App. 3d 59, 74-75, 396 N.E.2d 59, 71-72 (4th Dist.
1979) (Green, J., dissenting), rev'd, 82 Ill. 2d 268, 412 N.E.2d 541 (1980).
369. 82 Ill. 2d 268, 412 N.E.2d 541 (1980).
370. Id. at 276, 412 N.E.2d at 545.
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tion of 1970 had vested "judicial power" in the courts to be exercised
"exclusively and exhaustively" by them.37' The court acknowledged that the
phrase "judicial power" was not defined in the constitution,3 72 and also con-
ceded that the General Assembly "ha[d] the power to enact laws governing
judicial practice [which did] not unduly infringe upon the inherent powers
of the judiciary." '373 The court, however, found undue infringement here
because the Act's appellate review provisions conflicted with a rule related
to a "matter within the court's authority." This rule, Supreme Court Rule
615(b)(4), authorized reviewing courts to "reduce the punishment imposed
by the trial court. 374 In case of conflict between the rule and the Act, the
court concluded that the rule had to prevail. Otherwise, "a basic tenet of
our form of democratic government would be destroyed." 37
The Cox court's assertion of its preeminent rulemaking authority is on
shaky ground both constitutionally and factually. Surely the court overstates
matters when it claims that any legislative pronouncement in conflict with
a supreme court rule "within the court's authority" is void. The proper for-
mulation of te argument would be that any such conflict pertaining to a
matter within the supreme court's exclusive authority is constitutionally
infirm.37 6 As numerous precedents had recognized, the separation of powers
doctrine was not intended to hermetically seal off one branch of govern-
ment from another.37 Instead, there are numerous areas in which branches
of government have overlapping authority. Sentencing is certainly one of
these areas.3 ' In terms of the famous analysis employed by Justice Jackson,
371. Id. at 274, 412 N.E.2d at 544.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 274, 412 N.E.2d at 545.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Only activities within the exclusive province of a non-legislative branch of state govern-
ment are beyond the General Assembly's power to regulate. This is the teaching of Mr. Justice
Jackson's famous concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 635-40 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring), in which, speaking of the validity of presidential
action taken against the will of Congress, he concluded that such an action could be sustained
only if "within his domain and beyond the power of Congress." Id. at 640 (emphasis added);
see authorities cited infra note 377.
377. Strukoff v. Strukoff, 76 Ill. 2d 53, 58-59, 389 N.E.2d 1170, 1172 (1979); In re Estate
of Barker, 63 111. 2d 113, 119, 345 N.E.2d 484, 488 (1976); City of Waukegan v. Pollution
Control Bd., 57 Ill. 2d 170, 174-75, 311 N.E.2d 146, 148 (1974); Illinois v. Illinois Cent. R.R.,
246 Ill. 188, 230-31, 92 N.E. 814, 833 (1910).
378. The virtually plenary power of the General Assembly to define offenses and to prescribe
the penalties therefor, frequently recognized by the court, has a significant and direct impact
on judicial sentencing prerogatives by eliminating certain sentences from consideration in a
wide variety of circumstances. See, e.g., People ex rel. Carey v. Bentivenga, 83 I11. 2d 537,
542, 416 N.E.2d 259, 262 (1981); People v. Smith, 14 I11. 2d 95, 97, 150 N.E.2d 815, 817
(1958); see also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3(c)(2)(A)-(F) (1983) (requiring imprison-
ment for certain offenses); id. § 1005-5-3(c)(6) (requiring imprisonment for certain offenses
if committed while on probation or parole); id. § 1005-5-3(c)(2)(F) (requiring imprisonment
for certain offenders having sufficiently aggravated prior records). Clearly such legislation has
a far more direct and immediate effect on the manner in which cases are decided than did
[Vol. 33:631
ILLINOIS' DETERMINA TE SENTENCING
such areas fall within a "zone of twilight" in which legislative "inertia,
indifference or quiescence may . . . enable, if not invite, measures of
independent . . . [judicial] responsibility." 37 9
Certainly the Illinois Supreme Court's promulgation of rule 615(b)(4) was
appropriate under this test. The rule came into existence upon the General
Assembly's repeal of a virtually identical legislative provision.38 There can
be no real doubt that the court was free to promulgate such a measure in
those circumstances. The Cox court, however, went too far in its claim that
the General Assembly was precluded permanently by the mere fact that the
rule was in force when the Act took effect. Rather, once the Act went into
effect, the rule became incompatible with the express or implied will of the
General Assembly. Such a rule may be sustained only by disabling that body
from acting upon it.3"'
The Cox 'court made two efforts to place the rule in that untouchable
category. The first was to characterize the General Assembly's action (and
its own rule) as procedural rather than substantive,382 and thus within the
zone of judicial interests subject to the supreme court's rulemaking
authority.383 The second was to brand it as an attempt to influence how
particular cases are decided,38 ' and thus invalid as a legislative intrusion into
"the area of minimum functional integrity of the courts. ' 385
Both of these positions, however, are factually infirm. As to the first,
by any traditional measure, the provision at issue can only be characterized
as substantive. 388 On its face, it purports to create a variety of rights innur-
the Act's appellate review provisions. Yet, the only modern case concluding that these legislative
judgments could violate the principle of separation of powers was reversed by the Supreme
Court on appeal. See People v. Taylor, 115 111. App. 3d 621, 629-30, 450 N.E.2d 1256, 1258-63
(1st Dist. 1983) (language in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(a)(1) (1983) that courts "shall"
impose sentence of natural life imprisonment on certain murderers not sentenced to death held
to be directory rather than mandatory, to avoid invalidating section on separation of powers
grounds), rev'd in part, 102 Ill. 2d 201, 207-09, 464 N.E.2d 1059, 1062-64 (1984).
379. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
380. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 121-9 (1965) (repealed by Act of Sept. 5, 1967, §1, 1967
I11. Laws 3615, 3615).
381. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
382. Cox, 82 Ill. 2d at 273-74, 412 N.E.2d at 545.
383. Even the staunchest defenders of judicial independence have recognized that courts have
no competence to promulgate rules governing substantive law. See Bonaguro, The Supreme
Court's Exclusive Rule Making Authority, 67 ILL. B.J. 408, 411 (1979). Other authorities are
in accord. See, e.g., Comment, People ex. rel Stamos v. Jones, J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC.
382, 391-92 (1973); Note, The Rule-Making Powers of the Illinois Supreme Court, 1965 U.
ILL. L.F. 903, 903-05.
384. Cox, 82 I11. 2d at 280, 412 N.E.2d at 547-48.
385. See Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rulemaking: A Problem
in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 31-32 (1958).
386. While the distinction between substance and procedure is not always easily drawn, "[i]n
general it can be stated that laws which establish duties, rights and responsibilities are substan-
tive, while those which prescribe the manner, e.g., time, place and method of performing an
act, in court, are procedural." Bonaguro, supra note 383, at 411.
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ing to the benefit of defendants, the state, and the public at large.387 Of
course, if the subject matter of the provision is indeed substantive, any con-
flict between it and rule 615(b)(4) must be resolved in favor of the
former. 88
The Cox court's claim that the provision intrudes on the manner in which
cases are decided is also based on a number of faulty factual premises. One
premise of that argument, the Act's supposed overturning of the abuse-of-
discretion standard, is an outright misconstruction of the legislature's intent. 89
The other aspect of that contention, the Act's authorization of dispositional
alternatives to the appellate court not provided for in rule 615(b)(4), seems
irrelevant to a claim of undue legislative "intrusion upon the manner in which
cases are decided." 3 90 The authorization involved is purely an enabling statute
that leaves undisturbed the appellate court's right to decide particular cases
however it sees fit. In short, there simply is not any "intrusion" in sentenc-
ing matters attributable to the Act's appellate review provisions.'
387. For example, the provision confers a "right" on criminal defendants to appeal their
sentences. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 111. Laws 3264, 3302 (codified as amended at ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-4.1 (1983)); see supra note 290. Such a right unquestionably would
be substantive under the definition quoted above. The provisions also confer a right on both
defendants and the state to have a fair, proportionate sentence imposed. In other words, the
Act both requires and enables the appellate court to ensure that such a sentence is imposed.
Under either formulation, this appears to be a substantive rather than a procedural matter.
Finally, this provision could be conceptualized as advancing a public right-the General
Assembly's entirely legitimate interest in seeing that penalties are applied consistently with its
intentions. That concern, too, is inherently substantive in nature.
388. See authorities cited supra note 383.
389. See supra text accompanying notes 211-13, 355-58.
390. Cox, 82 Ill. 2d at 276, 412 N.E.2d at 545.
391. The Act did affect the distribution of sentencing power within the judicial branch,
however, by vesting appellate courts with the power to reduce penitentiary sentences to proba-
tion. This aspect of the provision undid a long line of supreme court cases denying this power
to the appellate court. Those cases had uniformly decided that an appellate court, confronted
with what it believed was an erroneous denial of probation, should vacate the sentence imposed
and remand for a further hearing before a different judge. See People v. Bolyard, 61 Ill. 2d
583, 589, 338 N.E.2d 168, 171 (1975); People ex rel Ward v. Moran, 54 I11. 2d 552, 557,
301 N.E.2d 300, 303 (1973); People v. Sims, 32 I11. 2d 591, 595-96, 208 N.E.2d 569, 572-73
(1965); People v. Donovan, 376 Ill. 602, 606-08, 35 N.E.2d 54, 57 (1941).
The appellate courts generally were very restrained in their use of these new powers. Most
of the cases that reversed trial courts' denials of probation involved first-time offenders of
demonstrated rehabilitative potential who, arguably, had been denied probation for legally
insufficient reasons. See, e.g., People v. Huffman, 78 Ill. App. 3d 525, 527-29, 397 N.E.2d
526, 528-30 (4th Dist. 1979); People v. Thomas, 76 Ill. App. 3d 969, 973-76, 395 N.E.2d 601,
603-06 (5th Dist. 1979). Indeed, in the most famous and influential early appellate court opinion
interpreting the new Act, the court upheld the imposed prison sentence despite several mitigating
factors. People v. Choate, 71 I11. App. 3d 267, 274-76, 389 N.E.2d 670, 676-77 (5th Dist.
1979). The same mix of appealing features had existed as in those pre-Act cases where appellate
court remands of cases denying probation for possible "abuse of discretion" were not over-
turned on appeal. See People v. Knowles, 70 111. App. 3d 30, 388 N.E.2d 261 (4th Dist. 1979);
People v. Brooks, 69 I11. App. 3d 97, 386 N.E.2d 1160 (4th Dist. 1979); People v. Wilson,
47 Ill. App. 3d 220, 361 N.E.2d 1155 (4th Dist. 1977).
Nonetheless, it is likely that the supreme court was more than a bit piqued by the General
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3. Abuse of Discretion After People v. Cox
The abuse of discretion standard promulgated by Perruquet, Cox, and
other Illinois Supreme Court precedents has succeeded in dampening the ardor
of reviewing courts to alter sentences imposed below. Isolated instances of
reductions in prison sentences,392 as well as vacations of denials of
probation,393 can be found. These cases, however, stand out against vast
numbers of sentencing appeals affirmed with little more than a string cita-
tion to precedents extolling the deference due to trial judges' sentencing
decisions. 9 ' Because that standard of deference results in the virtually
automatic affirmance of any sentence reached below, appellate tribunals
understandably have almost totally ceased to concern themselves with broader
efforts to rationalize the sentencing process.
A comprehensive approach to sentencing issues might have been achieved
despite the barriers created by the abuse-of-discretion standard, if only the
Act's intended aids to principled sentencing decisions-data on existing
sentencing practices and more detailed sentencing guidelines-had been
developed and utilized.39 For a variety of reasons detailed below, however,
the data on sentencing practices contemplated by the Act have not been
Assembly's decision to expand the appellate courts' authority in this fashion. Such institutional
indignation is the most likely explanation for the breadth and tenor of its opinion in Cox,
a decision that ranged far beyond the issues at hand. A straightforward comparison of the
appellate court's action in Cox with the authority interpreting the intended scope of the Act's
appellate review provisions would have shown that that court had exceeded its proper role.
Cases such as People v. Choate, 71 I11. App. 3d 267, 274, 389 N.E.2d 670, 675 (4th Dist.
1979), already had established that the Act did not intend that appellate courts retry sentencing
matters de novo on appeal, as the appellate court in Cox had done. Indeed, the Cox court
had acknowledged that the Act was not intended to permit the rebalancing of cases on appeal
that already had been carefully considered below, although its own conduct clearly violated
that maxim as well. Cox, 77 Ill. App. 3d at 63-65, 396 N.E.2d at 63-65 (4th Dist. 1979). The
supreme court's willingness to overlook that narrow but unassailable basis for reversal in favor
of one based on broad constitutional doctrine is, unfortunately, all too typical of its decisions
in this area.
392. See People v. Hargis, 118 111. App. 3d 1064, 1078-82, 456 N.E.2d 250, 258-260 (4th
Dist. 1983) (sentence of natural life for murder vacated where court imposed it under erroneous
belief that the death penalty was available); People v. Rosa, Ill Ill. App. 3d 384, 392-95,
444 N.E.2d 233, 239-41 (2d Dist. 1982) (22-year sentence for armed robbery reduced to 12
years); People v. Nelson, 106 Ill. App. 3d 838, 846-48, 436 N.E.2d 655, 661-62 (Ist Dist. 1982)
(concurrent 20-year sentence for two armed robbery convictions reduced to 10 years).
393. See People v. Free, 112 Ill. App. 3d 449, 455-56, 445 N.E.2d 529, 533-34 (4th Dist.
1983) (two-year sentence for unlawful use of weapons vacated where record did not reveal
that judge had considered probation, even though defendant had a prior murder conviction);
People v. Williams, 112 I11. App. 3d 617, 618-200, 445 N.E.2d 931, 932-34 (3d Dist. 1982)
(five-year sentence for voluntary manslaughter vacated where probation may have been denied
arbitrarily); People v. Turner, 110 Ill. App. 3d 519, 523-25, 442 N.E.2d 637, 640-41 (1st Dist.
1982) (five-year sentence for forgery vacated where court did not explain what statutory basis
it relied on to deny probation).
394. Literally hundreds of sentencing appeals are affirmed each year. As the second article
in this series will illustrate, many of them are highly questionable.
395. See supra text accompanying notes 185-88 and infra text accompanying notes 399-425.
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prepared.396 As a consequence, even though the Act intended that individual
sentencing decisions be influenced by the range of sentences normally imposed
by other courts in similar cases, this has not occurred.397 Likewise, both
the CSC and the Illinois Supreme Court have consistently declined to limit
or clarify the Act's substantive reach by preparing more detailed guidelines. 99
Thus, significant opportunities to improve sentencing practices in Illinois have
been squandered.
a. Anticipated Data-Gathering and Data-Analysis Activities
Under the Act, both the DOC and the CSC were charged with the task
of gathering and analyzing data on the application and impact of the new
law.399 Had these data been compiled, it would have been possible to deter-
mine with considerable accuracy where a given sentence fit into the overall
pattern of sentences for that offense. 00 Such information could have been
immensely useful both to the judiciary and to counsel for the parties in
arriving at fair sentences. In the context of plea bargains, for example, the
data could have served as both a guide to and a direct restraint on the parties'
respective bargaining positions by eliminating sentences of wholly unrealistic
leniency or severity, given the facts at hand. This data also could have served
much the same purpose after a bench or jury trial by permitting counsel
to present sentencing alternatives to the court which were at least arguably
appropriate in light of the distribution of sentences normally imposed and
the circumstances of the particular case.
Such a perspective also would have been of immense value to a sentenc-
ing judge. Typically, judges have some familiarity with the charging, plea
bargaining, and sentencing practices in their counties and perhaps even in
their circuits. But in all probability they would not have a detailed view
396. See infra notes 399-425 and accompanying text.
397. The author is aware of only one case in which such an argument was even advanced,
and it was not successful. See People v. Hoyer, 100 I11. App. 3d 418, 423, 426 N.E.2d 1139,
1142 (2d Dist. 1982) (data not presented until appeal and deemed waived); cf. People v. Welsh,
99 I11. App. 3d 470, 470-71, 425 N.E.2d 53, 54 (4th Dist. 1981) (rejecting defendant's attack
on prison sentence for reckless homicide, based on claim that others convicted of same offense
in same county had received probation).
398. See infra text accompanying notes 426-66.
399. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, §3, 1977 I11. Laws 3264, 3302 (DOC to provide extensive
information regarding the sentences imposed and time served by inmates committed to the DOC
Department) and 3315 (CSC to develop data on offenders committed to the DOC or give alter-
native dispositions, delineated by offense) (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-5-4.3,
1005-10-2(4) (1983)).
400. The DOC's obligations included preparation of annual reports which were to contain
the rate, frequency distribution, and averages of both prison sentences imposed and time actually
served, detailed by offense. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-4.3(l)-(2) (1983). The use of regular
term, extended term, and consecutive term sentences were to be reported separately by offense.
Id. § 1005-5-4.3(3). All of this information, together with any other data available to the DOC
which a court might request to assist it in sentencing, id. § 1005-5-4.3(4), were to be "made
available to trial and appellate court judges for their use in imposing or reviewing sentences
• . . and to other interested parties upon a showing of need." Id. § 1005-5-4.3.
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of how those practices had operated in the aggregate over time, or how they
compared to those prevailing in other Illinois courts. By placing their
knowledge of particular cases in that broader context, these data would have
allowed sentencing judges to exercise more informed oversight of plea bargains
and to impose sentences which more closely approximated those imposed
on similarly situated offenders.
Regrettably, however, the data that have actually been prepared by the
DOC and the CSC have fallen short of these ideals to varying degrees.
Through the preparation of annual statistical reports on the populations enter-
ing and leaving the prison system,4 ' the DOC has come far closer to fulfill-
ing its statutory mandate than has the CSC. From the perspective of their
utility for courts or practitioners, however, these reports have a number of
serious deficiencies. For one thing, the data do not include sufficient informa-
tion on extended term and consecutive term sentences, and the information
that is presented is not integrated into the DOC's various statistical
presentations. 2 As a result, the data given tend to present a distorted pic-
ture of the sentences actually imposed on offenders. Moreover, the reported
data generally are not displayed in a way which would permit a sentencing
judge to determine just where a contemplated sentence fits into the run of
sentences imposed. Many offenses are not treated individually in the DOC's
presentations.'03 Of those offenses that are singled out, the sentencing data
often is displayed in irregular and very broad ranges, giving at best a poor
estimate of how severe a particular sentence tends to be. ""' And, not sur-
prisingly, no effort is made to correlate sentence length to any other variable
that might be expected to affect the choice of an appropriate sentence in
a given case. These variables would include, for example, whether convic-
tions were by trial or plea,40 ' the extent of the defendants' prior adult or
401. See generally POLICY DEVELOPMENT DIVISION, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
STATISTICAL PRESENTATION (Year] [hereinafter cited as [Year] STATISTICAL PRESENTATION].
402. The DOC presents data on the average regular term and extended term sentences imposed
on offenders in different tables, none of which displays the full range of such sentences. See,
e.g., Tables 3, 5 in 1982 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 401. Except for murder, no
information is provided on the distribution of extended term or consecutive term sentences.
See Tables 11, 13-25 in 1982 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 401.
403. Data on sentence distribution are prepared by offense only for murder, armed robbery,
rape, robbery, burglary, aggravated battery, and theft. See Tables 11-25 in 1982 STATISTICAL
PRESENTATION, supra note 401. Data on average sentences imposed are also provided for those
offenses, as well as attempted murder, voluntary manslaughter, forgery, unlawful use of weapons,
and "other" felonies of each felony class. See Tables 3, 5, 10 in 1982 STATISTICAL PRESENTA-
TION, supra note 401.
404. For example, all class X felonies are grouped according to whether the sentence was
6 years, 7-10 years, 11-25 years or 26-30 years. See, e.g., Tables 13-16 in 1982 STATISTICAL
PRESENTATION, supra note 401. The only information provided on longer sentences is the percent-
age that they represent of all prison sentences and the most common such sentence imposed.
See Table 5 in the 1982 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 401.
405. The Annual Reports, supra note 67, prepared by the Administrative Office of the Illinois
Courts, provide data on the percentage of convictions for each felony class disposed of by
plea, bench, trial, and jury trial. Those reports, however, make no effort to correlate those
dispositions to sentences imposed. See, e.g., Dispositions Chart, supra note 67.
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juvenile records,"0 6 and whether the defendants were sentenced on other
charges as well. 0 7
These deficiencies have been compounded by the failure of the CSC to
develop any data called for by the Act's mandate. Although the CSC's early
nonfeasance can be attributed to a lack of staff,"0 8 its continued failure to
generate any original data on sentencing practices' 9 is both puzzling and
disturbing. Whatever the reasons for this state of affairs," ' no Illinois source
has been developed which displays the full range of dispositions imposed
on offenders by offense. This failure to comply with the Act, ' 1' in turn,
has greatly hampered efforts by counsel to argue the inappropriateness of
particular sentences based on the common run of sentences imposed." 2
As a result of the CSC's default, the closest approximation to the informa-
tion it was intended to generate is contained in the annual reports of the
Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts." 3 Since 1979, those reports have
provided information concerning the percentages of convicted felons receiv-
ing various types of sentences, broken down by the most serious felony class
of which the offender was convicted.' Chart 6 below examines the fre-
quency with which probation was imposed on offenders convicted of class
2, 3, and 4 felonies since that date.
These high probation rates for all probationable felony classes", should
have an impact on the excessive sentence claim of a defendant sentenced
to prison for a probationable offense. To put that claim in a specific con-
text, suppose that a defendant had been convicted of burglary, a class 2
felony, after a jury trial in 1980 and, although he had no prior record, he
was sentenced to five years in prison. He argued on appeal 1) that the trial
court punished him for exercising his right to trial by jury, and 2) that his
406. This factor is specifically made relevant to sentencing by several provisions of the Act.
See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I1. Laws 3264, 3294-3301 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, §§ 1005-3-1, 1005-5-3.1(a)(7), 1005-5-3.2(a)(3), 1005-5-3.2(b)(1) (1983)).
407. The Illinois Supreme Court has used the occurrence of multiple offenses to justify a
somewhat longer sentence for one or more of the crimes involved. See People v. Godinez,
91 Ill. 2d 47, 54-56, 434 N.E.2d 1121, 1125-26 (1982); id. at 57, 434 N.E.2d at 1127 (Simon,
J., concurring).
408. See Act of Sept. 24, 1979, Pub. Act No. 81-1021, § 1, 1979 Ill. Laws 3904, 3906 (codified
at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-10-1 (1983)) (providing for CSC staff).
409. This is readily apparent from a comparison of any of the Commission's annual reports
with the DOC's corresponding Statistical Presentation for that same year. Improvements may
be under way in this area.
410. The author believes that this lack of action is deliberate and that a majority of the
Commission has no desire to either study or alter existing sentencing practices. This is hope-
fully a mistaken perception.
411. See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
412. See supra note 397.
413. See supra note 67.
414. See 1979-1981 Dispositions Chart, supra note 67.
415. Some Class I felonies are probationable as well, but because various changes in the
nature and number of felonies so classified occurred during 1979-1981, no data were included
in Chart 6 concerning them.
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CHART 6
PROBATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF ALL
SENTENCES IMPOSED ON PERSONS
CONVICTED OF CLASS 2, 3, OR 4 FELONIES
1979 TO 1981
Percentage of Probation
Year Jurisdiction C1.2 C1.3 C1.4
1979 Downstate 64.3 74.1 75.0
Cook 59.8 74.7 43.2
Total 61.4 74.4 56.7
1980 Downstate 65.8 72.7 76.5
Cook 61.1 74.2 59.1
Total 62.9 73.5 68.6
1981 Downstate 64.0 72.8 78.4
Cook 61.3 72.3 54.4
Total 62.4 72.5 70.4
sentence was excessive given the frequency with which probation is imposed
for his offense. The typical response to the first argument is that the judge
will be presumed not to have taken the defendant's exercise of his rights
into account"1 6 unless the contrary is clearly indicated on the record." 7 The
second argument can be rejected by invoking the great deference to be shown
to trial judges in matters of sentencing, 48 perhaps coupled with the nostrum
that a judge is not required to impose a minimum sentence on a defendant
just because the defendant had no prior criminal record.4 19
This treatment of the defendant's arguments, however, ignores how
416. People v. Davis, 93 111. App. 3d 187, 194-95, 416 N.E.2d 1179, 1184-85 (1st Dist. 1981);
People v. Franklin, 80 111. App. 3d 128, 132-33, 398 N.E.2d 1071, 1074-75 (1st Dist. 1980).
417. Occasionally, either a judge will forget himself and remark negatively on the defen-
dant's exercise of his right to a jury trial in sentencing the offender, People v. Moriarty, 25
I11. 2d 565, 567, 185 N.E.2d 688, 689 (1962), or an appellate court will recognize the obvious
and intervene, absent an express admission of that type by the trial judge. See, e.g., People
v. Dennis, 28 111. App. 3d 74, 77, 328 N.E.2d 135, 138 (5th Dist. 1975) (where minimum sentence
imposed after trial was 20 times greater than minimum term offered during plea negotiations,
it was reduced).
418. See, e.g., People v. Franklin, 80 Ill. App. 3d 128, 133, 398 N.E.2d 1071, 1075 (1st
Dist. 1980) ("Even if we accept defendant's assertion that the 200 to 600 year sentence . . .
imposed at the end of his jury trial greatly exceeded the 118 to 50 year sentence he claimed
was) suggested during plea negotiations, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in sentencing defendant.").
419. See People v. Barney, Ill I11. App. 3d 669, 679, 444 N.E.2d 518, 525 (1st Dist. 1983)
("The [Act) imposes no requirement that the minimum sentence be imposed in the absence
of aggravating factors."); cf. People v. Oravis, 81 I11. App. 3d 717, 719, 402 N.E.2d 297,
299 (4th Dist. 1980) (six-year sentence for burglary reduced to four years where defendant had
no prior record and no other aggravating circumstances were present; one judge dissented from
what he viewed as a holding that a "six-year sentence for a first conviction [for burglary]
should be reduced per se").
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statistically odd it is for this defendant to have received the sentence in ques-
tion. Although the Administrative Office does not keep such records by
offense, its 1980 Annual Report shows that over sixty percent of all persons
convicted in Illinois of a class 2 felony, such as burglary, received
probation.420 Perhaps all of those defendants also had no prior records.
Nevertheless, the question should be asked: "Why is this defendant more
deserving of imprisonment than almost two-thirds of all class 2 offenders
sentenced in 1980?" '42 Beyond that, records maintained by the DOC for
1980 show that of that minority of offenders who were sentenced to prison
for burglary, about eighty percent received a sentence of less than five
years. '22 Thus, the hypothetical defendant's sentence was among the twenty
percent encompassing the most severely sentenced incarcerated inmates, or
in approximately the top 7.556 of all persons convicted of burglary that
year.
423
It is submitted that this defendant should prevail on his excessive sentenc-
ing claim on these statistical grounds, no matter how rationally and fairly
the sentencing issue appears to have been handled below. The hypothetical
defendant would have shown that the sentence he received was imposed only
in very rare instances, and thus it should have been reserved for cases present-
ing far greater aggravating circumstances.4 24 The Act's overriding concern
for fairness and proportionality in sentencing was clearly intended to treat
the severe treatment of a run-of-the-mill offender as an abuse of discretion.42 5
Given the inadequacies in the present data, it is hardly surprising that
neither counsel nor the judiciary have given any real consideration to the
light these data would shed on issues of fairness and proportionality in
420. See 1980 Dispositions Chart, supra note 67.
421. See id.
422. Table 19 in 1980 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 401.
423. The figure is derived as follows. DOC data for 1980 shows that 80.1% of all burglars
sentenced to prison received less severe sentences than our hypothetical defendant. Id. Assum-
ing that approximately the same percentages of burglars were sentenced to prison in 1980 as
was true of Class 2 offenders generally, then the group of imprisoned burglars, to whom our
hypothetical defendant was compared, comprised approximately 37.1 % of all defendants con-
victed of burglary that year. 1980 Dispositions Chart, supra note 67. Consequently, our defen-
dant was sentenced more severely than 80.1% of 37.1%, or 29.60o0, of all sentenced burglars
in 1980. Id. That 29.6%, added to the 62.9% receiving probation, makes a total of 92.5%
of all persons convicted of burglary in 1980 who were sentenced less severely than our hypothetical
defendant.
424. Aggravating circumstances may be found in the commission of the offense itself or
in the particular offender's background such as a prior history of serious delinquent or criminal
activity. See supra text accompanying notes 325-29, 332-67.
425. Id.; cf. People v. Cox, 77 I11. App. 3d 59, 64, 396 N.E.2d 59, 64 (4th Dist. 1979)
("A sentence while not capricious may, nevertheless, be unjustifiably disparate. We believe
that the . .. [Act] authorized us to correct such an error."), rev'd, 82 Il. 2d 268, 412 N.E.2d
541 (1980); People v. Choate, 71 111. App. 3d 267, 273, 389 N.E.2d 670, 675 (5th Dist. 1979)
("If appellate courts continued to defer to the discretion of trial courts whenever a sentence
was within the statutory range without regard to whether or not it was appropriate in all the
facts and circumstances, then the purpose of the new law would be defeated.").
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sentencing. Efforts should be undertaken at once to insure that properly
presented sentencing data are prepared and disseminated.
b. Anticipated Development of Sentencing Guidelines
The Act also anticipated that either the judiciary or the CSC would take
affirmative measures to rationalize the sentencing process.42" As of this
writing, however, neither the Illinois Supreme Court nor the CSC has evinced
the slightest interest in developing sentencing guidelines. Moreover, it seems
likely that both groups are actively hostile to any such effort.4 2
The development of guidelines was an important aspect of the proper
implementation of the Act, because of the facially broad substantive sentenc-
ing discretion it gave to trial judges. 428 Initially, at least, it seemed possible
that a vigorous appellate review procedure eventually might take the place
of these guidelines by developing a detailed common law of sentencing on
a case-by-case basis. With the evisceration of that sentencing review process
on constitutional grounds, '2 9 however, the Illinois Supreme Court has effec-
tively disabled that mechanism in a way that the General Assembly cannot
426. See supra text accompanying notes 186-90.
427. The hostility of the judiciary is readily inferable from the tone of the many opinions
extolling the virtues of granting broad discretion to sentencing judges' decisions, see supra notes
249-64 and accompanying text, as well as the unremitting efforts of the Illinois Supreme Court
to prevent interference with those prerogatives. See generally supra notes 332-42 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the court's pervasive view that the trial judge has wide latitude in sentenc-
ing matters). For discussions concerning the attitude of the Commission, whose membership-
judges and prosecutors-is dominated by persons with a vested interest in a loosely controlled
system, see supra note 410 and infra notes 504-06.
428. As will be discussed in detail in a later article, the key legislative compromise struck
in enacting Pub. Act No. 80-1099 was to accept a comprehensive regulation of the sentencing
process on the one hand, in return for relatively vague and broad grants of substantive sentenc-
ing prerogatives on the other. That compromise opened the door to either one of two broad
approaches to construing and applying the new law. The first was to recognize that its over-
riding concerns for consistency and proportionality in sentencing required limitations on those
grants of substantive power. This is clearly what the General Assembly hoped would occur,
as it is inconceivable that it would have adopted such a complex interlocking set of structural
controls on sentencing discretion and, yet remain indifferent to whether the actual sentences
imposed were sensible and fair.
But if one ignored the larger significance of those structural controls and focused only on
the Act's broadly phrased substantive sentencing provisions, a second course was available-
one which, while contrary to legislative intent, was not utterly implausible. That approach would
assume that no specific limitations were included in the Act because it was intended that trial
judges should be free to resolve such questions as they saw fit, entirely unconstrained by law
or by the approach taken by their colleagues.
Such an interpretation, of course, would have made a mockery of the Act's efforts to bring
some degree of order to unduly disparate sentencing practices by converting the Act itself into
a license to perpetuate those practices. This possibility, coupled with the fact that it would
be both easier to implement and more conducive to the prevailing attitudes toward sentencing,
made it a real threat to the successful implementation of the Act.
It is the thesis of this author's later article that that threat has become reality.
429. See supra text accompanying notes 291-324, 369-89.
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readily repair. It is, therefore, both urgent and peculiarly appropriate that
the court exercise its rulemaking authority to bring some order to the pre-
sent chaotic situation. 3 '
There is no real doubt that "chaotic" is a proper word to apply to cur-
rent sentencing practices. This assertion is illustrated by a class of cases in
which the lack -of teeth in the sentencing review process is particularly
apparent: those cases involving codefendant sentencing disparity in which
all the defendants either pleaded guilty or all were tried and found guilty.43'
One would expect that these cases would afford the best opportunity to begin
sorting out the basic principles of proportionality in sentencing. Two of the
variables that bedevil efforts to compare "similarly situated" offenders-
the circumstances surrounding the commission of different instances of the
same offense and the method of disposition of the offenders4 32-are either
reduced or eliminated in these cases. As is shown below, however, this pro-
mise has not been realized.
One source of error in this class of cases stems from the casual treatment
of claims of sentencing disparity when all the defendants received lengthy
indeterminate sentences. Apparently influenced by the universal availability
of parole in twenty years, less time off for good behavior, courts have
repeatedly committed the twin sins of affirming similar sentences of this type
for offenders who were very differently situated '33 or affirming substantially
disparate sentences for offenders who seemed deserving of quite similar
treatment. 34 These decisions also have created procedural barriers to a defen-
430. Specific recommendations in this regard are set out infra text accompanying notes 473-507.
431. For a discussion of some codefendant sentencing issues that arise in cases involving
both pleas and trials, see supra text accompanying notes 85-131.
432. Both variables are frequently treated as significant in sentencing. Cases noting the nature
of a defendant's participation in an offense in determining the proper sentence include People
v. Smith, 94 Ill. App. 3d 969, 975, 419 N.E.2d 404, 408 (1st Dist. 1981); People v. Dimmick,
90 Ill. App. 3d 136, 138-39, 412 N.E.2d 1150, 1152 (3d Dist. 1980); People v. Ganter, 56
I11. App. 3d 316, 327-28, 371 N.E.2d 1072, 1080-81 (1st Dist. 1977). Cases upholding sentenc-
ing concessions to pleading defendants include People v. Davis, 93 111. App. 3d 187, 194-95,
416 N.E.2d 1179, 1184-85 (1st Dist. 1981); People v. South, 70 Ill. App. 3d 245, 248, 387
N.E.2d 1294, 1296 (4th Dist. 1979); People v. Morgan, 59 I11. 2d 276, 281-82, 319 N.E.2d
764, 767-68 (1974).
433. For example, People v. Lykins, 77 Ill. 2d 35, 394 N.E.2d 1182 (1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 952 (1980), involved the brutal armed robbery of a gas station attendant, who died
some months later of his injuries. Lykins, despite his passive role in the crime and substantial
uncontroverted mitigating factors in his background, received a 70- to 150-year sentence, while
his codefendant received a 75- to 100-year sentence. Id. at 39, 394 N.E.2d at 1185. On appeal,
the Illinois Supreme Court, without addressing the issue of codefendant disparity, affirmed
Lykins' sentence, stating that the shocking brutality of the offense justified the admittedly severe
sentence imposed. Id. Because parole was available to Lykins in 20 years, less credit for good
behavior, irrespective of his lengthy sentence, the court concluded that the sentence could not
be considered an abuse of discretion. Id.
434. For example, in People v. Kline, 99 111. App. 3d 540, 425 N.E.2d 562 (3d Dist. 1981),
rev'd in part, 92 Ill. 2d 490, 442 N.E.2d 154 (1982), the appellate court reviewed the propriety
of a 50- to 100-year sentence imposed on Kline for his role in the brutal murder of a 16-year-old
girl. Kline and two codefendants, Garza and Schultz, were tried separately and convicted, with
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dant wishing to raise a claim of sentencing disparity. 35 These barriers
unfortunately have spilled over into sentences imposed under the Act. As
a consequence, cases continue to multiply in which comparable determinate
sentences are imposed upon incomparable offenders 3 6 and incomparable
sentences are imposed upon comparable offenders.4 37
Garza (who was sentenced by a different judge) receiving 15 to 25 years and Schultz (who
was sentenced by the same judge as Kline) receiving 20 to 25 years. 99 Ill. App. 3d at 553-54,
425 N.E.2d at 572. The testimony and physical evidence in all three trials was consistent, tend-
ing to show that the victim, after a fierce struggle, was clubbed to death, with Garza and
Schultz being the actual perpetrators and Kline merely facilitating commission of the crime.
Id. at 543-44, 425 N.E.2d at 564-65; see also People v. Schultz, 99 Ill. App. 3d 762,
771-72, 425 N.E.2d 1267, 1273 (3d Dist. 1981); People v. Garza, 92 Ill. App. 3d 723, 726-29,
415 N.E.2d 1328, 1332-34 (3d Dist. 1981) (both discussing evidence linking Garza and Schultz
to the striking of blows that contributed to the victim's death).
On appeal, a majority of the appellate court vacated Kline's sentence and remanded for
another sentencing hearing. While Kline had a truly egregious prior record when he was sentenced
(two convictions for murder, one for attempted murder and one for robbery), which could
have justified such a differential, the court noted that those convictions, except the robbery
charge, had recently been reversed on appeal, thus removing the only apparent basis for his
far lengthier sentence. Id. at 554-55, 425 N.E.2d at 572-73. On further appeal, however, the
Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the circuit court's sentence, concluding that Kline had not
carried his burden of providing the reviewing court with a rational basis for comparing his
sentence to that of his codefendants. People v. Kline, 92 Ill. 2d 490, 508-09, 442 N.E.2d 154,
163 (1982). The Supreme Court also concluded that Kline did not have a right to be re-sen-
tenced because his two murder and one attempted murder convictions had been vacated since
his sentence was imposed, because the trial court had explicitly denounced any reliance on
those convictions as a bsis for enhancing Kline's sentence. Id. at 508, 442 N.E.2d at 162.
Left unanswered by this approach, of course, was the rather glaring problem that if Kline's
two murder and one attempted murder convictions had been disregarded below, there was no
apparent reason for sentencing Kline to three to four times as long a term as either of his
codefendants.
See also People v. Hamilton, 100 IIl. App. 3d 942, 956, 427 N.E.2d 388, 399 (1st Dist.
1981) (affirming sentences of 1,250 to 2,500 years and 500 to 1,000 years, respectively, imposed
on two defendants who murdered a motorist after an automobile accident). For rather com-
pelling, but futile, criticisms of the practice of imposing such sentences, see People v. Franklin,
80 11. App. 3d 128, 134-35, 398 N.E.2d 1071, 1075-76 (1st Dist. 1979) (Johnson, J., dissenting);
People v. Short, 62 IIl. App. 3d 733, 737-38, 379 N.E.2d 360, 363-64 (3d Dist. 1978) (Stouder,
J., concurring).
435. In People v. Kline, 92 Il1. 2d 490, 442 N.E.2d 154 (1982), the court had rejected Kline's
challenge to his sentence in part because he had not brought information concerning his codefen-
dants before the appellate court. Id. at 509, 442 N.E.2d at 163. What the court failed to recognize,
however, was that since People v. Carroll, 49 Ill. App. 3d 387, 364 N.E.2d 408 (1st Dist.
1977), such information may not be added to the record on appeal. Id. at 396, 364 N.E.2d
at 415. After Kline and Carroll, there appears to be no way for an earlier-sentenced defendant
to bring the issue of codefendant sentencing disparity before the appellate court.
436. See, e.g., People v. Church, 102 Ill. App. 3d 155, 167-68, 429 N.E.2d 577, 586-87
(4th Dist. 1981) (codefendants each received 40-year sentences for murder and armed' violence
although one had perpetrated the crime in this case and had a worse prior record); People
v. Rogers, 101 Il1. App. 3d 614, 616-19, 428 N.E.2d 547, 549-50 (5th Dist. 1981) (defendant,
who had prior convictions for rape and robbery, and codefendant, who had no prior record,
both received 30-year sentences for rape of a stranded motorist; both sentences affirmed).
437. See People v. Bergman, 121 Ill. App. 3d 100, 458 N.E.2d 1370 (2d Dist. 1984) (upholding
25-year sentence imposed on first offender, pursuant to a blind plea, for distribution of one
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Perhaps the most striking example of the lack of concern for disparity
in this area is People v. Brown. 438 In Brown, the defendant committed vir-
tually the identically bizarre crime in two counties in the course of a single
criminal episode."39 As a consequence, it was necessary for him to be tried
separately in each county, thus presenting the two trial judges with what
was probably a unique situation in Illinois law: two indistinguishable crimes
were committed by the same offender. If the new Act were working properly,
those two judges would have agreed roughly on what sentence was most
appropriate. Alas, it was not to be. One judge imposed concurrent terms
of twelve years, while the other judge imposed concurrent terms of thirty
years. "
On appeal, the defendant contended that the thirty-year sentences were,
inter alia, disproportionately severe compared to his twelve-year sentences. 4 4 1
The appellate court rejected his contention, stating that "the established rule
that fundamental fairness and respect for the law require that defendants
similarly situatled not receive grossly disparate sentences" did not apply to
a case in which a single defendant received disproportionate sentences for
similar but separate offenses. 4 2 The court maintained that such sentencing
disparity was indicative of neither the more severe sentence's excessiveness
nor the less severe sentence's insufficiency.44
It seems clear that Brown was incorrectly decided and that it does a serious
disservice to efforts to reduce undue sentencing disparity. If fundamental
fairness requires a rational basis for imposing disparate sentences on dif-
ferent individuals who committed the same crime, the requirement of a
rational basis for imposing such sentences on a single individual is far more
compelling. Although it is true that the existence of a disparity does not
show that it is the longer sentence which is inappropriate, the existence of
an eighteen-year differential clearly is inappropriate in and of itself. There
simply was no way that both sentences in Brown could be right.44 4 The
court erred in failing to recognize that fact.
pound of cocaine, where codefendant negotiated a six-year sentence for same offense; a dis-
senting judge would have reduced defendant's sentence to 12 years).
438. 103 Ill. App. 3d 306, 431 N.E.2d 43 (2d Dist. 1982).
439. The defendant had approached the home of a DuPage County resident, gained admis-
sion under a ruse, and produced a pellet gun. He then ordered the occupants to drive to their
bank and withdraw money for him. They complied, but defendant became nervous while waiting
in line and ordered the victims to drive off without obtaining any money. With this entourage
in tow, he proceeded to Kane County, where much the same process was completed with another
victim. The police, however, had been alerted and the defendant was apprehended when the
car he was in crashed. No one was harmed. Id. at 307-08, 431 N.E.2d at 44-45.
440. Id. at 307-09, 431 N.E.2d at 44-45.
441. Id. at 309-10, 431 N.E.2d at 46.
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. As between the two sentences, there is little doubt that the 12-year sentences were far
closer to the mark. The defendant had a serious prior record, but his youth, nonviolent
background and actions on the occasion in question all pointed to a mentally ill but rehabilitatable
individual, rather than a vicious and hardened criminal meriting a lengthier term in prison.
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The types of shortcomings in treating claims of codefendant sentencing
disparity discussed above are not the only problems that have arisen. Rather,
the doctrine prohibiting codefendant disparity has been applied in one area
where justice and common sense-not to mention the Act itself-would
indicate that it should be dismissed out of hand. In what must be regarded
as the height of irony, that doctrine has been employed to reduce the fair
sentences imposed on some codefendants to the lower penalties imposed on
remaining codefendants who, in all likelihood, were punished far too leniently
to begin with.
This curious perversion of sentencing principles can be traced to the early
pre-Act case of People v. Steg. 45 In Steg, three defendants, Witt, Steg, and
Bravo, eventually pleaded guilty to an armed robbery."4 6 Witt was sentenced
first to two-to-ten years to be served consecutively to any other sentence
imposed on him in connection with outstanding criminal charges in another
state." 7 Thereafter, Steg and Bravo were sentenced by a different judge to
terms of five-to-twenty years. The second judge explained his actions as
follows:
Now it is true that one of these defendants has been sentenced from two
to ten years in the penitentiary. But the fact that this Court made a mistake
in the third of this crime doesn't mean I'm going to make a mistake likewise
for two-thirds of the crime.44
Steg and Bravo appealed their sentences. A majority of the appellate court
concluded that the appeal involved not only "determining whether [Steg's
and Bravo's] sentences are excessive in view of the crime committed," ' 9
but also whether those sentences were "consistent with the basic principle
of dispensing equal justice under the law."' 40 Because Witt had the worst
prior record and was the mastermind of the crime, ' the majority held that
the "ends of justice" required a reduction of the Steg and Bravo sentences
to the same two-to-ten year term imposed on Witt."5 2 In the dissent, one
justice argued that leniency in one case "did not transform reasonable punish-
ment in another case into an excessive sentence." '453
The dissent in Steg certainly seems to have been the better argument,
Id. at 307-08, 431 N.E.2d at 45. Even a 12-year sentence would have been more severe than
those imposed on more than 74% of the offenders committed to the DOC for armed robbery
(the closest analogous offense for which sentencing data are available) in 1980, when Brown
was sentenced. See Table 13 in 1980 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 401.
445. 69 Ill. App. 2d 188, 215 N.E.2d 854 (3d Dist. 1966).
446. Id. at 189, 215 N.E.2d at 854.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 190, 215 N.E.2d at 855.
449. Id. at 191, 215 N.E.2d at 855. The court found it "obvious" that the 5- to 20-year
terms would not have been excessive had all three defendants received them. Id.
450. Id.
451. Id. at 191, 215 N.E.2d at 856.
452. Id. at 193, 215 N.E.2d at 856.
453. Id. at 194-96, 215 N.E.2d at 856-57 (Coryn, P. J., dissenting).
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especially since the passage of the Act. If undue lenity has been shown to
one offender,"" showing the same lenity to another does not seem to advance
any legitimate interest. The proper approach to this issue, as discussed earlier,
appears to be that put forward in the dissent in People v. King: 5 treat
the first sentence as a presumptively valid point of departure for later
sentences, but one which may be disregarded if explicitly examined and found
to have been either unduly lenient or unduly severe. '56 The Act is concerned
with the imposition of an appropriate sentence in each case based on an
assessment of the individual offender's circumstances. If some other defen-
dant has received an improper sentence which is beyond recall," 7 it is far
better to acknowledge its erroneous character than to use it to perpetrate
still another improper sentence.
It would be useful if the Illinois Supreme Court clarified this situation,
because' the Steg doctrine has apparently gained rather than lost currency
since passage of the Act. In People v. Earullo,4 58 for example, Earullo and
his codefendant, Klisz, both police officers, were convicted of involuntary
manslaughter and official misconduct in connection with the death of a per-
son they had arrested. '5 9 The evidence showed that the two officers had
administered a truly savage beating to the arrestee, with Klisz playing a more
major role than Earullo. ' ° Apparently in response to that role, the judge
sentenced Klisz to an extended term of eight years, while sentencing Earullo
to only two and one-half years.4 '
On appeal, the appellate court recognized that some differential between
the sentences imposed on the two defendants was appropriate given their
differing degrees of participation in the crime. Nevertheless, the court reduced
Klisz's sentence to five years. 6 ' The court found that Klisz's extended term
could not be sustained "where no such extended term was imposed on
454. It should be noted that it is not even clear that Witt's sentence would end up being
less severe than that of his codefendants. In effect, by making Witt's sentence consecutive to
other punishments, the court was adding those other sanctions to the 2- to 10-year terms it
was imposing.
455. 102 Ill. App. 3d 257, 261-64, 430 N.E.2d 292, 295-97 (3d Dist. 1981) (Stouder, J.,
dissenting).
456. Id. at 262-64, 430 N.E.2d at 296-97 (Stouder, J., dissenting).
457. Under Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4), only decreases in sentences are allowed on appeal,
although the court has entertained claims from prosecutors, by way of a petition for a writ
of mandamus, that a sentence was unlawfully lenient. See People ex rel. Carey v. Bentivenga,
83 I1. 2d 537, 416 N.E.2d 259 (1981). In the wake of People v. Cox, 82 Il1. 2d 268, 412
N.E.2d 541 (1980), this apparently cannot be varied through legislation. See supra text accom-
panying notes 369-75.
458. 113 11. App. 3d 774, 447 N.E.2d 925 (1st Dist. 1983).
459. Id. at 776, 447 N.E.2d at 926.
460. Id. at 776-79, 447 N.E.2d at 926-28.
461. Id. At 791-93, 447 N.E.2d at 936-37. Klisz's extended term sentence was predicated,
not unsurprisingly, on the finding that his conduct constituted "exceptionally brutal or heinous
behavior, indicative of wanton cruelty." Id. at 792, 447 N.E.2d at 937; see ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(b)(2) (1983).
462. Earullo, 113 I1. App. 3d at 791, 447 N.E.2d at 937.
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Earullo," even though the court believed that "both defendants acted in
an exceptionally brutal and heinous manner." ' 3 In short, the appellate court
apparently believed that both defendants merited extended term sentences,
but because only one had received such a sentence, the other's would be
reduced as well.
Adherence to the ancient maxim that "two wrongs don't make a right"
is the key to reform in this area of the law. The practice in Earullo and
numerous similar cases 64 of reducing an appropriate sentence because another
might not have been sufficiently severe, is more than unfortunate. Because
such a practice associates the Act with what amounts to a perversion of
fairness, it has actively undermined many of the Act's legitimate objectives. '
Consequently, this aspect of the codefendant disparity doctrine should be
eliminated at the first opportunity.46 1
E. Possible Remedial Measures Under Judicial Auspices
This canvassing of the Act's efforts to structure the exercise of judicial
sentencing discretion has shown that those controls have been largely vitiated
by judicial constructions. Running through these decisions is a thread that
bears further comment: a belief that many of the Act's proposed solutions
to unfair and inequitable sentencing practices constitute dangerous and undue
legislative trammeling on judicial prerogatives. '67 This belief is particularly
unfortunate because nothing could be further from the truth. Indeed, the
463. Id. at 792-93, 447 N.E.2d at 937.
464. See, e.g., People v. Tate, 122 II1. App. 3d 660, 462 N.E.2d 662 (1st Dist. 1984); People
v. Cook, 112 Ill. App. 3d 621, 445 N.E.2d 824 (2d Dist. 1983). In Cook, the appellate court
reduced a seven-year prison sentence for escape to five years, even though Cook's prior criminal
record included five felony and 15 misdemeanor convictions, because Cook's two co-escapees
had received only three-year sentences. Id. at 623-25, 445 N.E.2d at 825-27. The court did
not explicitly examine the appropriateness of the sentence imposed on Cook's codefendants.
Moreover, the appellate court was "frank to admit that separate and apart from the sentences
imposed upon [Cook's confederates in the escape] . . . we would uphold the seven-year sentence
imposed upon Cook." Id. at 624, 445 N.E.2d at 826.
In Tate, the defendant's 10-year extended term sentence for aggravated assault, growing out
of a series of sexually-related beatings extending over two days, was reduced to five years,
apparently because a codefendant, who had participated in those beatings to a lesser extent,
had received only a four-year sentence. Tate, 122 I11. App. 3d at 667, 462 N.E.2d at 667-68.
A dissenting judge would have affirmed Tate's sentence. Id. at 670, 462 N.E.2d at 669-70
(Romiti, J., dissenting).
465. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
466. Since this doctrine is entirely judge-made and limited strictly to judicial sentencing con-
siderations, it arguably is a suitable subject for the exercise of the Illinois Supreme Court's
rulemaking prerogatives, if not under its general administrative and supervisory authority, then
under the Act's special supplemental grant of such powers. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3,
1977 I11. Laws 3264, 3302 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-4.2 (1983)); see also
infra text accompanying notes 473-507 for suggestions concerning possible additional areas for
the court to exercise such authority.
467. See People v. Davis, 95 Ill. 2d 1, 447 N.E.2d 353 (1983) (discussed supra text accompa-
nying notes 291-315); People v. Cox, 82 Ill. 2d 268, 412 N.E.2d 541 (1980) (discussed supra
text accompanying notes 369-91).
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Act was deferential " 8 to those prerogatives. Its basic approach was to let
the judiciary develop and implement its own scheme for ensuring that the
legislature's broad ranges of penalties were fairly and rationally applied. '69
Direct constraints on the exercise of judicial sentencing discretion were largely
avoided by the legislature in favor of facilitative measures designed to increase
the likelihood that appropriate sentences would be imposed. 7 '
But now that the Illinois Supreme Court has invalidated that approach
on constitutional grounds, 7 a further legislative narrowing of judicial sentenc-
ing discretion remains the only viable course of action to implement a sentenc-
ing system that meets at least minimal standards of consistency, rationality,
and fairness. The result of such a legislative endeavor could well be an
exceptionally detailed specification of sanctions that is both constitutionally
unassailable and extremely confining to sentencing judges. '72 If the legislature
were to take this action, cases such as Davis and Cox could become preemi-
nent examples of winning the battle but losing the war. If for no other reason
than to forestall such an eventuality, it would be both appropriate and
welcome for the court to exercise its rulemaking authority in order to imple-
ment the various sentencing reform measures entrusted to the judiciary by
the Act. It is respectfully suggested that at least four major areas of activity
seem appropriate for the Illinois Supreme Court's attention.
The first of these would be the role to be taken by sentencing judges in
connection with plea bargains. The rule should provide that in such cases,
as in any other, sentencing remains a judicial act. The rule also should state
that it is an abuse of discretion to fail to make an independent assessment
of the validity of the plea bargain before imposing it. ' In that regard, the
rule should specify that the extent of deference due to the parties' proposed
bargain should depend primarily on the bargain's consistency with other mat-
468. See McAnany, Merritt, & Tromanhauser, supra note 43, at 627-33; cf. People v. Meeks,
75 11. App. 3d 357, 366, 393 N.E.2d 1190, 1197-98 (5th Dist. 1979), rev'd on other grounds,
81 111. 2d 524, 411 N.E.2d 9 (1980). The Meeks court concluded that
[olne problem with the new statute is that it makes no provision for weighing the
various factors in aggravation and mitigation against each other or for choosing
between them in order of importance. *** The danger of too much or too little
emphasis on certain factors is handled by giving appellate courts a broader scope
of review and inquiry into the underlying bases for any sentencing decision.
75 I11. App. 3d at 366, 393 N.E.2d at 1197-98.
At least that was the way it was supposed to be.
469. See supra text accompanying notes 214-18.
470. Id.
471. See supra text accompanying notes 291-315, 369-91.
472. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09 (West 1984); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9751-81
(Purdon 1982). While this approach would not be superior to judicially established standards,
it would represent a substantial improvement on the present state of affairs. For a variety
of reasons, the author believes that judicial guidelines will not be developed, thus necessitating
such an approach. See infra notes 503-07 and accompanying text.
473. This rule would implement existing law, which requires a judge to make an "indepen-
dent assessment" of these bargains. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-4-1(b) (1983); supra
text accompanying notes 50-53, 59-60.
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ters of record bearing on sentencing issues,"7" including information con-
veyed to the court by the prosecutor concerning the sustainability of par-
ticular charges.475 The rule also should point out that systemic considera-
tions such as court congestion should not be deemed a sufficient basis for
imposing an otherwise unjustifiable sentence.
Additionally, this plea-bargaining rule should address the situation where
the trial judge entertains doubt as to the propriety of any proposed bargain,
either as to charge or as to sentence. The rule should state that, in such
a case, the sentencing judge should refuse to accept the bargain without first
ordering a pre-sentence investigation. 7 It should also limit a trial judge's
ability to accept a plea to what he believes to be a factually inappropriate
charge. In such situations, a judge should not accept a plea unless the sentence
imposed is commensurate with the offense actually committed. "77
474. The most important matter is the offender's prior history of delinquency or criminal
activity. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-3-1, 1005-3-2(1) (1983). Additional information
of this type frequently will come before the court in the course of establishing the existence
of a factual basis for the plea. See Supreme Court Rule 402(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IlA,
§ 402(c) (1983).
475. This information would be available to the court at least in the more serious cases
if other reforms proposed herein were implemented. See supra notes 149-57 and accompanying
text.
The court should, of course, also consider any information presented by defense counsel
bearing on sentencing. That admonition is not included above because in the present context,
the principal concern is unduly lenient bargains, not unduly harsh ones.
476. The sentencing judge is presently free to do this. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-3-1
(1983). The proposed rule would ensure that power is exercised in appropriate cases.
477. See supra text accompanying notes 160-66. It should be noted that a defendant has
no right to have his guilty plea to a particular charge accepted. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§§ 113-4(c), 113-4.1, 115-2 (1983).
Some basis for concern exists over allowing sentencing judges to look beyond the pleaded
offense in search of the "true" offense. See People v. Michels, 72 Il1. App. 3d 182, 185-86,
390 N.E.2d 927, 930 (3d Dist. 1979) (sentence imposed on a defendant convicted of involun-
tary manslaughter would be improper where based on the sentencing judge's belief that the
defendant actually was guilty of murder); People v. Hill, 14 IIl. App. 3d 20, 23, 302 N.E.2d
373, 375 (5th Dist. 1973) (improper to consider in sentencing that defendant could have been
charged with a felony, when he was only charged with a misdemeanor).
Weighed against this, however, is the unanimity of the available literature in concluding that
sentencing judges do look beyond the pleaded offense and that they should do so. See D.
NEWMAN, supra note 142, at 98-99; Gifford, supra note 46, at 56. This body of authority
is supported by a variety of Illinois cases permitting consideration, for sentencing purposes,
of other criminal acts committed by the defendant on the occasion in question, even where
the defendant was never charged with those other "crimes." See, e.g., People v. Ely, 107 I11.
App. 3d 102, 107-08, 437 N.E.2d 353, 357 (4th Dist. 1982) (extended term of imprisonment
for burglary could be based on fact that woman was sexually assaulted in the course of the
crime, even though no charges related to the assault were lodged); People v. Harris, 40 I11.
App. 3d 204, 206-07, 351 N.E.2d 890, 893 (3rd Dist. 1976) (six-year minimum sentence for
burglary affirmed where individual died in the course of the crime).
The author believes that this latter group of cases represent the proper resolution of the
court's role in the context of a plea bargain. The proposed rule does not require the judge
to sentence a defendant pleading to one crime as if he were guilty of another. But it does
require the judge to be satisfied that, when the information before the court clearly establishes
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Finally, a rule addressed to plea bargaining should address the degree of
lenity that may be shown by the court in return for a defendant's willingness
to plead guilty. All sentences, including those imposed on pleading defen-
dants, must be within a zone of reasonableness surrounding the sentence
the judges would have selected had the defendants been convicted after trial
on the charges to which they are pleading guilty.478 The rule should contain
some concrete limits, expressed in relatively narrow terms of years, specify-
ing the permissible gap for various felony classes between the proposed
bargain and what the trial judge would otherwise be inclined to impose.4' 9
The rule should further provide for the routine ordering of a full pre-sentence
investigation in an effort to resolve any difference that might arise between
the parties and the court.' 80
A second major area for the court's rulemaking authority relates to pro-
viding a statement of reasons for imposing sentence and reviewing sentences
that, without objection, were imposed without providing a statement. There
apparently has been a strong judicial reaction to the statement-of-reasons
requirement in those cases in which the trial judge merely imposed a bargained-
for sentence.' 8' Much can be said for the position that the reasons require-
ment has little value in such cases. Instead, it probably would be more
appropriate to substitute a brief statement of compliance with the "indepen-
dent assessment" requirement of the Act and with the proposed rule just
discussed, if it were adopted. 82 Additionally, it would seem to be entirely
proper to disallow sentencing appeals in cases involving bargained-for
sentences on the grounds of waiver if a defendant fails to request that a
statement be furnished. 83
the defendant's guilt of a substantially mure serious offense than the pleaded offense, the ends
of justice will be served by imposition of the bargained-for sentence.
478. See supra text accompanying notes 158-74.
479. See supra text accompanying notes 158-66.
480. See supra note 476.
Pre-sentence investigations undertaken prior to a defendant's plea of guilty and without his
consent raise a variety of complicated issues which are deemed beyond the scope of this article,
but which would require at least careful consideration before implementing any such procedure.
See People ex rel. Kunce v. Hogan, 37 Ill. App. 3d 673, 675-80, 346 N.E.2d 456, 460-63 &
n.l (5th Dist. 1976) (holding that convicted defendant has absolute right to refuse to make
any statement to probation officer pending appeal, but indicating that investigation could con-
tinue utilizing other sources), rev'd on other grounds, 67 Ill. 2d 55, 364 N.E.2d 50 (1977).
481. This observation is based on conversations that the author has had with a number of
Illinois judges and other knowledgeable officials.
482. See supra text accompanying notes 473-80. Such a rule presumably could not displace
the statutory requirement of a full statement of reasons for the sentence imposed in those
cases where the defendant requested one, see supra note 315, but in many cases where bargained-
for sentences were imposed, an abbreviated statement would be a simpler and more sensible
requirement.
483. After People v. Davis, 95 111. 2d 1, 447 N.E.2d 353 (1983), only the Illinois Supreme
Court seems to be empowered to act in this area, although, as argued above, the General
Assembly also should be free to legislate concerning these matters. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 301-15.
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With regard to all other cases, however, the rule should partially abrogate
the effect of Davis"4 by requiring that a statement of reasons for imposing
sentence must be given by the trial judge, in conformity with the Act's
requirements. '85 The rule should also modify the waiver principle announced
in Davis to allow appellate review of some unexplained sentences. In those
cases in which the defendant makes a colorable showing, based solely on
the information presented in the trial court, that a lesser sentence was
appropriate, the appeal should be allowed even though the defendant never
requested the statement nor objected to its omission.4 86 Finally, the rule
should affirm what was apparently implicit in Davis: that a defendant has
an absolute right to be furnished with a judicial statement of the basis for
his sentence, if one is requested, and that the failure to provide such a state-
ment is reversible error.48 7 Because Davis prohibited only legislative-not
judicial-efforts to require mandatory statements of reasons for imposing
sentence, 88 these actions could be undertaken without modifying the con-
stitutional principles enunciated in Davis.
The third major area requiring the Illinois Supreme Court's rulemaking
authority is the appellate review of sentencing decisions. The heart of any
such rule would be a reformulated definition of the abuse-of-discretion stan-
dard of review traditionally applied to these decisions. 89 This redefinition
is necessary in order to accommodate the fact that the Act requires far more
of trial judges in sentencing matters than did prior law, and that conse-
quently, it is easier for trial judges to abuse their discretion in sentencing.4 9
It should be emphasized, again, that this rule could be fashioned without
retreating from the constitutional principle enunciated in People v. COx,"'
that it is for the judiciary rather than the legislature to define the standard
of review in these cases. 92 Indeed, the court could even take this action
without abandoning the abuse-of-discretion standard. 93
Any reformulated definition should incorporate the Act's overriding con-
cern that sentences not only be consistent with its literal strictures but also
that they be appropriate in light ' of both the defendant's particular situation
and the sentences typically imposed in comparable circumstances. 94 The rule
could make it clear that a de novo review is not proper by carrying forward
484. 95 111. 2d at 1, 447 N.E.2d at 353.
485. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-4-1(c), 1005-8-1(b), 1005-8-4(b) (1983).
486. See supra text accompanying notes 273-90.
487. See supra note 315.
488. See supra text accompanying notes 296-99.
489. See, e.g., People v. Cox, 82 Ill. 2d 268, 275, 412 N.E.2d 541, 545 (1980) (standard
of review for sentencing is whether discretion has been abused); People v. Perruquet, 68 I11.
2d 149, 153, 368 N.E.2d 882, 883-84 (1977) (trial court's sentence not to be altered absent
abuse of discretion); see also supra text accompanying notes 332-67.
490. See supra text accompanying notes 343-67.
491. 82 Ill. 2d 268, 412 N.E.2d 541 (1980).
492. See supra text accompanying notes 369-75.
493. See supra text accompanying notes 357-58.
494. See supra text accompanying notes 343-50.
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some provision patterned after the Act's rebuttable presumption of a
sentence's validity. ' Supplementation of the record on appeal should be
permitted in the interests of justice;49 6 but if additional information seems
to tip the balance against the decision reached below, the proper course should
be to remand for a new hearing rather than impose a reduced sentence on
appeal. This course would permit full development of any such new matters
in the trial court.4 97
In that regard, the supreme court might also reexamine its decision to
withhold from reviewing courts the power to reduce prison terms to sentences
of probation. 4 9 As the court itself has frequently noted, such a change con-
stitutes a drastic alteration in the character of the sanction imposed. 499 This
observation certainly justifies a rule that the usual course would be to remand
the matter to the trial judge for a fuller explanation of his reasons for initially
denying probation. A remand would ensure that there were no factors con-
sidered, but not articulated, below which make such lenity inappropriate.
There are, however, two problems with requiring a remand when proba-
tion was improperly denied. First, there is no reason to disable the appellate
courts from acting directly to reduce a prison sentence to probation in those
cases in which its denial was clearly erroneous. Moreover, the appellate courts
are authorized at present to reduce the severity of penitentiary sentences on
appeal without limitation.59 ' Nevertheless, many such cases also might benefit
from a remand for fuller factual development of sentencing issues.
These observations suggest that the present supreme court rules governing
appellate review of sentences are both over- and under-inclusive in the powers
495. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3302 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-5-4.1 (1979)) amended by Pub. Act No. 83-344, § 1, 1983 111. Laws 2573, 2573
(codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-4.1 (1983)); supra note 290.
496. This provision is needed to undo the effects of People v. Kline, 92 111. 2d 490, 442
N.E.2d 154 (1982) and People v. Carroll, 49 I1l. App. 3d 387, 364 N.E.2d 408 (1st Dist. 1977),
which when read together require that additional information be furnished to the appellate
court and then preclude its submission. See supra note 435.
497. This provision is designed to bolster the Illinois Supreme Court's view that trial courts
should play a preeminent role in sentencing matters. These courts, of course, are also far better
suited to exploring factual issues.
498. See People v. Cox, 82 IlI. 2d 268, 275, 412 N.E.2d 541, 545 (1980) (Rule 615 does
not authorize reviewing court to reduce sentence of imprisonment to one of probation); People
ex rel. Ward v. Moran, 54 Ill. 2d 552, 556, 301 N.E.2d 300, 302 (1973) (reviewing courts
lack authority to reduce prison sentence to probation).
499. See People ex rel. Ward v. Moran, 54 I11. 2d 552, 556, 301 N.E.2d 300, 302 (1973)
(probation and imprisonment are "qualitatively distinct"); People v. Bolyard, 61 II. 2d 583,
588, 338 N.E.2d 168, 170-71 (1975) (adherence to Moran decision drawing distinction between
imprisonment and probation).
500. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA, § 615(b)(4) (1983). Indeed, appellate courts have the
even greater power to reduce the degree of the offense of which the defendant was convicted
in appropriate cases. See People v. Coleman, 78 111. App. 3d 989, 993-94, 398 N.E.2d 185,
187 (3d Dist. 1979) (exercise of powers granted in Rules 615(b)(3) and (4) to reduce degree
of offense and sentence); People v. Plewka, 27 Ill. App. 3d 553, 559, 327 N.E.2d 457, 461
(1st Dist. 1975) (reduction in degree of offense and remand for resentencing); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. IIOA, § 615(b)(3) (1983).
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conferred on the appellate courts in matters of sentencing reduction. It is
submitted that these rules should be recast to allow the outright imposition
of reduced sentences on appeal (whether to lesser penitentiary terms, periodic
imprisonment, or probation) only if the reviewing court is satisfied that the
following criteria are met: all factual matters pertinent to sentencing were
fully explored below; the trial judge's reasons for imposing the sentence are
clear; those reasons do not provide a legally sufficient basis for the sentence
selected; and the appellate court has sufficient information available to impose
an appropriate sentence to which the state has had a fair opportunity to
respond. 0' In all other cases, a remand to the trial court judge for resentenc-
ing should be required. In order to promote uniformity in sentencing generally
and to act as a guide to both the parties and the trial judge on remand,
the rule should also require the appellate court to state in its opinion the
range of dispositions that it believes to be appropriate on the then-existing
record."'o
The final major area in which the court should consider exercising its
rulemaking powers is even more vexing than those already mentioned: develop-
ing substantive guidelines for the exercise of sentencing discretion. This is
an immensely complicated subject, a detailed discussion of which is postponed
to the next article in this series. For now it suffices to note that action by
the Illinois Supreme Court probably should include elaboration on the follow-
ing subjects: the circumstances (over and above minimal statutory criteria)
in which discretionary sentences of death" 3 or natural life should be imposed;
when consecutive or extended term sentences should be imposed; how prison
sentences should be selected within a given range; whether different weights
should be given to different factors in mitigation and aggravation contained
in the Act and, if so, what those weights should be; and a variety of other
matters of great consequence to efforts to develop a rational and consistent
sentencing system.1
0 4
This will be a tedious, time-consuming, and probably unwelcome," 5 task
501. See supra text accompanying note 496.
502. See supra text accompanying notes 108-18.
503. This would be a particularly appropriate area for the Illinois Supreme Court to con-
sider, given its unusual involvement in death penalty cases. See 1970 ILL. CONST. art. 6, §
4(b) (providing defendants sentenced to death a direct appeal, as a matter of right, to Illinois
Supreme Court); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(i) (1983); id. ch. IIOA, §§ 603, 606(a).
504. The author realizes that this suggestion asks a good deal of the judiciary and that quite
apart from the burdensomeness of the task, there are several reasons why the judiciary could
be reluctant to become involved in these matters. For one, the judiciary could well desire to
avoid the appearance of acting in a legislative capacity by prescribing penalties for offenses
generally. For another, the judiciary probably would wish to avoid the far more public posture
on sentencing matters that would flow from publishing such guidelines. See infra notes 505-06.
Nonetheless, in view of the judiciary's insistence on complete sovereignty over sentencing, it
should be willing to accept its fair share of the responsibility for making the sentencing system
as rational and equitable as possible.
505. The psychological determinants behind judicial opposition to reforms of its sentencing
function have not received the attention they deserve. For a very perceptive commentary on
this phenomenon, see Robin, Judicial Resistance to Sentencing Accountability, 21 CRIME AND
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which is sure to be viewed in some quarters as fundamentally misguided." 6
Yet, if such a task should be undertaken, no one is better suited to carry
it out than the judiciary, acting under the guidance and leadership of the
Illinois Supreme Court. Limitations on judicial sentencing discretion ideally
should be both pragmatic and conducive to promoting just sentencing in
the great run of cases. The prospect of developing guidelines without tapp-
ing the reservoir of judicial sentencing experience is minimal."' There is much
to be done, and an urgent need for considered action.
DELINQUENCY 201 (1975). That author asserts that such judicial opposition is entirely rational
from a psychological point of view: Judges desire to preserve their advantageous position in
the criminal justice system and will take extraordinary measures to avoid or minimize any infringe-
ments upon their highly prized discretionary domain that could result from reform measures.
Robin stated:
[I]t is at least a viable hypothesis that the judiciary perceives sentencing account-
ability as an intrusion, a modification of authority that would appreciably reduce
its sacred tradition and life style. The court confirms and reinforces its definition
of self, service and office in the process, circumstances, and art of sentencing. A
significant manifestation of the power and identity of the office and its incumbent
is to be found in sentence imposition and the associated judicial degrees of freedom
surrounding that function.
In addition . . . there is another interesting . . . status' impediment to judicial
acceptance of intrusion upon its sentencing domain. . . . It is vested by tradition,
precedent and legislation as the ultimate arbiter of the disputes and conflicts of
others, including those of other segments of the criminal justice community; but
the court is rarely the recipient of such dispositional judgment by others. . . . Thus
when proposed reform of the criminal justice establishment includes the suggestion
by otherwise subservient system representatives and those outside it that the court's
sentencing power be curtailed in the name of improvement of the system, it is
understandable that the court views the proposal as particularly offensive, with insult
(the inappropriateness of the source of the suggestion) being added to injury (the
curtailment of its sentencing power).
Id. at 211, 213 (emphasis in original).
This is not to suggest that such attitudes, if they existed, would be unique to the judiciary.
Prosecutorial and correctional officials undoubtedly would be equally desirous of protecting
the perquisites of their positions in a criminal justice system that provides them broad discre-
tionary powers.
506. Defenses of unfettered judicial sentencing discretion and broad sentencing ranges fre-
quently emphasize the desirability of being free to consider all pertinent circumstances in each
offender's case and to impose whatever sentence that examination seems to require. While the
author has no quarrel with either proposition, that concession does not invalidate the argument
for the reforms proposed. Granting such discretion in no way weakens the argument that it
should be exercised in a consistent, even-handed manner from one case to the next so as to
impose sentences on offenders that are proportionate to their blameworthiness, as assessed through
objective criteria. This is, of course, what the Act sought to provide and what this proposal
seeks to implement.
507. This is not to say that the needs and desires of prosecutorial and correctional authorities,
among others, should be excluded. From both an informational and a pragmatic, consensus-
building perspective, the court probably would be well advised to utilize the recommendations
of a widely representative "blue ribbon" committee-or perhaps the existing Criminal Sentenc-
ing Commission (if it were willing to accept the responsibility) as a basis for any new rules
it might enact in this area.
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IV. STRUCTURAL CONTROLS ON THE
DISCRETION OF CORRECTIONAL OFFICIALS
A. An Historical Overview
From the outset of the legislative process leading to the enactment of the
Act, it was recognized that a rational sentencing scheme could not be
established merely by controlling judicial and prosecutorial discretion in the
sentencing process. Of equal importance was eliminating or guiding the
exercise of discretion by correctional officials in administering prison
sentences. The overriding goal in this regard was fairness. It would do no
good to develop a sensible, even-handed method for imposing criminal sanc-
tions on offenders if those sentenced to prison were placed in an atmosphere
rife with discrimination, arbitrariness, and injustice.0 8 To this end a variety
of reforms affecting the DOC were proposed in the earliest reform legisla-
tion. Insofar as they related directly to sentencing issues, these reforms were
passed into law largely unchanged. The principal measures are discussed
below.
1. Abolishing Parole
The most profound restructuring of the discretion of correction officials
proposed by the reform group was, of course, replacing parole with good-
conduct credit.5 09 Prior to the Act's passage, the Illinois Parole and Pardon
Board and, to a lesser extent, clinicians within the DOC, had discretion to
lengthen or shorten an inmate's prison stay based on their perception of
the inmate's "clinical readiness" for release." ' By divorcing any release issue
508. See supra text accompanying notes 22-29.
509. A good concise explanation of the reasoning underlying this position can be found in
Proposal Commentary, supra note 27, at 1-5, 47-49. Compare S.B. 1885, 79th I11. Gen. Assembly,
1977 Sess., 3-3-1(a), 3-3-3(d) at 2, 6-7 (Parole and Pardon Board in DOC is paroling authority
for all adult offenders) with H.B. 1500, 80th 111. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess., 3-3-1(a), 3-3-3(d)
at 9, 13 (Prisoner Review Board shall be independent of DOC and shall be paroling authority)
and Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 111. Laws 3264, 3272 (same language as H.B. 1500) (codified
at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1003-3-1(a), 1003-3-3(d) (1983)).
510. This approach is widely referred to as the "medical model" of corrections. See generally
D. FOGEL, supra note 25, at 50, 56-57 (Fogel refers to this approach as the "rehabilitative
model"); N. MORRIS, supra note 26, at 12, 17 (commenting on the model of medical treat-
ment). Under that model, criminality is viewed as the result of social and psychological factors
which are amenable to treatment in much the same manner as physical or mental illness. As
a consequence, an offender is seen primarily as a person in need of treatment or rehabilitation,
who should be incarcerated pursuant to an indeterminate sentence, which permits the prisoner
to be released on parole as soon as rehabilitation has occurred. See generally D. FOGEL, supra
note 25, at 161-64 (detailing the parole and probation proceedings); Proposal Commentary,
supra note 27, at 2, 47.
The reform group had two principal objections to the medical model. First, it questioned
whether rehabilitation, if achieved, could be recognized by correctional officials. Rather than
accepting the traditional view of the parole release process as a rational winnowing out of
the saved from the damned, the reform group saw it as a process which, to an even greater
extent than judicial sentencing, added or subtracted years from inmates' lives in an utterly
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from an inmate's choice of, or degree of "success" in, any given rehabilita-
tion program, the reform group sought to eliminate what it saw as the vast,
unreviewable, 5 ' and standardless exercise of this discretion. Curtailing cor-
rectional discretion in this area, however, highlighted the importance of assur-
ing that the formulation and administration of policies concerning the award
and revocation of good-conduct credits also were subject to meaningful checks
and limitations. The Act's measures in those areas are discussed below.
2. Establishing Statutory Rates for the Accumulation of Good-Time Credits
At the initiation of the process that culminated in the Act, Illinois followed
a common pattern of providing the DOC with statutory authorization to
establish rates administratively for the accumulation of good-time credits."'
Pursuant to this authorization, the DOC had developed three types of good-
time credit: good conduct, meritorious service, and work performance.
Good conduct was available to all inmates merely for not breaking prison
disciplinary rules. "I The departmental regulations then current established
a sliding scale whereby one month off the first year of a sentence was earned,
two months off the second year, three months off the third year, and so
on until the sixth and each succeeding year, for which six months credit
were subtracted from each year." 4This schedule was unacceptable for four
patternless, random manner, free of any meaningful standards or checks. Second, the reform
group rejected the assumption implicit in the medical model that it could ever be proper to
deprive an inmate of liberty solely in an effort to rehabilitate him. Instead, the group argued
that incarceration should be viewed-as inmates regarded it-solely as punishment; and that
it should never be extended in order to complete an offender's rehabilitation. See Proposal
Commentary, supra note 27, at 3, 47-48; N. MORRIS, supra note 26, at 26 (improper purpose
of imprisonment).
511. Parole release decisions are not utterly beyond the pale of judicial review. See, e.g.,
Walker v. Prisoner Review Bd., 694 F.2d 499, 502-03 (7th Cir. 1982) (Parole and Pardon Board
may repeatedly refuse to release inmate based on its conclusion that "parole at this time would
deprecate the seriousness of the crime for which you were convicted and would promote disrespect
for the law," as long as it assesses each application in good faith, with particular regard to
the inmate's rehabilitation and prison behavior record; but it may not deny the prisoner access
to materials in his file that the board used, or may have relied on in making that determina-
tion); Welsh v. Mizell, 668 F.2d 328, 331 (7th Cir. 1982) (a prisoner who committed his crime
prior to the date that a statutory amendment added the ground that "release would deprecate
the seriousness of the offense" to the criteria for denial of parole, could not be denied parole
on that basis), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 235 (1982); United States ex rel. King v. McGinnis,
558 F. Supp. 1343, 1345-46 (N.D. Il. 1983) (denial of parole based on the Board's conclusion
that the defendant's criminal behavior indicated that "the risk of further non-conforming behavior
is too great for release at this time" does not violate Welsh).
512. Good-time credit is a system that awards offenders reductions in their sentences based
on their conduct while in prison. For a thorough review of good-time practices in the United
States, see Jacobs, Sentencing by Prison Personnel: Good Time, 30 UCLA L. REV. 217 (1982).
According to Professor Jacobs, all but four states have some form of good-time. See Table
11 in Jacobs, supra.
513. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-6-3(a) (1975).
514. See Department of Corrections Administrative Regulation (DOC A.R.) 813 (Apr. 16,
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reasons. First, it had the anomalous effect of compelling offenders sentenced
to shorter terms of imprisonment-individuals who presumably had com-
mitted less serious offenses-to serve a far greater proportion of any given
sentence than those sentenced to longer terms. Second, this very characteristic
seriously distorted the intent of the judiciary in imposing sentences on
offenders by mitigating those sentences in precisely the reverse order sentenc-
ing judges would have recommended. Third, the DOC's regulation was quite
complicated, and its effect on the judicially-imposed sentence, if known to
the sentencing judge at all, was very difficult to calculate and to allow for
in sentencing. Finally, the existence of any administrative latitude to develop
good-conduct schedules created the possibility that once an equitable sentenc-
ing schedule was established, a change in that schedule could introduce new
inequities based on the system then in force for awarding good-conduct
credits. 5 Consequently, the earliest legislation called for the replacement
of this complicated, administratively-derived schedule of good-conduct credits
with a simple statutory formula which provided for the award of one day
of "good-conduct" good-time credit for each infraction-free day spent in
prison." 6 This approach ultimately was adopted in the Act." 7
1976). The table below shows the amount and percentage of time an offender would actually
have to serve for a variety of given sentences under A.R. 813:
Table 3
Sentence Good Conduct Time Served
Imposed (Mos.) Credit Mos. Mos. 07o
12 1 11 92
24 3 21 88
36 6 30 83
48 10 38 79
60 15 45 75
72 21 51 71
120 45 75 63
168 69 99 59
240 105 135 56
Id.
Over the years, the DOC has had a variety of other schedules in force. See, e.g., DOC
A.R. 813 (June 1, 1977). DOC A.R. 813 replaced the sliding-scale regulation with one that
allowed inmates three months off each year of their sentences from the outset of their
incarceration. Thus, during the period the reform group's proposals were under consideration,
inmates were earning good-conduct credits at different rates.
515. See Proposal Commentary, supra note 27, at 19.
516. See S.B. 1885, 79th I1. Gen. Assembly, 1976 Sess., 3-6-3(a) at 15; H.B. 1500, 80th
Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess., 3-6-3(1) at 19.
517. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I1. Laws 3264, 3289 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1003-6-3(a)(1) (1983)).
At least one authority has suggested that this prisoner-control feature of good-time is undesirable
because it inevitably leads to abuses by prison officials. Jacobs, supra note 512, at 219-21,
258-70. The reform legislation, perhaps unwisely, rejected such an absolutist view, preferring
instead to confine the exercise of discretion by prison officials so as to minimize improper
actions. See infra text accompanying notes 558-627.
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In addition to good conduct, however, Illinois law also provided for the
award of similar credits either for meritorious service5 8 or for performing
a work assignment." 9 Traditionally, meritorious service good-time credits had
been awarded only sporadically, for activities such as a prisoner intervening
to save a guard from injury in the course of a prison disturbance.52 Since
it was deemed desirable to leave the DOC with the flexibility to reward such
exceptional behavior, the power to award this type of good-time credit was
not dffected by either the Act or its legislative predecessors. 2 ' Work-
assignment credit,522 however, was slated for abolition.2 5 This was done
because of the belief that linking an offender's release date to any sort of
programmatic activity would merely create a "false demand" for that kind
of program, and that its quality and effectiveness would deteriorate markedly
as it was inundated by insincere applicants. 2 '
3. Regulation of the Revocation of Good-Time Credits
Any good-time lost because of disciplinary infractions assuredly would
result in lengthening the inmates sentence. With the proposed abolition of
parole as a release mechanism for prisoners sentenced under the new law,
good-time credits took on increased importance. Consequently, it became
necessary to insure that initially fair and equitable sentences could not be
undermined through the arbitrary actions of lower-level correctional
personnel. 25
The Act adopted three proposals directed toward this issue, all of which
have their roots in either the legislative proposals advanced by the reform
group or in H.B. 1500, their immediate successor. The first of these pro-
posals, directly traceable to the reform bill, proposed a panoply of procedural
due process protections against arbitrary disciplinary actions. This proposal
required that inmates be advised in writing of the nature of prison infrac-
tions, the possible penalties, the disciplinary procedure by which those
penalties could be imposed, and the rights of prisoners in connection
therewith. 26 As further safeguards against abuse, the Act adopted two pro-
518. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-6-3(a) (1975).
519. Id. § 1003-12-5.
520. See DOC A.R. 864 (Feb. 1, 1978).
521. See S.B. 1885, 79th 111. Gen. Assembly, 1976 Sess., 3-6-3(a) at 15; H.B. 1500, 80th
111. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess., 3-6-3(a) at 19; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-6-3(a)(1) (1983);
Technical Paper, supra note 40, at 13.
522. Work-assignment good-time credit traditionally amounted to seven and one-half days
per month. See DOC A.R. 866 (Sept. 1, 1975).
523. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3; 1977 I11. Laws 3264, 3293 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1003-12-5 (1983)) (adopting the Senate version); S.B. 1885, 79th I11. Gen. Assembly,
1976 Sess., 3-12-5 at 20-21 (amending to delete good-conduct credit); H.B. 1500, 80th Ill.
Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess., 3-12-5 at 24 (removing good-conduct credit for work assignment,
but allowing good-conduct credit for other programs).
524. Proposal Commentary, supra note 27, at 4, 24, 66.
525. Id. at 20.
526. Compare S.B. 1885, 79th 111. Gen. Assembly, 1976 Sess., 3-8-7(a), 3-10-8(g) at 16,
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posals which had originated in H.B. 1500. The first of these limited the
maximum loss of good-conduct credits for a single disciplinary infraction
to one year. 27 The second created a Prisoner Review Board (PRB), which
was to be independent of the DOC, 528 and was to act as the board of review
for cases involving the revocation of good-conduct credits or a suspension
or reduction in the rate at which such credits were accumulated. 29 In addi-
tion to this review function, the PRB was mandated to "hear and decide"
all disciplinary cases in which the DOC sought to revoke more than thirty
days of good-conduct credits, whether arising from a single incident or
accumulating from a series of infractions occuring within a year's time.53
B. Implementation of the Act's Structural Controls
The Act's one year cap on the loss of good-conduct credits weakened the
absolute protections against such losses provided by the earliest reform legisla-
tion. Nonetheless, the Act contemplated a thorough, independent review of
major disciplinary actions by the DOC in order to insure that the presumably
rational sentences imposed by the judiciary would be served out in a fair
and nonarbitrary manner. The system that has been implemented, however,
bears very little resemblance to that just described. As discussed in more
detail below, the DOC's system for awarding good-conduct credits did not
operate in conformity with the Act until very recently.53 ' Moreover, while
the data are not conclusive, there are good reasons to believe that the Act's
intended checks against arbitrary imposition of disciplinary sanctions have
not been effective.5
32
19 (requiring rules, penalties and procedures be posted and available to inmates) with Pub.
Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3290 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-8-7(a),
1003-10-8(3)(9) (1983)) (same language as S.B. 1885).
527. See H.B. 1500, 80th Il1. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess., 3-6-3(c) at 19-20; Pub. Act No.
80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3289 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-6-3(c)
1983)) (same language in both H.B. 1500 and enacted Pub. Act No. 80-1099). The earliest
legislation had proposed a maximum loss of 30 days of good-conduct credits for a single offense,
but had not called for an independent review of disciplinary determinations. S.B. 1885, 79th
Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1976 Sess., 3-6-3(c) at 15-16. This expansion of the DOC's discretion,
coupled with a more intensive review of the exercise of that discretion, first appeared in the
Subcommittee Bill, supra note 38, 3-2-6.1(a), 3-2-6.2(a), 3-6-3(c) at 5, 6-7, 21-22.
528. See H.B. 1500, 80th Il1. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess., 3-2-6.1(a) at 5 (proposing this
new section); Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 11. Laws 3264, 3272 (codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-1 (1983)).
529. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 11. Laws 3264, 3274 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1003-3-1(a)(2) (1983)).
530. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 111. Laws 3264, 3274 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, §§ 1003-3-2(a)(4), 1003-6-3(c)(2) (1983)). The legislation extended to violations resulting
in more than 30 days of lost time within 12 months, even though no single revocation exceeded
the 30-day figure. Id. Presumably this was done to prevent the DOC from nibbling away at
an inmate's good-time through a series of petty sanctions while evading independent review
of its actions. See Proposal Commentary, supra note 27, at 20.
531. See infra text accompanying notes 533-56.
532. See infra text accompanying notes 558-627.
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1. Good-Time
In deciding how to implement the Act's good-time provisions, the DOC
initially took the position that the only inmates who were entitled to earn
the new statutory good-conduct credits were those sentenced under the new
law.'' All other inmates were to receive whatever system of good-conduct
credits was in force at the time they were sentenced, including the now-banned
compensatory work and program-related good-time which had been available
under prior law.""
This decision was clearly contrary to the provisions of the Act. The Act
amended section 1005-8-7(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections, providing
for the accumulation of good-conduct credits against a maximum term as
well as a determinate sentence, with the minimum period of imprisonment
to be calculated at the day-for-a-day rates specified in the Act.53" ' Since there
were no minimum or maximum terms under the new sentencing scheme,
the only possible interpretation of this language was that the legislature
intended the new good-time provisions to apply to indeterminate sentences
imposed under prior law. In Johnson v. Franzen,"6 the Illinois Supreme
Court put the matter to rest, holding that all inmates were entitled to day-
for-a-day good-conduct credits for all time served after the effective date
of the Act.'" Credits for time served prior to that date, however, were to
be awarded pursuant to the old good-conduct credit system. '
As soon as the court put this aspect of the good-conduct system in order,539
another problem arose. There were massive increases in the number of per-
sons committed (or recommitted) to the DOC after the passage of the Act.5 "
533. See Johnson v. Franzen, 77 I11. 2d 513, 515-18, 397 N.E.2d 825, 827 (1979); see also
Letter from James B. Haddad to James R. Irving, then-Chairman of the Illinois Prisoner Review
Board (June 15, 1978) (complaining of practice).
534. See supra text accompanying notes 522-24.
535. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Il. Laws 3264, 3314 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-8-7(b) (1983)).
536. 77 Ill. 2d 513, 397 N.E.2d 825 (1979).
537. Id. at 517-22, 397 N.E.2d at 827-29.
538. Id. at 521-22, 397 N.E.2d at 829.
539. Lower courts have dealt with various other questions related to the good-time issue.
In Williams v. Irving, 98 Ill. App. 3d 323, 424 N.E.2d 381 (3d Dist. 1981), the court concluded
that defendants were entitled to only a pro rata share of "old" good-conduct credits on their
sentences that had accumulated prior to February 1, 1978 (the effective date of the Act) rather
than all credits that could possibly be earned over the entire sentence plus day-for-a-day credits
beginning February 1, 1978. Id. at 328-29, 424 N.E.2d at 385. Other cases have held that inmates
held by the Department of Mental Health, In re Coppersmith, 108 Il. App. 3d 161, 164, 438
N.E.2d 1267, 1269 (1st Dist. 1982), or in local jails prior to being transmitted to the DOC,
People v. Garlin, 101 Ill. App. 3d 716, 723, 428 N.E.2d 697, 703 (5th Dist. 1981), must be
awarded good-conduct credits on the same basis as if they had been in the custody of the
DOC during those periods. These decisions seem sensible and correct.
540. The precise reasons for this are not clear. The increase, though, seems to have stemmed
primarily from an increase in the rate of felony convictions statewide and an upsurge in the
number of parole violators recommitted to the DOC. Longer sentences for murderers and Class
X felons, coupled with their presence in the incoming population in ever-increasing percen-
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In 1980 and 1981 alone, nearly four thousand more persons entered the DOC
than were released. 4 ' Such a trend seemed likely to continue for the
foreseeable future. This desperate situation tempted the DOC to take
desperate measures. In an effort to stem the tide, beginning in 1981 it began
using "meritorious service" good-time as a basis for making reductions in
prison sentences rather than merely as a special reward for exceptional
cases. 42 By 1982, literally hundreds of thousands of days of additional good-
conduct credit were being awarded in this manner. As a consequence,
judicially imposed sentences were being reduced to about thirty percent of
their slated lengths, rather than being halved as the Act intended.543
Notwithstanding the straits in which the DOC found itself, this action
was clearly contrary to the Act. As discussed in detail earlier, the Illinois
General Assembly specifically intended to divest the DOC of all authority
to vary the statutorily established day-for-a-day good-conduct rate. "' Thus,
this blanket use of meritorious service good-conduct credits to alter the
statutory formula was precisely the kind of conduct the Act sought to
prohibit.
The early releases engendered by this policy caused considerable (and
understandable) concern among judges and prosecutors. For a time, no
effective challenge to them could be found. Eventually, however, in Lane
v. Sklodowski"54 those two groups managed to get the issue before the Illinois
Supreme Court. A number of state attorneys instituted proceedings against
DOC Director Michael Lane, alleging that the early release policy was
resulting in an illegal shortening of sentences." 6 Various judges had issued
show-cause orders against Lane in response to these actions. He responded
by seeking a writ of mandamus and prohibition or a supervisory order direc-
ting the judges to dismiss those proceedings. 47
The court granted Lane's petition but concluded that the Act allowed a
cumulative award of only ninety days of meritorious good-conduct credits
tages, also seem to have contributed to the problem. See IDOC, Ill HUMAN SERVICES DATA
REPORT, Part 1, at 38-39, 1981-1983 [hereinafter cited at HUMAN SERVICES REPORT].
541. See Tables 2-16, 2-19 in HUMAN SERVICES REPORT, supra note 540. The tables reveal
that a total of 19,098 persons were admitted to the DOC in 1980 and 1981 combined, while only
15,087 were released in those years.
542. In one publication, the DOC claimed that it had begun this process in June, 1980.
HUMAN SERVICES REPORT, supra note 540, at 39-40. This program, however, was not used
extensively until the spring of 1981, when the number of days of such credits awarded per
month, which had ranged between 500 to 4,000 days per month from July 1980 through March
1981, increased to 30,474 days in April, 96,536 days in May and 135,860 days in June, 1981.
See Table 2 in IDOC, GOOD TIME MONITORING, FY 1981 Report (1981) [hereinafter cited as
GOOD TIME MONITORING].
543. See Early-release Issue Sparks Con Violence, Chicago Sun-Times, July 17, 1983, at 3,
col. 1.
544. See supra text accompanying notes 512-17.
545. 97 Ill. 2d 311, 454 N.E.2d 322 (1983).
546. Id. at 313-15, 454 N.E.2d at 323-24.
547. Id. at 313, 454 N.E.2d at 323.
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during an offender's sentence." '8 The court noted that the Act had "care-
fully circumscribed the Director's authority to grant, revoke, and restore
good-conduct credits. 54 9 The court correctly discerned that this was done
to insure that, with very limited exceptions, the length of an offender's
sentence would be determined by operation of law rather than by discre-
tionary decisions."' Consequently, it was "inconceivable" that the General
Assembly had intended "to grant the Director unlimited authority to award
any number of days of credit for meritorious service he saw fit." '51
The Lane court wisely decided to give its ruling only prospective
application. 52 Nevertheless, its decision left the DOC in a very difficult posi-
tion. Stripped of its power to vary the rate of accumulation of good-conduct
credits as a safety valve to alleviate overcrowded conditions,5" the DOC
is now largely reduced, in the words of Tennessee Williams, to "depend[ing]
on the kindness of strangers.""'  The prospects of the entire prison system
slipping into an unconstitutionally overcrowded condition is a very real one,
as the Lane court recognized,"55 and both short- and long-term remedial
measures are an urgent necessity.5 6 It would be a tragedy if the integrity
of judicial sentencing decisions were restored only at the price of utterly
disabling the DOC.
2. Prison Discipline
While Franzen and Lane seem to have finally brought the process of award-
ing good-conduct credits into conformity with the Act, 5 7 there are strong
indications that the process involved in revoking those credits has not func-
tioned as the Act intended. The best available evidence is that all three of
the Act's checks on such arbitrary action have been ineffective. First, the
creation and dissemination of written disciplinary rules have had little if any
effect because of the vague text of the rules. 58 Second, the requirement that
penalties be specified has also been of little use in curtailing abuses of discre-
tion because no criteria for selecting sanctions of any particular length have
been established. " 9 Finally, it appears that for a variety of reasons, the PRB
has not carried out its statutory duty to conduct a thorough, independent
review of the DOC's decisions to impose substantial disciplinary sanctions
548. Id. at 315-18, 454 N.E.2d at 324-25.
549. Id. at 317-18, 454 N.E.2d at 325.
550. Id.
551. Id.
552. Id. at 319, 454 N.E.2d at 325-26.
553. Such policies have frequently been changed in the past for precisely this reason, both
in Illinois and elsewhere. See Jacobs, supra note 512, at 267-69.
554. See T. Williams, A Streetcar Named Desire, Scene 11.
555. 97 I1l. 2d at 318, 454 N.E.2d at 325.
556. See infra text accompanying notes 628-42 (some proposals in this regard).
557. See supra text accompanying notes 536-38 and 545-51.
558. See infra text accompnaying notes 561-94.
559. See infra text accompanying notes 595-602.
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on inmates. 6 ° For all of these reasons, the Act's checks on arbitrary exer-
cise of discretion by correctional officials have not been effective.
a. The DOC's Internal Disciplinary Procedures
By way of background, it is necessary to describe briefly how the DOC's
internal disciplinary procedures operate. 6 ' An allegation that an inmate has
committed an infraction is initiated by the filing of a Resident Disciplinary
Report (RDR or ticket), detailing the circumstances of the alleged violation. 62
This RDR is reviewed by a shift supervisor, who must determine whether
the reported facts justify a disciplinary hearing. 63 If so, the matter is referred
to an Adjustment Committee (AC), a group of three correctional officials
appointed by the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) of each prison
facility. 6 ' After notice to the inmate, the AC holds a hearing at which the
inmate may testify on his or her own behalf and, with the consent of the
AC, may present other favorable testimony or documentary evidence. '65 If
the AC sustains the charges, it imposes sanctions within the permissible range
for the violation in question. '66 Those sanctions, in turn, are subject to review
at the inmate's request by the CAO. The CAO may, but need not, refer
the case to a standing three-member institutional inquiry board for its advisory
view.5 67 If the inmate remains dissatisfied with the CAO's actions, he or
she may appeal to the Director of the DOC. 68 The Director, in turn, refers
all arguably meritorious appeals and all cases in which more than thirty days
of good-conduct credits are sought to be revoked, to an administrative review
board before taking final action. 69
560. See infra text accompanying notes 603-27.
561. The DOC's disciplinary rules and procedures have been amended in various versions
of its Administrative Regulation 804. The DOC amended this regulation, effective February 1,
1978, in an effort to bring it into conformity with the Act's requirements. That amended
regulation was revised further into a version that became effective January 26, 1979, and still
later into a version which became effective July 1, 1981, into its current form. That version
is itself undergoing further revision as this article goes to press.
This article will discuss DOC A.R. 804 (Jan. 26, 1979) rather than the current regulation
primarily because the only available detailed data concerning the DOC's disciplinary practices
relate to the period when DOC A.R. 804 (Jan. 26, 1979) was in effect. DOC A.R. 804 (July
1, 1981) did make a number of important revisions in DOC A.R. 804 (Jan. 26, 1979), however,
which will be noted passim.
562. See DOC A.R. 804 1 II. B (Jan. 26, 1979).
563. Id. 1 II. C.
564. Id. 11 11. D, II. E.
565. Id. 1 II. G.
566. Id. 1 II. G.13.
567. Id. I II. G.14; DOC A.R. 845 11 II. B, II. D, II. F, II. G (Feb. 1, 1978).
568. DOC A.R. 845 1 1I. H (Feb. 1, 1978).
569. Id. 1 II. J, II. K, II. L, II. M, II. N.
The process has been modified in some respects by the current version of DOC A.R. 804.
RDRs, now called "inmate disciplinary reports" or IDRs, must be prepared for all but minor
violations and forwarded to a designated reviewing officer. DOC A.R. 804 1 II. B (July 1,
1981). The reviewing officer then determines whether any offense should be processed further.
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b. The Written Rules Requirement
The DOC's response to the requirement that it disclose disciplinary offenses
to inmates was to revise and disseminate its Administrative Regulation 804
(A.R. 804).17" An early 1979 revision of that rule listed twenty-eight offenses
that could result in loss of good-conduct credits, with six of these carrying
maximum penalties of up to one year.5 7' Among the more minor offenses,
involving maximum losses of one month's good-conduct credits, were such
offenses as "being disrespectful, ' 57 2 exhibiting "carelessness or negligence
of work, ' 5 73 employing "indecency in language, action or gesture at any
time,'' 71 "gambling of any type,'' 7 5 "giving away unauthorized food,'' 576
"refusing to keep person or housing assignment clean and tidy," '577 and "tat-
tooing the body or piercing the ears." '578 Two months could be lost for the
unauthorized possession of money579 or of the property of other residents, 8 '
without the necessity of showing that such items were stolen. It takes no
great insight to discern the possibilities for abusive or selective enforcement
of such provisions."'
If he or she so finds, he or she forwards minor offenses to an Adjustment Committee (AC)
and transmits major violations to a designated hearing investigator. Id. II. C.
Thereafter, the hearing investigator reviews the charge, conducts whatever investigation he
or she thinks appropriate and determines whether to submit the matter to the AC. The AC
is required to hold a hearing concerning all violations which could result in a loss of good-time
credit, at which the inmate may testify, present relevant physical exhibits and documents, and
indicate witnesses who should be interviewed in connection with the incident in question. The
inmate charged is also entitled to assistance in preparing his defense, as well as an impartial
AC. Id. I1. D, Ii. E., 11. H.3, II. H.4.
If the AC sustains the charges, any penalty it imposes is reviewable at the behest of the
inmate by the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) of the institution and thereafter by the Director
of the DOC and/or by an Administrative Review Board before being submitted to the Prisoner
Review Board. Id. II. H.14-18. Accused inmates appear to have more useful protections
through this procedure than were available under DOC A.R. 804 (Jan. 26, 1979); but its effec-
tiveness cannot be assessed because of the dearth of available data concerning the DOC's
disciplinary practices. See infra note 595.
570. See supra note 561.
571. See DOC A.R. 804 II. A.1(1)-(28) (Jan. 26, 1979).
572. Id. II. A.l(2).
573. Id. II. A.1(3).
574. Id. I. A.l(4).
575. Id. I. A.l(16).
576. Id. 11. A.l(21).
577. Id. II. A.1(23).
578. Id. II. A.1(27).
579. Id. II. Al(12).
580. Id. II. A l(20).
581. These provisions were improved upon in drafting DOC A.R. 804 (July 1, 1981), in
some respects, but obvious problems remain. A wide variety of rather vague offenses, such
as "being disrespectful" and employing "indecency in language, action or gesture" were replaced
by a single prohibition against "insolence" carrying a 30-day penalty, although, even as redrafted,
the provision remains somewhat vague. Id. 11. A.1(304). Similarly, the prohibition against
such offenses as "tattooing the body or piercing the ears" and "refusing to keep person or
housing assignment clean and tidy" were apparently consolidated in a new offense not punishable
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Turning to the six provisions carrying maximum penalties of twelve
months,582 different problems emerge. Most of those infractions, when
serious, would merit stern actions by correctional officials. They are so loosely
worded, however, that they hold great potential for being arbitrarily
applied.5"3 The first such offense, "assaulting an employee or fighting with
a resident or employee, ' 584 provides a good example of this phenomenon.
An enormous variety of conduct is embraced within this rule, ranging from
vicious physical attacks upon guards by inmates at one extreme to an in-
mate's resistance to such an attack by a fellow inmate at the other.5" A
similar problem is presented by the twelve-month sanction for "engaging
with others in or pressuring others to engage in any unnatural sexual
activity."' 86 Vagueness problems aside,587 this rule covers everything from
brutal gang rapes and terroristic threats to wholly consensual activity which
would not even be a crime in Illinois, at least outside of prison.' Likewise,
it would belabor the obvious to discuss the potential for capricious enforce-
ment of the twelve-month penalty for "gathering around an employee in
by a loss of good-conduct credits. Id. II. A.1(402). Again, however, vagueness in the regula-
tion arguably would permit such violations to be treated as "willfully refusing to comply with
an order," which is punishable under another provision of the regulation by a loss of up to
15 days good-conduct credit. Id. 1 11. A.1(403).
582. DOC A.R. 804 II. A.1(5), (8), (10), (24), (25), (38) (Jan. 26, 1979).
583. The revised regulation is not a great deal more helpful in this respect. It now includes
seven provisions dealing with specific offenses-arson, assault, bribery and blackmail, dangerous
contraband, dangerous disturbance, escape, and bestiality or nonconsensual sexual conduct,
DOC A.R. 804 11 11. A.l(101)-(107) (July 1, 1981), as well as a catchall provision relating to
any "violation of state or federal law." Id. 1 11. A.1(501).
This revision obviously increased the range of conduct subject to severe disciplinary sanc-
tions. Moreover, it did so without significantly narrowing the discretion of the DOC to "pick
and choose" between major and minor violations. For example, a variety of actions under
the regulation's prohibition of assault, carrying a 360-day maximum penalty, could also be
treated as gang activity, carrying a 180-day maximum penalty, intimidation or threats, carrying
a 90-day maximum penalty, or "insolence," carrying a 30-day maximum penalty. DOC A.R.
804 11 II. A.1(102), (205), (206) (304) (July 1, 1981).
584. DOC A.R. 804 I. A.l(5) (Jan. 26, 1979).
585. This problem persists in large part under the current regulation as well. See supra note
583. Some other relief has been provided, however, by making unauthorized but consensual
fighting a minor offense, punishable by a maximum loss of 30 days good-conduct credit. DOC
A.R. 804 1 II. A.1(301) (July 1, 1981).
586. Id. II. A.1(24).
587. See, e.g., Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975) (upholding decision by state to punish
act of cunnilingus as "crime against nature" against objection that statute was unconstitu-
tionally vague); cf. Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1143 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (statute pro-
hibiting private homosexual conduct between consenting adults is unconstitutional).
588. See generally ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 11-2, 11-3, 11-9 (1983) (defining various sexual
offenses and not prohibiting such conduct if undertaken between consenting adults in a non-
public place).
The current version of DOC A.R. 804 works a marked improvement in this respect by
distinguishing between voluntary sexual conduct, with a maximum penalty of 30 days lost good-
conduct credit, and nonconsenting sexual conduct, punishable by a loss of up to 360 days
of good-conduct credits. See DOC A.R. 804 1 II. A.1(107.A), (107.B) (July 1, 1981).
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a threatening or intimidating manner." '89 The DOC's regulations, however,
do not even mention the need for distinguishing between the extremes of
conduct that could fall under these various rules, much less establish criteria
for doing so.
A different type of problem is presented by the availability of numerous
lesser charges arguably covering the same conduct prohibited by a serious
charge. For example, a forbidden "gathering around an employee" or
"mutinous act" can be readily characterized as merely "disobeying any order
from any institutional employee or any prison rule," "being disrespectful
to [that] employee," or being "abusive, insolent, [or] threatening" to the
employee, all of which carry only one month penalties. 9 ' Thus, the
chameleon-like character of this language gives the DOC substantial discre-
tion in the area of charging as well as punishment. While some flexibility
in these matters obviously is desirable, the possibilities for abuse offered
by such language are obvious. The Act recognized that possibility and
addressed it by requiring a thorough review of discretionary PRB determina-
tions whenever an inmate's sentence was affected to any significant extent. 92
It seems likely, however, that such a probing review never has been
available and that, absent corrective legislative action, it never will be. Instead,
data on the nature and distribution of the DOC's disciplinary sanctions sug-
gest that those penalties are imposed in an arbitrary manner and are affected
significantly by divergent administrative policies among various correctional
institutions. 9 3 Beyond that, additional data on the activities of the PRB
strongly suggest that it has not been able to serve in the capacity of the
strong, independent check on the DOC's actions contemplated by the Act. 9 '
This failure has occurred at least in part because of deficiencies in resources
that will require legislative action to correct.
c. Penalties
In examining the frequency and severity with which disciplinary procedures
589. DOC A.R. 804 11. A.1(25) (Jan. 26, 1979); see also supra note 583 (discussing revi-
sions in DOC A.R. 804 that increased the types of prisoner conduct subject to severe disciplinary
sanctions).
590. The DOC also has made a modest improvement in this area by providing in the cur-
rent version of DOC A.R. 804 as follows:
Listed after each offense is the maximum penalty that the Adjustment Committee
may impose if the inmate is found guilty of the violation after a disciplinary hear-
ing. The maximum penalty need not be imposed. In determining the appropriate
sanctions, the Adjustment Committee, Chief Administrative Officer and Director
may consider, among other things, mitigating or aggravating factors such as the
individual's mental state at the time of committing the offense, the extent and degree
of participation in the commission of the offense, the amount and/or nature of
stolen property and/or contraband, and the inmate's prior disciplinary record.
DOC A.R. 804 II. A.1 (July 1, 1981).
591. Id. 11. A.1 (1), (2), (4), (8).
592. See supra text accompanying notes 525-30.
593. See infra text accompanying notes 595-602.
594. See infra text accompanying notes 603-27.
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are invoked, disturbing and inexplicable disparities emerge. The available
data, although not conclusive, strongly suggest that disciplinary procedures
are invoked at substantially different rates from one institution to another
and, when invoked, result in substantial differences in the severity of sanc-
tions imposed. Moreover, those variations are not explicable in terms of dif-
ferences in the inmate populations housed at those institutions.
Data gathered by the DOC indicate substantial variation in the rate at
which good-conduct credits were revoked at the various correctional institu-
tions. Charts 7 and 8 below show the number of instances in which good-
conduct credits were revoked at each institution during a two-year period. "5
CHART 7
NUMBER OF DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS
AT ADULT DOC INSTITUTIONS - FISCAL YEAR 1980
Average Daily
Pop. (ADP)
No. of % of
Tickets ADP
Days Revoked
Total Avg.
Dwight 367 82 22 3,215 39.2
Joliet 1,382 491 36 16,899 34.4
Logan 813 313 38 5,931 18.9
Menard 2,514 751 30 31,620 42.1
Menard Psych. 372 38 10 6,464 170.1
Pontiac 1,861 253 14 31,892 126.1
Sheridan 490 1,134 231 7,103 6.3
Stateville 2,199 1,429 65 97,482 68.2
Vandalia 770 571 74 6,600 11.6
Vienna 721 97 13 1,248 12.9
TOTAL 11,489 5,159 45 208,454 40.04
595. For chart 7, average daily population (ADP) figures are approximated (in a way which
overstates them) by taking the DOC's published head-count for those institutions as of July
12, 1981, because actual ADP data were not available for that fiscal year. The source of the
data used is Table 3-13 in IDOC, POPULATION & CAPACITY REPORT, at 177. All other data
in that chart are derived from Table 2 in a special report to the DOC director from its Policy
Development Division entitled, "Illinois Adult Institutional Population: Time Revoked and
Restored in Fiscal Year 1980." All data in chart 8 are derived from table 5 in GOOD TIME
MONITORING, supra note 542.
The reason such old data are utilized is that the DOC has consistently refused to release
its studies of conduct revocation practices to the public. Although the author was able to obtain
the information set out in charts 7 and 8 from other sources, they did not have more recent
information and the DOC declined to furnish it. A more current assessment of the DOC's
disciplinary practices is desirable; and it can only be hoped that the DOC will reconsider its
policy so as to permit it to be undertaken.
Institution
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CHART 8
NUMBER OF DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS
AT ADULT DOC INSTITUTIONS - FISCAL YEAR 1981
Average Daily No. of % of Days Revoked
Institution Pop. (ADP) Tickets ADP Total Avg.
Centralia 609 6 1 75 12.5
Dwight 364 52 14 4,190 80.6
East Moline 53 0 0 0 0
Graham 457 9 2 102 11.3
Joliet 1,323 666 50 18,262 27.4
Logan 791 166 21 3,010 18.1
Menard 2,542 1,115 44 50,285 45.1
Menard Psych. 348 68 20 8,372 123.1
Pontiac 1,831 247 13 17,425 70.6
Sheridan 490 1,017 208 6,420 6.3
Stateville 2,203 967 44 74,645 77.2
Vandalia 787 283 36 3,545 12.5
Vienna 735 138 19 1,775 12.9
TOTAL 12,533 4,734 38 188,106 39.7
As these two charts show, there are very substantial variations in the fre-
quency of tickets written (expressed as a percentage of each institution's
average daily population) ranging from over two hundred percent at Sheridan
to under five percent at Centralia, East Moline, and Graham. Nothing in
the prison populations at these institutions offers an explanation of why this
should be so. Indeed, both Centralia and Graham have higher percentages
of inmates who had committed the most serious felonies (murder and class
X) than Sheridan, " 6 yet they have consistently lower disciplinary rates. 97
596. The percentages of inmates from each felony class at these three institutions during
fiscal year 1981 are set out below. Percentages do not add up to 100% because misdemeanant
and miscellaneous categories are not included.
Table 4
Felony Institution
Class Centralia Graham Sheridan
M 8.8 6.6 5.9
X 41.8 46.3 23.2
1 5.7 6.2 4.1
2 32.2 31.9 55.3
3 8.0 7.4 9.8
4 1.2 1.4 1.2
GOOD TIME MONITORING, supra note 542, at Table 4.
597. See Chart 8 in text, at 728.
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The same spreads appear if one looks at those prisons with the highest percen-
tages of inmates convicted of murder and class X felonies-Stateville,
Menard, and Pontiac. Despite roughly comparable prison populations, 98 these
three institutions, as shown in Chart 9 below, exhibited wide variations in
both the rate and severity of disciplinary measures. 9
CHART 9
COMPARISON OF DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS
AT MENARD, PONTIAC AND STATEVILLE
FOR FISCAL YEARS 1980 AND 1981
Violations as % Average Sanction
Institution Of Avg. Daily Pop. Imposed
1980 1981 1980 1981
Menard 30 44 42.1 45.1
Pontiac 14 13 126.1 70.6
Stateville 65 44 68.2 77.2
As this chart shows, in 1980 a Pontiac inmate was only half as likely to
get written up as a Menard inmate and only about one-fifth as likely as
a Stateville inmate. In 1981, a Pontiac inmate continued to be only about
one-third as likely to get a ticket as was a Menard or Stateville inmate. On
the other hand, if an inmate were unfortunate enough to be punished, Menard
rather than Pontiac was definitely the place to be. At Menard, the average
violation resulted in a sanction of only about forty-five days, substantially
below the prevailing rate at either Pontiac or Stateville.
It is difficult to explain variations of this magnitude in terms of prison
population. Instead, it seems more likely that disparities are due to a cause
that the DOC itself has acknowledged as possible: "differences in the nature
598. The percentages of inmates from each felony class at those three institutions during
fiscal year 1981 are set out below. Percentages do not add to 100% because misdemeanant
and miscellaneous categories are not included.
Table 5
Felony Institution
Class Menard Pontiac Stateville
M 22.3 24.7 19.3
X 37.7 45.0 46.0
1 3.7 4.1 3.2
2 25.4 25.6 21.6
3 8.0 5.2 4.0
4 0.9 0.6 0.6
GOOD TIME MONITORING, supra note 542, at Table 4.
599. Data are derived from charts 7 and 8, which in turn are derived as discussed supra
note 595.
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of . . . administrative practices regarding good-time. ' 6°° The Act had
anticipated, of course, that such differences might arise. It thus created a
mechanism designed to keep them in check: PRB oversight of the good-
conduct revocation process. 60 ' As shown below, however, the DOC thus far
has resisted effective PRB oversight of its disciplinary decisions. For a variety
of reasons, that resistance has been largely successful.
6
1
2
d. PRB Involvement in Disciplinary Matters
The written specification of offenses and penalties was not seen as the
principal check on the DOC's use of its disciplinary powers. Instead, the
linchpin of these controls was the requirement that the PRB "hear and
decide" cases in which the DOC sought to revoke over thirty days of good-
conduct credits within a twelve-month period. 6 3 This procedure, however,
did not operate as intended. Rather, the DOC has adopted a series of
unjustifiably narrow constructions of the Act which have sharply curtailed
the PRB's authority. The PRB, for a variety of reasons, has acquiesced in
these constructions. As a consequence, there is no effective check at present
on the DOC's use of its disciplinary power.
Disciplinary matters are referred to the PRB only after elaborate
administrative procedures have been exhausted. 64 However, not all sanctions
in excess of thirty days are forwarded to the PRB as required by the Act.
Instead, the DOC consistently has taken the position that the PRB has no
role in connection with disciplinary sanctions imposed on inmates sentenced
under prior law, and the PRB has accepted this limitation on its authority.
6
1
This interpretation parallels the DOC's discredited view on the applicability
of the Act's revised good-conduct provisions6 6 and, for similar reasons, is
clearly in error. The Act explicitly states that the PRB is to "hear and decide
cases" brought by the DOC to revoke over thirty days of good-conduct
credits.60 ' This language is not limited to inmates sentenced pursuant to the
Act. The Act also explicitly provides that the DOC "shall bring charges"
600. GooD TIME MONITORING, supra note 542, at I.
601. See supra text accompanying notes 525-30.
602. See infra text accompanying notes 603-27. Much of the analysis in the next section
is attributable to a 1979 publication of the Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group, authored
by Paul Bigman, entitled "Discretion, Determinate Sentencing and the Illinois Prisoner Review
Board: A Shotgun Wedding." Although dated in some respects, this work remains the most
thorough and thoughtful study of the working of the Prisoner Review Board.
603. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I11. Laws 3264, 3274 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1003-3-2(a)(4) (1983)).
604. DOC A.R. 804 11. B (Jan. 26, 1979); see also supra text accompanying notes 561-69.
605. Bigman, supra note 602, at 19, 26, 28. The PRB continues to adhere to this position.
606. See supra text accompanying notes 533-37.
607. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 111. Laws 3264, 3274 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § '1003-3-2(a)(4) (1983)).
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before the PRB in such cases.6"8 It is difficult to conceive of a more univer-
sal and more clearly obligatory phrasing.6 "9
The DOC's complete exclusion of certain cases from PRB consideration
has not been its only effort to trim the PRB's sails. In perhaps an even
more far reaching decision, the DOC has taken the position that the PRB
does not have "the power to determine the guilt or innocence of the resi-
dent or make any other disposition" other than reviewing the number of
days of good-conduct credit sought to be revoked by the DOC." ' This posi-
tion is based primarily on section 1003-3-1(a)(2) of the Unified Code of Cor-
rections, as amended by the Act, declaring that the PRB "shall be the board
of review for cases involving the revocation of good-conduct credits or a
suspension or reduction in the rate of accumulating such credit.""' The
DOC's position, however, fails to accommodate the more specific language
of section 1003-3-2(a)(4), granting the PRB the power to "hear and decide
cases brought by the DOC against a prisoner . . . in which the Department
seeks to revoke good-conduct credits;" 6 2 and the language of section
1003-6-3(c)(2), instructing the DOC to "bring charges ... against the prisoner
sought to be so deprived of good-conduct credits before the PRB." 61 3
Admittedly, these provisions are somewhat contradictory. A "board of
review" is not, in general, a body before which one brings charges. But
neither are the PRB's powers to revoke good-conduct credits those of a mere
board of review. The PRB has the power to subpoena witnesses for hear-
ings on revocation of good-conduct credits, as well as for other hearings. 6 4
Moreover, the inmate charged has the right to testify on his or her own
behalf at such hearings." ' The PRB has reserved the right to consider other
evidence as well. 61 6 The existence of these powers strongly supports the con-
clusion that the PRB should determine the innocence or guilt of prisoners
against whom charges are brought, and not just the equity of the sanction
sought by the DOC. As one perceptive authority has noted, both the
legislative history of the Act and the more cogent interpretation of its
608. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I11. Laws 3264, 3289 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1003-6-3(c)(2) (1983)).
609. For a more elaborate analysis of this issue, which also concludes that the PRB and
DOC's position is wrong, see Bigman, supra note 602, at 26, 28.
610. Id. at 22, 24, Appendix C.
611. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3272 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1003-3-1(a)(2) (1983)); Bigman, supra note 602, Appendix C.
612. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I11. Laws 3264, 3274 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1003-3-2(a)(4) (1983)).
613. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I11. Laws 3264, 3289 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1003-6-3(c)(2) (1983)).
614. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3274 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1003-3-2(2)(f) (1983)).
615. Bigman, supra note 602, at 21; Prisoner Review Board Rules, § XVII.C.2.
616. Bigman, supra note 602, at 21; Prisoner Review Board Rules, § XVII.C.3.
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language persuasively demonstrate that the broader view of the PRB authority
was intended." '
In this instance, however, the PRB has not been ousted from its rightful
role by the DOC. Rather, the PRB has gracefully retired from the field on
its own initiative. The PRB has never asserted the broader authority argued
for above.6"' Nor is it likely to assume such a role unless it is provided
with an investigative and support staff commensurate with the task. As of
this writing, the PRB is entirely dependent on the staff of the DOC to
assemble the records and information pertinent to disciplinary cases.6"9
Although a disciplined inmate may be expected to present objections to earlier
administrative procedures and penalties, only the record compiled by the DOC
will be before the PRB. If the PRB wished to initiate its own inquiry, it
CHART 10
SUMMARY OF PRB REVIEWS
OF GOOD CONDUCT REVOCATIONS
SOUGHT BY DOC - 1978 TO 1982*
5-Year
Action 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 Total
DOC Revocation
Requests 88 586 1675 1585 1406 5340
PRB Revocations
In Full Amount
# 80 580 1613 1527 1375 5175
076 90.9 99.0 96.3 96.3 97.8 96.9
PRB Revocations
In Lesser Amount
# 6 4 36 31 15 92
% 6.8 0.7 2.1 2.0 1.1 1.7
PRB Refusals
To Revoke
# 2 2 26 27 16 73
% 2.3 0.3 1.6 1.7 1.1 1.4
* The "year" 1978 consists of February through December of 1978, while
the "years" 1979 and 1980 consist of February 1979 through January 1980
and February 1980 through January 1981 respectively. This non-calendar-
year reporting system apparently was initiated because of the 2/1/78
effective date of the Act. It was discontinued in favor of a calendar-year
approach beginning with the 1981 Annual Report.
617. Bigman, supra note 602, at 24-25.
618. Id. at 24. Bigman gives this as the PRB's position as of 1979. The author understands
that the Board continues to adhere to that view.
619. Id. at 25-26.
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would have to either rely on DOC personnel or do the investigatory work
itself. The latter alternative is highly unlikely, given the many duties of the
PRB.6 20
In light of the limitations in both the jurisdiction and the resources of
the PRB, it would be surprising indeed if the DOC's disciplinary decisions
were overturned with any regularity. As Chart 10 shows, the PRB's actions
are entirely consistent with these expectations. The PRB has sustained the
DOC's position in the overwhelming majority of cases, agreeing to revoca-
tions of good-conduct credits in the amounts requested by the DOC in almost
all of the matters heard during the five-year period examined. Revocations
were denied altogether by the PRB in a mere 1.407o of all cases reviewed.6 2'
These data show rather convincingly that the PRB review mechanism is
not having any appreciable impact on the DOC's disciplinary decisions, either
as to the merits or as to the choice of sanctions. Wholesale reversals of
departmental actions would not be expected, given the elaborate administrative
appeals process before reaching the PRB. 622 Nonetheless, the DOC's success
rate before the PRB seems suspiciously high. The PRB's failure to equalize
the sanctions chosen by the DOC also seems unjustified, given the widespread
variance existing in that area.623
One long-time observer of the DOC and the PRB has argued that this
record clearly establishes that the vagaries and abuses of the prison
disciplinary process sought to be controlled by the Act remain unchecked,
and that broad-based reforms are necessary before the situation will
improve. 624 This assessment is accurate in large part. It is possible, despite
all appearances, that the prison disciplinary system is determining violations
and allocating sanctions in some principled, consistent manner. If this is
so, however, it is not because of the features of the Act directed to that
end. The DOC's specificiations of disciplinary infractions still permit the
imposition of substantial sanctions for relatively minor acts. 625 Moreover,
a substantial number of prisoners fall outside of the PRB review procedure
altogether 626 and the remainder receive a less intensive scrutiny than that
contemplated by the Act. 627 Thus, if the system is working as planned, no
reason exists to credit the PRB's supposed independent check on depart-
mental disciplinary action.
620. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-2(a)(1), (3), (5), (6) (1983).
621. The principal sources of these data are the Annual Reports prepared by the Prisoner
Review Board. Prior to 1982, the Board published only two categories of data of this sort:
Cases in which they granted the DOC's request in full and cases in which they did not. They
maintained the three categories of data displayed in chart 10 throughout the period, however,
and supplied it to the author upon request.
622. See supra text accompanying notes 561-69.
623. See supra text accompanying notes 595-600.
624. Bigman, supra note 602, at 45-50, Appendix E. The author suggested reforms, which
parallel those proposed herein, but are more limited. See infra text accompanying notes 643-49.
625. See supra notes 581-85 and accompanying text.
626. See id.
627. See supra text accompanying notes 610-17.
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C. Proposals for Remedial Action
The Act's efforts to structure correctional discretion in sentencing matters
have been affirmed in the area of awarding good-conduct credits but have
been largely ignored or rendered ineffective in the area of revoking such
credits. Enforcing the Act's limitations concerning awards of good-conduct
credits, however, has had the unfortunate consequence of exacerbating the
DOC's severe prison overcrowding problem. The succeeding materials will
briefly discuss some of the measures that could be undertaken to alleviate
prison overcrowding and to improve prison disciplinary procedures.
1. Prison Overcrowding
The multitude of problems facing the DOC in the wake of Lane v.
Sklodowski 28 is staggering indeed. Deprived of the meritorious good-conduct
mechanism for expediting the release of current inmates, and inundated with
increasing numbers of new inmates having longer sentences than their
predecessors, the DOC faces a difficult and uncertain future. At present,
groups such as the Governor's Task Force On Prison Crowding629 are
addressing varied approaches to alleviate these problems in the short term.
No attempt will be made to duplicate those efforts here. Several observa-
tions on approaches directly related to sentencing matters, however, seem
appropriate.
First, the duration of the present overcrowding crisis indicates that it is
a particularly bad time to send anyone to prison whom the sentencing judge,
after a thorough and conscientious review of the pertinent circumstances,
beleives does not belong there. For that reason, the Illinois General Assembly
should consider expanding the range of sentencing alternatives for those
offenses currently carrying mandatory minimum sentences. One possibility
would be to authorize sentences of periodic imprisonment in any cases
presenting exceptionally mitigating circumstances 3. 6 1
628. 97 Ill. 2d 311, 454 N.E.2d 322 (1983).
629. The Adult Corrections Subcommittee of the House Judiciary I1 Committee also has
been considering a broad range of criminal justice issues, including prison overcrowding. The
subcommittee is preparing a report on its activities, which will be issued shortly. The John
Howard Association, a prison reform organization, also has been very active in this area, as
has the League of Women Voters.
630. The reform group's original legislation contained such a proposal. See S.B. 1885, 79th
I11. Gen. Assembly, 1976 Sess., 5-5-3(d)(l)-(2) at 25-26. It should be noted that many such
offenses were probationable in the not too distant past. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 117-1
(1969) (only capital offenses, rape and sale of narcotics nonprobationable); id. § 1005-5-3(d)
(1973) (only murder, rape, armed robbery, four offenses under the Illinois Controlled Substances
Act and one under the Cannabis Control Act nonprobationable). Thus, the proposal to revive
periodic imprisonment but not probation as a sentencing option in a limited class of cases
is hardly a radical measure. Given the pace at which new nonprobationable offenses have been
created in recent years, however, it does not seem to be in tune with the times.
If a general grant of authority to impose non-incarcerative sentences were deemed unad-
visable, the General Assembly might want to consider reclassifying specific offenses so as to
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Second, the current crisis also serves as a pointed reminder that there are
limits to how many persons can be punished through commitment to prison,
as well as to how severe their prison sentences can be. Due primarily to
plea bargaining, the present system does a rather poor job of determining
who should be incarcerated and how severe of a sentence should be imposed.
Reforms needed in that area will probably increase both the number of prison
commitments and the lengths of sentences imposed in more aggravated
cases. 3 ' Moreover, as the next article in this series will argue, the present
system has not selected who should receive the most severe sentences, nor
what those sentences should be, in a fair and rational manner. Instead, the
Act's more severe penalties frequently have been imposed in a haphazard
manner on offenders who were indistinguishable from those punished far
less severely. The resulting injustice and disparity have contributed substan-
tially to prison overcrowding and will do so at ever-increasing rates without
any offsetting advantage to the public. 32 Reforms in this area may result
in reducing the number and duration of prison commitments.
Both of these observations lead to the same conclusion: If the people of
Illinois want a sentencing system that will permit a sensible differentiation
between offenders, protect the public, and still permit the DOC to function,
it is imperative that the average prison sentence be reduced significantly from
present levels.633 The most appropriate way to do this, it is submitted, is
I
allow offenders eligibility for probation. The offenses that come immediately to mind, based
in large part on the difficulties they have occasionally caused the judiciary, are: (1) Class 2
offenses committed while on probation for a class 2 offense, see People ex. rel. Carey v.
Bentivenga, 83 I1. 2d 537, 540, 416 N.E.2d 259, 261 (1981) (probation imposed where second
offense was burglary of $1.55 item); People v. Konrad, 117 11. App. 3d 555, 559, 453 N.E.2d
831, 834 (1st Dist. 1983) (trial judge originally had imposed probation in spite of statute);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3(c)(2)(F) (1983); (2) Distribution of relatively small amounts
of certain nonaddictive, nonhallucinogenic drugs, see People ex rel. Daley v. Schreier, 92 Il.
2d 271, 275, 442 N.E.2d 185, 187 (1982) (overturning probation imposed for conviction of
class X felony where trial court believed defendants only guilty of class 3 felony); People
ex rel. Daley v. Limperis, 86 Ill. 2d 459, 466, 427 N.E.2d 1212, 1215 (1981) (upholding proba-
tion imposed by trial court which found defendants guilty of class 2 felony rather than class
X felony); (3) Residential burglary, see People v. Berry, 123 Ill. App. 3d 1042, 1047, 463 N.E.2d
1044, 1048-49 (4th Dist. 1984) (appellate court defers to legislature's setting penalties); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 19-3(a) (1983); (4) Armed violence, see People v. Griswald, Ill Ill. App.
3d 454, 455-56, 444 N.E.2d 267, 268-69 (4th Dist. 1983) (noting that breadth of statute per-
mitted punishment of perjury committed by police officer while armed, as an armed violence
offense and questioning wisdom of same); People v. Alejos, 97 IIl. 2d 502, 511-13, 455 N.E.2d
48, 52-53 (1983); (concluding, contrary to a number of appellate court opinions, that armed
violence statute did not apply to voluntary manslaughter, a class I offense, for which proba-
tion is allowed); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 33A-1, 33A-2 (1983); (5) Armed robbery, see Peo-
ple v. Coleman, 78 Ill. App. 3d 989, 398 N.E.2d 185 (3d Dist. 1979) (appellate court reduced
conviction to robbery because of dissatisfaction with imposing class X penalty); ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 38, §9 18-2(a), 1005-5-3(c)(2)(c) (1983). The very length of this list is a potent argument
for a general reform.
631. See supra text accompanying notes 140-41.
632. This claim will be treated at length in the second article in this series.
633. As already noted, however, some sentences can be expected to increase. See supra text
accompanying note 631.
736 DEPA UL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:631
to lower sentencing minima and to shrink sentencing ranges in some orderly
manner.
6 34
For the sake of discussion, three alternative sentencing schedules are pro-
posed. The first, Alternative I, utilizes the regular-term minima provided
by present law but substantially reduces the present maxima. 3 The second,
Alternative II, utilizes the same reduced maxima as Alternative I and also
reduces the regular-term minima below those presently provided by law for
all but class 4 felonies. Finally, Alternative III utilizes the same regular term
minima as Alternative II but makes further reductions in regular maxima
and extended term ranges. A reformulation of penalties along such lines,636
whether or not accompanied by other suggested reforms,637 merits careful
study by the Illinois General Assembly and other interested constituencies. 36
634. These proposals will be further elaborated in the second article in this series. To briefly
summarize that discussion, it will be argued that any such reform should be accompanied by
additional measures-under either judicial or legislative sponsorship-to facilitate selection of
a presumptively appropriate type and/or length of sentence from within the range of available
alternatives. Although judges would be free to impose a sentence of a different type or length,
they would be required to state their reasons for doing so. In addition to sentencing appeals
by defendants, the state would be permitted to appeal sentences which are below the minimum
"guideline" sentence. After Davis and Cox, of course, these latter two measures would require
the approval of the Illinois Supreme Court. See supra text accompanying notes 290-324 and
369-85 (discussing Davis and Cox cases).
635. The regular and extended term sentencing ranges for Illinois' various felony classes are
set out below:
Table 6
FELONY REGULAR EXTENDED
CLASS TERM TERM
M 20-40 or 40-80
natural life
X 6-30 30-60
1 4-15 15-30
2 3-7 7-14
3 2-5 5-10
4 1-3 3-6
See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-8-1, 1005-8-2 (1983). All three proposals set out in the
text also eliminate an anomaly of present law which permits natural life sentences to be imposed
under regular term provisions for certain types of murders, but only an 80-year maximum
extended term for those same crimes. The proposals would make those natural life provisions
available only where an extended term would be warranted.
636. While none of these alternatives would need to be enacted in its entirety, it should
be noted that each has a degree of internal consistency not found in present law: the most
serious extended term penalty for a given felony class equals the most serious regular term
penalty for the next higher felony class. Such proportionality in the ranges of sanctions would
reinforce the Act's general concerns for fairness and rationality in sentencing.
637. See supra text accompanying notes 132-75, 467-507, 628-36 and infra notes 638-50. The
second article in this series will propose significant additional reforms.
638. Chief among such constituencies, of course, are the various components of the criminal
justice system most directly affected by them-prosecutorial, judicial and correctional officials.
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ALTERNATIVE I
FELONY REGULAR EXTENDED
CLASS TERM TERM
M 20-40 40-60 or
natural life
X 6-20 20-40
1 4-12 12-20
2 3-6 6-12
3 2-4 4-6
4 1-2 2-4
ALTERNATIVE II
FELONY REGULAR EXTENDED
CLASS TERM TERM
M 15-40 40-60 or
natural life
X 5-20 20-40
1 3-12 12-20
2 2-6 6-12
3 1.5-4 4-6
4 1-2 2-4
ALTERNATIVE III
FELONY REGULAR EXTENDED
CLASS TERM TERM
M 15-30 30-50 or
natural life
X 5-15 15-30
1 3-9 9-15
2 2-5 5-9
3 1.5-3 3-5
4 1-2 2-3
Finally, the issue of how to respond to Lane v. Sklodowski6" must be
faced. Presumably, the General Assembly could restore the DOC's authority
to award meritorious good-time or its equivalent. Although it has been asked
to do so, the General Assembly wisely has resisted such pleas thus far.6 "0
The use of meritorious good-time prior to the Lane case generated hostility
in prosecutorial and judicial circles and posed a danger to rational sentenc-
ing practices. An approach other than this correctional wild card should be
employed in the future.
639. 97 I11. 2d 311, 454 N.E.2d 322 (1983).
640. See Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 6, 1983, § 1, at 10, col. 1.
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A possibly fruitful alternative would be the creation of some body
(hereinafter the Authority) to devise policies for the expedited release of
inmates in certain circumstances. The Authority should have a broadly based
membership drawn from criminal justice, governmental, academic, and public
sources. In general terms, it would be empowered to act in a statutorily
defined "correctional emergency" to authorize the release of a sufficient
number of inmates pursuant to a pre-approved plan. 6 '
Such a plan would have several virtues. First, it would minimize any adverse
consequences or reactions to an early release of inmates. Second, it would
permit the development of a general consensus on the best approach to a
sensitive situation. This consensus, in turn, might prove to be a springboard
to other positive reforms. Third, it would minimize the distortion of judicial
sentencing choices. Finally, it would promote a sensitivity to the limitations
and interdependencies of the various components of the criminal justice
system. Hopefully, this sensitivity would inspire and infuse judicial or
legislative proposals in other areas of sentencing reform. 612 For all of these
reasons, the creation of the Authority seems worth pursuing.
2. Prison Discipline
The measures that would be necessary to implement the Act's structural
controls on the exercise of discretion by correctional officials are rather
straightforward. Although continued narrowing and refining of the
disciplinary regulations are desirable," 3 a more significant reform would be
to enlarge and to strengthen the PRB's oversight of the DOC's disciplinary
actions. Several measures appear necessary in that regard.64 '
The first two proposals are facilitative changes which will enable the PRB
to assert the full scope of its jurisdiction and to take effective remedial action
when necessary. First, the PRB should be provided with the staff necessary
to investigate disciplinary matters. Second, administrative law judges should
be authorized to act as hearing officers in such matters.4 ' It is unrealistic
to expect overworked PRB members to unearth any errors or improprieties
that might have arisen in earlier proceedings when the PRB must rely on
administrative records developed in DOC hearings and depend on the DOC's
own employees for support services. The changes proposed are the minimum
necessary to make effective oversight a realistic possibility.
641. This is much like a procedure currently utilized in Michigan to deal with prison
overcrowding.
642. See supra text accompanying notes 132-75 and 467-507.
643. Such efforts are underway. See supra note 561.
644. Additional measures have been proposed by others. See generally Bigman, supra note
602, at 45-50, Appendix E (recommending removal of power to revoke good-conduct credits
from PRB, abolishing mandatory supervised release, informing prisoners of PRB's guidelines
and procedures, restricting PRB by limiting number of terms Board members can serve and
mandating proportionate sexual and racial makeup of the PRB, and providing full-time counsel
to the PRB).
645. See supra text accompanying notes 618-20.
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In addition, the PRB should assert jurisdiction over disciplinary actions
involving inmates serving indeterminate as well as determinate sentences. It
clearly has this power under present law.64 In addition, the PRB should
assert and exercise its right to determine the guilt or innocence of alleged
violators, not merely the extent of their punishment. This power, too, clearly
belongs to the PRB under existing law. 64 7
Finally, the PRB should take a leading role in examining the significant
and inexplicable variations in the frequency and amount of good-conduct
revocations at different DOC institutions. 64 8 Rather than merely react on
a case-by-case basis to disciplinary matters, the PRB should attempt to
unearth the causes of disparities and to develop policies to curtail them
without sacrificing the DOC's legitimate needs. Such a pro-active role would
be far more valuable than any actions the PRB might take in individual
cases. Furthermore, such a role may result in a long-term reduction in the
PRB's own caseload as fairer, more even-handed policies are implemented.
Once again, this role seems to be within the PRB's existing authority." 9
V. CONCLUSION
The Act's efforts to structure the exercise of discretion by prosecutorial,
judicial, and correctional officials in the bargaining for, imposing, and serv-
ing of criminal sentences have been systematically ignored, subverted, or
invalidated. While remedial measures for these various shortcomings have
been proposed, one very significant issue has been addressed only briefly
and peripherally: the real-world necessity for these measures. It is at least
theoretically possible that sentences are being chosen in some fair and rational
manner consistent with the Act's purposes and substantive restrictions, even
though the structural measures designed to facilitate that result have not
functioned as intended. If that were so, this article's call for reform could
be dismissed as being of possible academic importance but of no practical
significance.
But as a succeeding article will show, precisely the opposite is true. With
the invalidation of the Act's structural controls, development of a coherent-
indeed, even a legally correct-approach to its substantive provisions has
also foundered. As a consequence, a thorough reworking of both the struc-
tural and substantive aspects of the Act is necessary in order to implement
the type of fair, rational sentencing scheme that the Illinois General Assembly
envisioned.
646. See supra text accompanying notes 604-09.
647. See supra text accompanying notes 610-17.
648. See supra text accompanying notes 596-602.
649. The PRB is authorized by statute to "review" the DOC's rules and regulations concern-
ing good-conduct credits. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1003-1-2(1), 1003-2-2(n) (1983).
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